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Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen’s Contributions to the Changing Notion of 
International Criminal Responsibility 
by 
Jason Reuven Kropsky 
 
Advisor: John Wallach 
The pure theory of law analyzes the legal normative basis of jurisprudence. According to 
its author, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), the study of law as a science can only arise once “alien 
elements” associated with sociology, politics, ethics and psychology are extracted from strict 
legal cognition. But what happens when the international sphere of law that possesses the special 
quality of holding state officials  accountable for core international crimes requires intrusion by 
extra-legal sources? Does Kelsen’s structural edifice collapse? Or is it reconstituted? In 
examining how international criminal responsibility, a test case for Kelsen’s positive law claims 
derives its legitimacy, this dissertation affirms the moral underpinnings of imputation at the 
highest level of legal cognition. The central legal concept of imputation as an otherwise “de-
personalized” or “de-psychologized” notion of responsibility under national legal conditions is 
conceptually transformed through analysis of offenses of the magnitude of crimes against 
humanity and genocide. The capacity for moral agency otherwise rejected as a term of legal 
cognition under Kelsen’s general theory of law and state, under the conditions of international 
criminal law are assumed to act on the willing state agent.  
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Through a combination of theoretical and case study analysis, I argue that critics 
misrepresent Kelsen’s position on international criminal responsibility by conflating it with a 
political realist or classical legal positivist defense of the immunizing acts of state doctrine, 
which protects state officials from prosecution by parties other than their own government. The 
advice Kelsen dispensed to US Supreme Court Justice and Nuremberg Prosecutor Robert H. 
Jackson in advance of the London International Military Tribunal (IMT) charter conference, 
demonstrates the most convincing rationale used to date in formulating the modern conception of 
individual (fault-based) responsibility in international law. While he violates his doctrinal 
commitment to the separation of law from morality in justifying international prosecution, 
Kelsen nevertheless establishes a unified description of a sphere of coercion based on the 
principle non sub homine sed sub lege (“not under man, but under law”).  
Modified to adapt to judicially adventurous opinions since 1993 with the creation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Kelsen’s dynamic analysis of 
responsibility for core international crimes remains under-studied, and hence under-valued. A 
revisionist account of Kelsen’s major writings on humanitarian law is necessary to promoting a 
theory of international criminal responsibility inspired by the democratic values of compromise, 
tolerance and relative peace. Despite his own emphatically contrary claims to purity, Kelsen’s 
legal philosophy retains an implicit commitment to moral normative values in determining 
culpability at the highest level of adjudication. His emphasis on the validity of retroactive legal 
technique, arguably his greatest contribution to the study of international criminal responsibility, 






In a way this dissertation began in Fall 2000 in West Philadelphia in the upper rows of a 
heavily populated lecture hall at the University of Pennsylvania Law School with the course Law 
and the Holocaust taught by Australian international law scholar Harry Reicher. I would be 
remiss, then, not to insist on the debt of gratitude owed to Professor Reicher, deceased in 2014, 
who permitted me to enroll in his class as an undergraduate. His intellectual guidance on matters 
related to the legal effort to exterminate European Jewry provided a series of landmark 
discussions on the perils of fascist-leaning governance. Professor Reicher arranged a veritable 
canon of jurisprudential writings related to the Holocaust, and I am especially thankful for 
Professor Reicher’s support in my initial application for doctoral study at the CUNY Graduate 
Center. 
Marshall Berman, a reader at my PhD prospectus defense in 2010, was an early, pivotal 
influence on my course of study in political theory. He taught wonderful classes on modernity in 
the Political Science department at the CUNY Graduate Center that I was fortunate to attend, 
including courses on Marxism and The Politics of Irrationality. His modernist philosophy where 
the man in the street is knocked down but gets right back up, where the force 
of humanizing creative change is far stronger than, say, Robert Moses bulldozing the Bronx, 
where the history of consciousness is towards ever greater liberation from Faustian excess, 
resonated with me. I wanted to be part of his urban adventure. His classic All That is Solid Melts 
into Air was a blueprint for how I wished to act politically in the world—alive, joyous, free. 
Marshall’s death on September 11, 2013 was indeed a doubly-sad day. 
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Throughout this dissertation process, long by the standards of doctoral study, I have 
turned for guidance to John Wallach, chair of my committee, who provided the initial impetus to 
research cases from Nuremberg to the Hague. Although this project deviates at points from its 
initial conception, I have been fortunate to have had an adviser who has supported a rather 
unconventional account of responsibility in international law focused on a critical assessment of 
the contributions of Hans Kelsen, author of the Pure Theory of Law. I am deeply indebted for his 
role as advisor, and for his willingness to continue to mentor me even during a rather extensive 
medical leave. In addition to his role as Professor of Political Science at Hunter College & The 
Graduate Center—CUNY, Professor Wallach was Founder & Chair (2010 - 2013) of the Hunter 
College Human Rights Program. 
Bruce Cronin, Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at the Colin Powell 
School for Civic and Global Leadership at the City College of New York, introduced me to 
the Basic Concepts and Theories of International Relations at the CUNY Graduate Center. In 
past years, Prof. Cronin,  my first reader, has been immensely helpful in adding me to the roster 
at City College in his role as CCNY Political Science Chair. Associate Professor of Political 
Science and Associate Director of the Center on Terrorism at John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice, Prof. Peter Romaniuk, my second reader, is also a Senior Fellow at the Global Center on 
Cooperative Security. In transitioning from full-time student of political theory to ICL 
researcher, Prof. Romaniuk has been extremely helpful in making room for me at John Jay in the 
International Criminal Justice (ICJ) program. I am grateful to both Prof. Cronin and Prof. 
Romaniuk for their constructive suggestions. 
I would also like to thank the following people for engaging conversations—and 
advice—during conference breaks, over the phone, by email, through snail correspondence, in 
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restaurants, coffee shops and apartments . Thanks especially to former International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Defense Attorney Tiphaine Dickson, former Attorney General of 
Canada Irwin Cotler, Thomas Olechowski, D.A. Jeremy Telman, Stanley Paulson, Jochen von 
Bernstorff, Jorg Kammerhofer, Drury Stevenson, Reuven Sugarman, Samuel Moyn, former 
President of Israel’s Supreme Court Aharon Barak, David Kinsella, Christopher Shortell, 
Michael P. Scharf, Joshua Felix, Utku Sezgin, Ari Solon, Monika Zalewska, Emily Amdurer, 
Joseph Bendersky, Jamie Aroosi, the late-Asher Arian, and Clemens Jabloner. Patrick Kerwin, 
Manuscript Reference Librarian in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress was 
especially helpful in retrieving key correspondence between Hans Kelsen and Supreme Court 
Justice and Nuremberg Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson. Karen Pittelman provided guidance on 
time management, encouraged me to incorporate stringent time lines, a clock set to 30-minute 
increments, and other tricks of the writing craft. Special thanks to Alyson Cole, Director of the 
Political Science Program at the CUNY Graduate Center, for her enduring support after what 
could have otherwise easily marked the end of this process in ’15. 
As this project neared completion, I received word of the passing of my closest friend, 
Saul Moshe Friedman. A scholar of symbolic currency in ancient Judea, especially 
knowledgeable in Semitic languages, Saul taught Hebrew at UC Berkeley and Syriac at the 
Jewish Theological Seminary. He introduced me to hiking, wine making, bird watching, wood 
working, mandolin and guitar, the poetry of Rilke and Celan. His wide-ranging interests 
extended to my own research—and we made it a point to hit up as many libraries as we could in 
the Hudson River Valley when Saul returned to New York from his stint in Northern California. 
The many shabbos mornings we played blocks with your son Avner now in his Bar Mitzvah 
year, the many cold nights we shared around the fire pit in the old house on Hillel Court 
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watching the stars, follows a memory path that leads all the way back to our first high school 
encounter at Torah Academy of Bergen County when you asked me who I was—and I replied to 
your amusement— “Me…well I’m a friend of Lubavitch.” 
Mom and Dad, thank you so much for all the home cooked meals and the bed to 
crash on whenever I returned to Jersey. I love you very much. My two sisters and brother, 
Alexandra, Leslie-Ann, and Lev—and my eleven wonderful nieces and nephews—I’m 
sorry I was so preoccupied that I sometimes neglected birthdays along the way.  Thank you 
to my aunts, uncles and cousins. Jacob Fine, Yakov Fleischmann, Ben Hassid, Ephi 
Stempler Joshua Bartosiewicz, and Dov Friedman, your friendships, as Ben Franklin says, is 
“the best possession.” Karim Shumaker, your help was inestimable, especially use of the 
computer lab at the Gold Beach division of Southwest Oregon Community College.  
Most of all, I thank MarVi Shumaker-Pruitt for her encouragement in life, and the home 
she’s made with me at the most westerly point in Oregon near the Cape Blanco Lighthouse. The 
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The Transatlantic Influence of Hans Kelsen 
 
I. The “Homeless Ghost” of International Criminal Law? 
 
 To political theorist Judith Shklar (1928-1992), the “homeless ghost” of law as “an 
isolated block of concepts that have no relevant characteristics or functions apart from their 
possible validity or invalidity within a hypothetical system” is exemplified by the formalism of a 
certain positive or “human-made” legal philosophical tradition: the pure theory of law.1 
 What makes pure theory a “homeless ghost,” according to Shklar, is the denial of the 
substance of norms or rules as the dominant concern of legal practitioners. Since the pure theory 
of law ignores “the content, aim, and development of the rules that compose it,”2  she insists that 
pure theory affirms that the actual application of law is a relatively predictable ordering of legal 
rules free of moral and political ideas encompassing the continuous negotiation between its 
practitioners. For Shklar, cognition of law cannot be separated from politics and morality, since 
legal application invariably follows from the ideology of legal practitioners who profess a wide 
range of moral and political convictions that impact the final articulation of legal opinions. 
Shklar's view, therefore, follows in the vein of legal realism, the dominant twentieth century 
tradition in American jurisprudence.3 
 Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), author of the pure theory of law, argues that a strict cognition 
                                                          
1“The idea of treating law as a self-contained system of norms that is 'there,' identifiable without any reference to the  
content, aim, and development of the rules that compose it, is the very essence of formalism...It consists...in treating  
law as an isolated block of concepts that have no relevant characteristics or functions apart from their possible  
validity or invalidity within a hypothetical system. But what aim is served by this 'homeless ghost'?” Judith Shklar,  
Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 33-34. 
2Ibid. 
3See: D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law in the Land of Legal Realists, in 




of positive legal norms insures that certain ideological interests do not prejudice our 
understanding of the legal cognition of imputable subjects, in accordance with momentary moral 
or political appeals.  Thus, the normative legal realm is predicated on generally prospective terms 
of cognition, rather than, for example, a series of seemingly arbitrary decisions that have not yet 
already been expressed legislatively, customarily, through judicial decisions, or, in the 
international sphere, by the particular means of ratified treaties. The concept of the coercive or 
legal norms, Kelsen argues in opposition to Shklar and the realist tradition, is the reason there is 
a distinct sphere of cognition denominated “jurisprudence”. 
Nevertheless, while Shklar succeeds in demonstrating some of the failings of formalism, 
including an over-veneration for rule-following that impedes justice, she is wrong to claim that 
Kelsen's philosophy does not incorporate consideration of the “content, aim and the development 
of the rules.” One example alone should suffice: the “crimes” committed by Nazis. According to 
Kelsen, core international crimes deserved punishment, in spite of the fact that no laws existed to 
penalize individual (fault-based) humanitarian offenses at the time they were committed.4 Given 
the abject nature of Nazi offenses, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in 
1945-46 necessitated the application of a criterion of justice that may be described as “extra-
legal”. Even though Kelsen criticized various procedural faults of the IMT prosecution,5 he 
                                                          
4 This point is thoroughly documented in chapter two. 
5 “[The London Agreement’s] greatest merit is that it puts into force the idea of individual criminal responsibility for  
violations of international law and thus improves—though not in general but for some particular cases—the  
primitive technique of general international law with its collective responsibility. But, at the same time, the London  
Agreement authorizes the International Military Tribunal to declare ‘groups or organizations’ as criminal, and  
confers upon the competent national authorities of any signatory ‘the right to bring individuals to trial for  
membership therein before national military or occupation courts.’ That means that an individual may be subjected  
to a criminal sanction not because he, by his own behavior, committed a crime, but because he belonged to an  
association declared as criminal. That means collective responsibility.” Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the  
Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent,” International Law Quarterly 153, no. 1(2) (1947) in Perspectives on the  
Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 285. On this count, Kelsen  
opposes the imputation of criminality to any organization or group, and argues that the Nuremberg IMT especially  
superseded its discretionary authority. The tribunal’s claim that “criminal guilt is personal, and that mass  
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nevertheless remained unwavering in his support for the validity of the proceedings6.  
Contravention of the continental European maxim Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege 
poenali (Latin, "[There exists] no crime [and] no punishment without a pre-existing penal law 
                                                          
punishments should be avoided” does not obviate the fact that “if satisfied of the criminal guilt of any organization  
or group, this tribunal should not hesitate to declare it to be criminal because the theory of ‘group criminality is  
new, or because it might be unjustly applied by some subsequent tribunals.’” See: Trial of the Major War Criminals 
BeforeThe International Military Tribunal 12 (1947), 256 in M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Evolution and 
Contemporary Application (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 491. Kelsen’s commitment to 
individual responsibility is no more apparent than here where he claims that “these provisions constitute a 
regrettable regress to the backward technique of collective criminal responsibility, in open contradiction to the 
progress made by the [London] Agreement in establishing the opposite principle in its provisions…” Kelsen, 
“Precedent,” 285. Quincy Wright, a naturalist who assumed a significant role as Robert Jackson’s legal advisor in 
the drafting of the IMT charter, like Kelsen opposed “guilt by association” on the grounds that “advanced systems of 
criminal law accept the principle that guilt is personal. Guilt is established by evidence that the acts and intentions of 
the individual were criminal.” Quincy Wright, “International Law and Guilt by Association,” American Journal of 
International Law 43, no. 4 (1947): 746-747. Wright further comments that “criminal responsibility is based upon 
psychological considerations and ought therefore to be a responsibility only of individuals. We should, therefore, 
recognize that the individual is criminally responsible when he commits an act which is an offense against the law of 
nations, and that a state cannot cover such an act with a blanket immunity if it is itself under an international 
obligation.” Ibid., 748-749. Wright deviates from Kelsen’s argument (see: chapter three) that the judgment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal was authorized by the IMT charter at London on August 8, 1945, not preexistent laws  
putatively criminalizing core international offenses, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In this respect, the idea that  
the individual is criminally sanctionable based on an “international obligation” at the time of the offense is incorrect  
from a Kelsenian standpoint. Nevertheless, Kelsen and Wright are in agreement with respect to the problem of “guilt  
by association,” which reflects “primitive” and “politicized” judgment under autocratic rule. How Kelsen establishes  
individual criminal responsibility based on the immorality of the offense without also acknowledging “fair warning”  
principles, must mean either that Kelsen presumes (a) the authority of ICL courts to hold individuals responsible  
while maintaining the primacy of the power of legal norms of the national legal order (or “state”) in the regulation of  
behavior beyond the capacity of the individual to choose between “right” and “wrong” with respect to offenses of  
the magnitude of crimes against humanity and genocide, or else (b) Kelsen acknowledges an intrinsic moral quality  
that reflects “agency” even under a positive legal structuring like the pure theory of law that otherwise excludes the  
psychological and moral motivations of the individual from legal cognition. 
6 Despite endorsing the ad hoc and retroactive judgment of the IMT prosecution at Nuremberg, Kelsen was vocal in 
his commitment to the ideal of a neutral court based on his model for a permanent compulsory international court 
adjudicating core international crimes. He writes, “If the principle applied in the Nuremberg trial were to become a 
precedent—a legislative rather than a judicial precedent—then, after the next war, the governments of the victorious 
States would try members of the governments of the vanquished States for having committed crimes determined 
unilaterally and with retroactive force by the former. Let us hope there is no precedent.”  Kelsen, “Precedent,” 289. 
As with Kelsen’s decision to embrace a higher principle of justice—“principles of civilization”—as the legal reason 
for why major Nazi war criminals ought to be punished, the author of the pure theory of law recognizes that the 
moral foundation of ICR animates an institutional goal reflecting Kelsen’s core concern: the modern legal 
description of imputation as pertains to individual responsibility. Rather than adhering to the principle of legality 
rule against ex post facto lawmaking, Kelsen endorses this exceptional methodology, especially in prosecution of 
core international crimes, despite reservations, and therefore any argument propounded by Kelsen suggesting that he 
does not endorse retrospective laws, in adherence of a strict construction of acts of state provisions, is necessarily 
unwarranted. For a higher order account of Kelsen’s position on the legitimacy of the trial, see: Hans Kelsen, “The 




[appertaining]")7 does not prove the violation of positive law precepts, Kelsen insists, since the 
principle of non-retroactivity itself licenses exceptions. Furthermore, since there is no general 
principle of international law that prohibits retroactive laws, Kelsen endorses this highly 
irregular approach as a positive law claim to validity.  
Given that the individual was not subject to penalizing norms for core international 
crimes prior to the Nuremberg proceedings, Kelsen’s account of ex post facto lawmaking as a 
valid methodological choice affirms the actual pattern of ICL in following a retroactive logic. 
The effort to insure the valid application of international law in the adjudication of humanitarian 
crimes by separating law from morality (“the separation thesis”), a key tenet of legal positivism,8 
however, is contravened by the function of international legal theorists and practitioners 
throughout the history of ICL in establishing a criterion for  “principles of humanity” (or 
“principles of civilization” in the Kelsenian lexicon), as well as other adventurous, if retroactive, 
morally-laden methodological means to shore up gaps in the law. The problem of the relationship 
between time and culpability persists throughout the history of this discipline—and Kelsen’s 
legal philosophy helps “structure” a valuable conception of agency amidst the imposition of new, 
if retroactive, standards of legality.  
This dissertation highlights the dissonance between Kelsen’s efforts to define ICR in 
accordance with a strictly legal positivist doctrine while readily promoting moral principles 
traditionally associated with the school of natural law. This is especially the case when the “legal 
                                                          
7See generally: Beth Van Schaack “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and 
Morals,” Georgetown Law Journal  97 (2008): 119-192.; See generally: Jerome Hall, General Principles of 
Criminal Law (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947), 35-64. 
8 See generally: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” last modified January 3, 2003, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. Chapter two provides an extensive appeal to the major legal  




subject,” who is otherwise generally reduced in Kelsen’s particular vocabulary to a fictional 
personification of a “bundle of legal norms,” as imputed “rights” and “duties” in accordance with 
the “de-personalized” or “de-psychologized” account of “law,” is recreated as a point of 
imputation (or responsibility) invested with “personal” or “psychological” characteristics. When 
no future-oriented guide to sanctioned conduct exists, Kelsen nevertheless argues that state 
officials retain the capacity to make moral choices, which reaffirm “principles of 
civilization/humanity” or “principles of tolerance”. The particular meaning of these principles, 
and their implications for Kelsen’s general moral conception, must be bracketed until the 
conclusion, chapter six. After assessing both the philosophical value of Kelsen’s contributions to 
the pure theoretical cognition of ICR (chapter 2), this investigation draws on empirical evidence 
to demonstrate the progressive confluence between Kelsen’s contributions to the study of ICR 
and the advancement of this institution through case study analysis of the pure theoretical 
methodology applied to three stages of ICL history (chapters 3-5). 
In foreshadowing the construction of an international criminal court as early as 1944 with 
his design for a permanent compulsory international court adjudicating both matters between 
states and individual criminal violations of international law, Kelsen blueprints a system of 
adjudication, which, despite its post-modern fragmentation, has nevertheless succeeded in 
operationalizing an International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. Even under contemporary 
ad hoc conditions, Kelsen’s writings continue to benefit those who value a designated criterion 
of validity. Why, then, did the author of the pure theory of law, the object of Shklar’s polemic, 
argue for the merit of this highly irregular methodology, if not to state his unequivocal 
recognition of the moral source animating positive legal claims at the highest level of 
imputation?  Does his express introduction of moral standards (i.e., “principles of civilization”) 
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not obviate his commitment to strictly positive legal analysis? Or is there another way to 
reconcile the positivity of ICR with a changing moral cognition sharing democratic-affinities 
with, for example, Roscoe Pound’s legal sociology?9 Is there a way to reimagine, as an emerging 
group of Kelsen scholars have, the moral-normative core of the pure theoretical philosophy, one 
that points to an explanation for Kelsen’s “extra-legal” resort to moral terms as justification for 
ICL prosecution? The placement of Kelsen within the relativist/absolutist moral continuum, 
however, is postponed until the concluding chapter—six.  
This dissertation consequently embarks on a three-fold quest: (a) to distinguish the pure 
theory of law as the most consistent positive or human made legal articulation of a valid 
international law system adjudicating humanitarian crimes, (b) to demonstrate how even the 
strictest positive theoretical application of ICL ends up incorporating morality, albeit through 
formal, legal means, and (c) to show how legal practitioners engaged Kelsen's philosophy of 
international criminal responsibility beginning with US Supreme Court Justice Robert H. 
Jackson. Even before he assumed his assignment as chief US prosecutor at the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, Jackson was instrumental in incorporating Kelsen's 
definition of ICR in Jackson’s other seminal role as US representative at the London IMT 
Charter Conference from June 26-August 8, 1945.10 The next section considers Kelsen’s direct 
role in helping to establish the definition of individual criminal responsibility in international law 
prior to the constitution of this new (fault-based) system of adjudication. 
 While many of the points made here resurface in subsequent chapters, this introductory 
account emphasizes biographical notes (section II), a general overview of the philosophy of ICR 
                                                          
9 For a general overview of Roscoe Pound’s description of “civilization, see his commentary on jural postulates in 
Roscoe Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), 
168, 179, 183-184. 
10 This point will be expanded upon in the biographical notes (section II). 
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in the context of ICL history (section III), and a chapter-by-chapter outline reaffirming the 
general methodological application of an historicized-account of the pure theory of law (section 
IV). While Kelsen's own students in his “Viennese Circle of Legal Positivists,”11 such as Alfred 
Verdross (1890-1980), later turned to a medieval scholastic interpretation of international 
criminal responsibility based on the naturalist concept of jus cogens,12 and Hersch Lauterpacht 
(1897-1960), a judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to a neo-Grotian view of ICR,13 
Kelsen claimed an express commitment to a thoroughly positive law notion of ICR. Is this even 
possible? If it is not, why is it not? And what are its implications for the general understanding of 
the relationship between law, politics and morality from the perspective of the test case of 
international criminal law? 
II:  Biographical Notes 
According to legal theorist W.B. Stern in a 1936 issue of The American Political Science 
Review, “Among legal philosophers the time-honored dispute between natural law schools and 
legal positivists arouses ever new interest. On the side of the positivists, the 'pure theory of law' 
gains more and more ground.”14 
 Stern laments that, in contrast to the favorable reception that the pure theory of law 
received in continental European circles, no American publication took account of its author 
Hans Kelsen's book, Reine Rechtslehre (1934), or The Pure Theory of Law, translated into 
                                                          
11Clemens Jabloner, “Kelsen and his Circle: The Viennese Years,” European Journal of International Law 9 (1998):  
368-385, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/9/2/1496.pdf. 
12Jus cogens (from Latin: compelling law; English: peremptory norm) refers “to certain fundamental, overriding  
Principles of international law, from which no derogation is ever permitted,” Legal Information Institute, “Jus  
Cogens, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens. 
13See: Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law  
23, no. 1 (1946). 




English in 1967. Kelsen’s project aimed at “cognition focused on the law alone,”15 separating out 
political ideology and moralizing, as well as methodologies that reduced the law to natural or 
social scientific study.16 In its purity Kelsen’s approach aimed to validate and unify national and 
international legal orders on grounds that accounted for positive law free of ‘alien elements’. 
Other methods of evaluation structurally distinguishable from jurisprudence, including ethics, 
sociology, political science and psychology, according to Kelsen, introduced categorically 
separate objects of cognition. In introducing ‘alien elements’ into the study of law, the so-called 
jurisprude violates cognition within a delineated “coercively-authorized” frame, No matter the 
ultimate merit—or even consistency—of such an approach, Kelsen’s study of imputation or the 
“de-personalized” or “de-psychologized” notion of responsibility provides relatively neutral 
ground in which to evaluate the object of this thesis: theoretical and practical implications of a 
pure theoretical conception of international criminal responsibility. 
 Kelsen, an Austrian-Jewish17 refugee who arrived on North American shores in 1939 at 
the age of 58, was mainly overlooked in his adopted country. A 2014 interdisciplinary conference 
entitled “Hans Kelsen in America” aimed to “explor[e] the reasons for Kelsen’s lack of influence 
in the United States, and proposed ways in which Kelsen’s approach to legal, political and 
international relations theory could be relevant to current debates in the U.S. academy in those 
areas.”18 The biographical notes on Kelsen are not merely of passing interest. Much can be 
                                                          
15 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), 7. 
16 Andrei Marmor. "The Pure Theory of Law,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/. 
17 Although twice-converted, first in 1905 to Catholicism, and, again, in 1912 to Lutheranism, after the Second 
World War Kelsen affirmed his personal identity as a Jew. According to legal scholar Reut Yael Paz, Kelsen 
“confess[ed], for instance, in 1932 that ‘Eretz Israel is my miserable love’. After his immigration to the United 
States, Kelsen considered himself a Jew.”  Reut Yael Paz, “Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law as ‘a Hole in Time’, 
Monde(s) 1, no. 7 (2015), 89. See also: Nathan Feinberg, “Hans Kelsen Veyaado” in Massot Besheelot Hazman 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Publishing HouseThe Hebrew University, 1973). 
18Proceedings of Interdisciplinary Conference: Kelsen in America, Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago, Illinois,  
June 2014. http://www.valpo.edu/law/kelsen-in-america.  The Chicago conference, organized by Valparaiso Law  
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learned in chronicling, for example, the opposition of natural law philosopher Lon Fuller to Hans 
Kelsen's legal philosophy, since Fuller represented a major force in modern natural law theory. 
Although Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound supported Kelsen in his quest for U.S. 
employment, there remains doubt as to whether Fuller may have directly opposed Kelsen's 
nomination to the Harvard Law School faculty,19 of which Fuller was a member. Such an 
appointment likely would have meant a far more influential role for Kelsen within the U.S. legal 
academy. After a very prominent European career, Kelsen, generally ignored in American legal 
                                                          
School Dean Jeremy Telman, included leading experts in Weimar studies, including historians Peter Caldwell and  
William Scheuermann; legal theorists Scott Shapiro and Brian Leiter; and some of the foremost Kelsen scholars  
worldwide, including Jochen von Bernstorff, Jorg Kammerhoffer, Clemens Jabloner and Thomas Olechowski, the  
latter two, co-directors of the Hans Kelsen Institute-Vienna. Notably absent, however, was the “Dean of North  
American Kelsen Studies,” Stanley Paulson.  At the September 27-29, 2018 IVR German-section Freiburg  
conference on Kelsen where nearly three hundred scholars from four continents and twenty-eight countries gathered  
to discuss “Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Conceptions and Misconceptions,” Telman presented on Kelsen’s  
views of judicial interpretation. While his IVR presentation could not be integrated into the present study outside of  
a few brief remarks, Telman affirms a Kelsenian “free law” interpretation similar to views expressed in the present  
project, especially in chapter five. See: Jeremy Telman, “Problems of Translation and Interpretation: A Kelsenian   
Commentary on Positivist Originalism” (paper presented at the Annual IVR German Section Conference, Freiburg,  
Germany, September 29, 2018. The second largest contingent of Kelsen scholars represented at the Freiburg IVR, it  
should be noted, were from Brazil, mostly from Sao Paulo, where Kelsen has assumed a central place in  
jurisprudential study. See: Carlos Eduardo de Abreu Boucault, “Hans Kelsen - A Recepção da "Teoria Pura" na  
América do Sul, Particularmente no Brasil,” Sequência (Florianópolis) no.71 (July/Dec. 2015),  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2015v36n71. Boucalt notes the widespread reception of Kelsen’s writings  
throughout Latin America, including Uruguay, Colombia, Argentina and Brazil in “Hans Kelsen - The Reception of  
‘Pure Theory’ in South America, Particularly in Brazil“. 
19 The Russian-trained scholar of international law, George Mazur, is confident that Fuller opposed Kelsen’s 
appointment. In an email correspondence with Kelsen scholar Jeremy Telman on November 12, 2018, Telman 
writes: “I talked with Fred Schauer about this.  I have no information about this issue.  George Mazur is convinced 
that Fuller blackballed Kelsen and made sure that he not only did not get a position at Harvard but could not get a 
position anywhere.  I cannot discount that possibility, but there are so many other reasons why Kelsen could not land 
a position, I am not inclined to accept George's theory when there is no evidence.” Frederick Schauer of the 
University of Virginia, a leading constitutional law expert, does not see proof of Fuller’s effort to prevent Kelsen 
from obtaining work at Harvard, which, in any event, he claims, cannot be determined insofar as Harvard continues 
to embargo documents that could shed light on this relationship. See: Frederick Schauer, “Fuller on Kelsen; Fuller 
and Kelsen” (paper presented at the Annual IVR German Section Conference, Freiburg, Germany, September 28, 
2018. For evidence that Fuller merely took a critical position but did not work to block Kelsen’s appointment, 
Nicola Lacey references a letter from Fuller to Dean Paul William Brosman of Tulane University “recommending” 
Kelsen: ‘I have found Kelsen very stimulating as a colleague. He is conversationally very entertaining, and not at all 
the heavy Teutonic type of scholar. His lectures have been pretty abstract, and I’m afraid most of our men got little 
out of them. His English is quite good now, and, though there are slips in idiom, is easy to understand.” See: “Letter 
from Fuller to Dean Paul William Brosman, Tulane University of Louisiana College of Law, January 10th 1942; The 
Papers of Lon Fuller, Harvard Law School Library, box 2, folder 1 in Nicola Lacey “Out of the ‘Witches’ 
Cauldron’?: Reinterpreting the Context and Re-assessing the Significance of the Hart-Fuller Debate,” London 
School of Economic: Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 18/2008, 11. 
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circles with no school of law offering full time appointment to the recent émigré, assumed a 
position as a political science instructor at the University of California-Berkeley in 1942.20 In a 
1948-49 issue of The Journal of Legal Education. Fuller wrote: 
 
I share the opinion of Jerome Hall21...that jurisprudence should start with justice. I place 
this preference not on  exhortatory grounds, but on a belief that until one has wrestled 
with the problem of justice one cannot truly understand the other issues of jurisprudence. 
Kelsen, for example, excludes justice from his studies (of practical law) because it is an 
'irrational ideal' and therefore 'not subject to cognition.' The whole structure of his theory 
derives from that exclusion. The meaning of his theory can therefore be understood only 
when we have subjected to critical scrutiny its keystone of negation.22 
 
 
 But is this a correct assessment of Kelsen's contributions to the study of justice?  Fuller, 
who would later engage in one of the most notable debates in legal theory in the twentieth 
century with HLA Hart, in which Fuller argues against Hart's division between law as it is and 
law as it should be,23 would have gained from a sustained encounter with Kelsen. While it is 
certainly true that Kelsen's legal philosophical project considers “justice an 'irrational ideal' and 
therefore 'not subject to  (legal) cognition',” it is Kelsen rather than Fuller who engages in a 
comprehensive account of the legal basis for the 1945-46 International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
                                                          
20 See especially: D.A. Jeremy Telman, “The Reception of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory in the United States: A 
Sociological Model, Law Faculty Publication, Paper 7 (January 2008), http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs/7.; 
D.A. Jeremy Telman, “A Path Not Taken: Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law in the Land of Legal Realists” in Hans 
Kelsen Anderswo/Hans Kelsen Abroad, eds. Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner and Klaus Zeleny (Manz: 
Schriftenreihe Des Hans Kelsen-Instituts, 2010), 
https://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=law_fac_pubs 
21Jerome Hall, an authority on American criminal justice and jurisprudence, provides a thorough account of this 
principle. Chapter two revisits Hall’s writings on retroactivity with respect to the distinction made between what 
Roscoe Pound refers to as “the humanitarian path” and “the totalitarian path.”  See: Jerome Hall, General Principles 
of Criminal Law (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960); Roscoe Pound, New Paths of the Law: First Lectures in the 
Roscoe Pound Lectureship Series (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2006). 
22Lon Fuller, “The Places and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum,” Journal of Legal Education 1,  
no.4, (1949): 496. 
23 H.LA. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 (1958): 593-629;  




of major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. 24 His numerous publications devoted to the 
interpretation of criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity—the core international criminal law (ICL) charges at the creation of the modern ICL 
“system” at Nuremberg—suggests the extent of Kelsen's concern for justice. Unlike John 
Austin’s nineteenth century command theory, and Hart’s neo-positivist critique of Austin a 
century later, Kelsen’s positive law approach provides comprehensive justification of 
international law as a valid “system” of legal norms providing for collective and individual 
responsibility.25 His early influence on the ICL system, for instance, has been documented with 
respect to the inauguration of the quasi-constitutional IMT Charter.26 The exact route that Kelsen 
took from exclusion within the confines of the American legal establishment to a leading, if 
generally unacknowledged, role in outlining United Nations (UN) legal philosophy, as well as in 
establishing international criminalization of heads-of-state and other state officials post-WWII, 
can only be briefly retold. 
US Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief US prosecutor at the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, stated in a July 5, 1945 memorandum addressed to 
members within the Office of the US Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality—
                                                          
24 See: Hans Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the  
Punishment of War Criminals," California Law Review 31, no. 5 (December 1943): 530-71.; Hans Kelsen, Peace  
through Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).; Hans Kelsen, "Will the Judgment in the  
Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guenael  
Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 274-89.; Hans Kelsen. The Judge Advocate Journal 2, no. 3 No.  
3 (Fall-Winter 1945): 8-13.; Hans Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in  
International Law,” Jewish Yearbook of International Law 226 (1948): 226-239. 
25 See: John Austin. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).; John Austin, Robert Campbell, and Sarah Austin. Lectures on Jurisprudence; Or, 
The Philosophy of Positive Law (London: J. Murray, 1885).; Hart, HLA. Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1961). 
26 Guénaël Mettraux, "Judicial Inheritance: The Value and Significance of the Nuremberg Trial to Contemporary 
War Crimes Tribunals,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 599-617. 
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Sidney Alderman, Francis Shea and Colonel Murray C. Bernays27—that “Hans Kelsen is worried 
over the absence of any international law on the subject of individual responsibility. He thinks a 
definite declaration is essential. I think it may be desirable.”28  
In commenting on Jackson’s report to President Harry S. Truman29 in preparation for the 
London IMT Charter conference, where Jackson served as chief-US delegate, Kelsen was 
adamant that a distinction be made between newly authorized treaties retroactively determining 
ICR and the assumption of an already-criminalized designation of responsibility in advance of 
the August 8, 1945 ratification of the London Charter. To assume that the law had already been 
created when only collective forms of responsibility applicable to states were part of the 
international legal lexicon, Kelsen maintained, threatened the legitimacy of this newly-
constituted ICL authority. In distinguishing between what Jackson believed to be “desirable” and 
Kelsen’s view of the “essential” effort to declare individual responsibility, Jackson frames the 
debate over what is preferable or recommendable against what is vital or indispensable.  
Before concluding the memo with the words, “I think it may be worth including to stop 
                                                          
27 The connection of Murray Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew through marriage, to Kelsen, an old Viennese friend 
of Freud’s, is yet to be explored. But as with other transatlantic connections, it is necessary to account for the small 
circle of scholars working on war crimes issues from both sides of the Atlantic. “Murray Bernays, Lawyer, Dead; 
Set Nuremberg Trials,” New York Times, September 22, 1970, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/22/archives/murray-bernays-lawyer-dead-set-nuremberg-trials-format.html. The 
subject heading of Bernays, July 6, 1945 memorandum to Justice Jackson read “Kelsen Recommendation for 
Declaration of Individual Responsibility.” In referencing Jackson’s July 5th response to Kelsen’s advice, Bernays 
writes: “Professor Kelsen was formulating language in the abstract.” Bernays recommends renumbering paragraphs 
in the U.S. 30 June Annex to read: “Individuals who have committed, instigated, been responsible for, or taken a 
consenting part in acts in violation of International Law as declared by this instrument shall be subject to trial and 
punishment thereof.” This he suggests could be “tie[d] in…under the general heading “Substantive Provisions for 
Liability and Defense.” Clearly Kelsen had made a mark on the original “substantive” conception of individual 
responsibility in international criminal law. Murray Bernays, “Memorandum to Mr. Justice Jackson: Kelsen 
Recommendation for Declaration of Individual Responsibility,” July 6, 1945, email correspondence with Patrick 
Kerwin, Manuscript Reference Librarian, Library of Congress, August 26, 2014.  
28 Hans Kelsen, ‘Report’ untiled text by typewriter, ‘Robert Houghwout Jackson Papers in the Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. in Monica Garcia Salmones-Rovira, The Project of 




the argument about whether the law does so provide,”30 Jackson references Kelsen’s definition 
that: 
Persons who, acting in the service of any state (of one of the Axis powers) or on their 
own initiative, have performed acts by which any rule of general or particular 
international law forbidding the use of force, or any rule concerning warfare, or the 
generally accepted rules of humanity have been violated, as well as persons who have 
been members of voluntary organizations whose criminal character has been established 
by the court, may be held individually responsible for these acts or for membership in 
such organizations and brought to trial and punishment before the court. 31 
 
The final text of the IMT Charter corresponds directly with Kelsen’s definition of 
individual culpability in ICL. As international law scholar Mónica García-Salmones Rovira 
indicates: 
  
Kelsen’s hand is clearly visible in respect of the issue of ‘individual responsibility’. The 
final text (Article 6) used a very similar formulation to that proposed by Kelsen in his 
report, which Jackson later recommended. The legal point about the individual criminal 
responsibility of members of the Nazi government appears sufficiently clear: that 
‘persons’, who had committed any of the three crimes defined in the article (i.e., crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity), as ‘individuals or as members of 
organizations’ acting in the interests of a state (Kelsen suggested ‘in the service of any 
state’) and within which countries, ‘Axis countries’ (Kelsen, ‘of any state (of one of the 
Axis powers)’) will be held ‘individually responsible.” 32 
 
Rovira writes that “[J]udging from the documents kept among Jackson’s papers from the 
period before and immediately after WWII, it appears that the advice given by Hans Kelsen 
caused individual criminal responsibility to become part of international law, and that, therefore, 
it is thanks to him that international law could be efficiently employed during the Nuremberg 
Trials.”33 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 365. 
33 Ibid, 364. 
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While Rovira's claims tend to be overstated, given Jackson's indebtedness to other leading 
scholars of the day, including Kelsen's disciple, Hersch Lauterpacht, who, according to Jackson's 
son, William, was instrumental in defining Article 6 of the IMT charter  (i.e., the definitions of 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity),34Harvard criminologist Sheldon 
Glueck, whose writings licensed a novel common law approach to ICL,35 or Jackson’s legal 
advisor, Quincy Wright36, an adherent of the natural law tradition, she is nevertheless correct in 
pointing to Kelsen's contributions as a spur towards greater positive law emphasis on individual 
(fault-based) culpability within a sphere that had traditionally conceived of the state as the lone 
subject of international law. Rovira states that due to his stature as “one of the world’s most 
renowned legal theorists…particularly noted for his defence of the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility in international law,” it only makes sense that “Jackson and, more 
generally the American executive turned to him for advice from 1942 onwards…and specifically 
asked him to advise on the preparation of the American draft for the London Charter.”37  
 Many of the most prominent scholars of public international law in the twentieth century, 
including Lauterpacht, Josef Laurenz Kunz38 and Alfred Verdross3940 were disciples of Kelsen’s. 
                                                          
34 See: Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
35Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals, Their Prosecution & Punishment (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1944).; Sheldon 
Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946). 
36 See generally: Quincy Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Judgment,” American Journal of International Law 
42, no. 1 (January 1947).; On Wright’s criticism of the legal positivist basis of the Nuremberg proceedings, see: 
Quincy Wright, “ Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Trial,” American Journal of International Law, 42, no 2 
(1948). 
37 Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law, 365-366. 
38 For Kunz’s most comprehensive assessment of pure theory in relation to international law, see: Josef Laurenz 
Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations: Essays on International Law (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).  
39The Vienna School of Jurisprudence established in the intermezzo between WWI and WWII as a counter to the 
dominant 19th century state-centric Hegelian trend in central European international legal theory was inspired by 
pure theory. See: Clemens Jabloner, "The European Tradition in International Law: Hans Kelsen. Kelsen and His  
Circle: The Viennese Years." European Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (1998): 368-85.  
40Javier Trevino writes in the introduction to an updated edition of Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State that  
“we would do well to consider the juridical principles put forth by the most important legal theorist of the twentieth  
century, in endeavoring to achieve a genuine and enduring peace in the world of the twentieth century.” See: Hans  
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Hans Morgenthau, author of the political realist classic Politics among Nations,41 received 
substantial support from Kelsen on his 1934 habilitation dissertation.42 Morgenthau dedicated an 
anthology of his writings to Kelsen, who he wrote “has taught us through his example how to 
speak Truth to Power.”43 Another former student, political realist John Herz, who championed 
the notion of the “security dilemma,”44 co-authored a critical introductory account of 
international justice with Kelsen soon after the latter’s arrival in the United States.45 Former dean 
of Harvard Law School Roscoe Pound stated that “Kelsen is the leading jurist of our time.”46 
While HLA Hart, whose concept of the law has often been cited as having been influenced by 
                                                          
Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2009), Introduction. Kelsen's influence 
on the theory of public international law is reflected in a 1998 issue of the European Journal of International Law  
devoted to Kelsen’s writings. See: Clemens Leben, "The European Tradition in International Law: Hans Kelsen and  
the Advancement of International Law." European Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (1998): 287-305; Danilo  
Zolo, "Hans Kelsen.: International Peace through International Law." European Journal of International Law 9, no.  
2 (1998): 306-24.; Francois Rigaux, "The European Tradition in International Law: Hans Kelsen. Hans Kelsen on  
International Law," European Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (1998): 325-43.; Carty, Anthony. "The  
Continuing Influence of Kelsen on the General Perception of the Discipline of International Law." European Journal  
of International Law 9, no. 2 (1998): 344-54. 
41 Hans J.  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967). 
42According to Kelsen biographer, Rudolf A. Metall, Hans Kelsen: Leben und Werk (Wien, 1969), 64 in Christoph 
Frei, Hans Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 2001), 49,  
Morgenthau was especially indebted to Kelsen for advocating on his behalf during a contentious defense of his  
habilitation dissertation, “If it had not been for Kelsen, my academic career would probably have come to a very  
premature end.” Morgenthau, Johnson Interview, HJM B2-08 in Frei, Hans Morgenthau, 49. See also: Hans  
Morgenthau, La Réalité des normes en particulier des normes du droit international: Fondements d'une théorie des  
normes, (Paris: Alcan, 1934) or The Reality of Norms and in Particular the Norms of International Law:  
Foundations of a Theory of Norms has yet to be translated into English. From Hans Kelsen’s evaluation, 15  
February 1934-HJM B65: “It augurs well for the seriousness and vigor of Herr Morgenthau’s scholarly effort that he  
chose what may be the most difficult problem in normative theory. And he has tackled this problem not only with  
outstanding knowledge of the extensive literature, not only with the deepest insight into the many related questions,  
but also with great independence and thoroughly original ideas. This study demonstrates Herr Morgenthau to be one  
of the rare minds that may have something important to contribute to an exact science of jurisprudence.” Frei, Hans  
Morgenthau, 49. 
43 Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970) in William E.   
Scheuerman, Morgenthau (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 230. 
44 See generally: John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1951). Herz describes the “security dilemma” as “a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look 
after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own 
measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening," Herz, Political Realism and Political 
Idealism, 157. 
45 Hans Kelsen and John H. Herz, “Essential Conditions of International Justice,” Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969), Vol. 35 (APRIL 24-26, 1941): 70-98. 




Kelsen's early attack on the foundations of classical legal positivism, remarked that he is "the 
most stimulating writer on analytical jurisprudence of our day."47 
Kelsen’s integrity extends to his support of Carl Schmitt’s candidacy for a law faculty 
position at the University of Cologne, despite Schmitt’s highly offensive previous attacks on 
Kelsen, and Schmitt’s soon-to-be decision to remain the only member of the Cologne faculty not 
to sign a letter in support of Kelsen, who had been targeted at the time of the Nazi seizure of 
power. Both the debate between Kelsen and Schmitt over “who rules?” that embodied the 
Weimar constitutional crisis, wherein Schmitt vested power in the executive branch, while 
Kelsen argued for the final authority of a judiciary with the right of constitutional review, and the 
general account of Schmitt’s offenses as “crown jurist of Nazism,” which warranted his 
investigation for war crimes by US prosecutor Robert Kempner in 1947,48 indicates an 
inextricable division between Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s distinct legal philosophies. The first 
devised a legal philosophy whose purpose was particularly amenable to fascist governance; the 
latter produced a legal philosophy that he called “science,” which correlated with democratic 
“principles of tolerance”. Schmitt’s embrace of Kelsen’s prospectively-designated defense of the 
acts of state doctrine (AoSD) as a weapon against allied prosecution,  though certainly an act of 
“bad faith,” points however to the stature that Kelsen had assumed in the legal philosophical 
world in 1946 even amongst his foremost critics. 
Kelsen's major professional achievements consisted of his role as legal advisor to the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister of War during the First World War; authorship of the 1920 Austrian 
Republican Constitution; professor of state and administrative law at the University of Vienna 
                                                          
47 Stanley L. Paulson, "The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law," Oxford Journal of Legal  
Studies 12, no. 3 (1992), 311. 
48 Schmitt was a potential defendant in subsequent Nuremberg trials under Control Council Law No. 10. See: Joseph 
W. Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg,” Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 72 (1987). 
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between 1919 and 1929; constitutional court judge in Vienna beginning in 1920 and ending in 
1930; professor from 1930 to 1933 at the University of Cologne until his removal by the Nazis; 
international law professor from 1934-1940 at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 
Geneva, Switzerland; keynote at the 1940 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectureship at Harvard 
University (later published as Law and Peace in International Relations [1942]); an assignment 
with the Office of Wartime Economic Affair’s Liberated Areas Division in Washington D.C. in 
1944; legal advisor, albeit in an unofficial, if highly impactful, capacity, to delegates at the 
United Nations conference in San Francisco that helped frame a new international system; 
consultant to the US War Crimes Commission in 1946. His commentary on the new international 
organization culminated in the 1950 publication, The Laws of the United Nations. 
In 1952, Kelsen completed Principles of International Law, which drew on his many 
years of research in the area of international law—and included sections devoted exclusively to 
the application of criminal responsibility. His major publications on international criminal 
responsibility, include “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with 
Particular Regard to Punishment of War Criminals (1943),” Peace Through Law (1944), 
especially “Peace Guaranteed by Individual Responsibility for Violation of International Law 
(Part II); "The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Law and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals 
(1945)," “Will the Judgment In the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent In International 
Law? (1947)," and "Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in International 
Law (1948).” Few extant non-English publications attest to Kelsen’s interest in international 
criminalization prior to his US-relocation after 1939.49 As a result, due to Kelsen’s virtual 
                                                          
49 Kelsen initially arrived in the United States in 1939, seeking full-time employment. He briefly moved back to 
Europe to be with his family, though he soon left for good with his wife and two daughters in 1940.  
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absence from contemporary American legal philosophical debate50 and the paucity of sustained 
contemporary interest in Kelsen’s conception of ICR amongst German-language scholars, this 
towering figure in the continental tradition has been otherwise neglected as seminal interlocutor 
on the modern origin and dissemination of this term. 
  In an incident that took place at the German University at Prague in 1936, a group of 
National Socialist students occupied a building where Kelsen was speaking and shouted: “Down 
with the Jew, all non-Jews must leave the hall.” Soon after, Kelsen “received several anonymous 
letters signed with the swastika, which threatened [his] life in case [he] did not give up [his] 
work at the university.”51 At the Eichmann proceedings in Jerusalem in 1961, Robert Servatius, 
Nazi SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Adolph Eichmann's defense counsel, who had drawn on pure 
theory in defense of his client, noted that Kelsen “had suffered personally from National Socialist 
persecution and had been compelled to emigrate to the United States. Therefore it would only be 
human and absolutely understandable if...Kelsen would have tried to reject or to weaken the 
validity of [the Acts of State] doctrine in international law. It bears witness to the human integrity 
and the juristic impartiality of this scholar that, being under the influence of obvious and only too 
understandable resentments, he has not succumbed to this temptation...”52 
 Much like a small but influential group of contemporary international legal scholars who 
attribute Kelsen’s discussion of “fault-based” international criminal responsibility to a nineteenth 
century “statist” logic, Servatius has completely misread Kelsen’s interest in furthering the 
                                                          
50 For an exception, see: D.A. Jeremy Telman, Hans Kelsen in America—Selective Affinities and the Mysteries of 
Academic Influence (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016). 
51 H. Kelsen, Autobiography in M. Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen Werke, 85-86. 





adoption of models of criminalization that can account for the punishment of traditional acts of 
state. Kelsen continues to be a point of reference for judges, prosecutors and defense counsel at 
ICL trials. After a brief historical survey of the development of ICL after the First World War, 
and general philosophical reflections on ICR within the taxonomy of guilt, section IV further 
outlines the research problem, including tracking general questions and sub-questions addressed 
within the context of each of the four major chapters, as well as reaffirming the value of this 
study and research objectives. 
 
III. The Philosophy of International Criminal Responsibility 
   
“The essence of sovereignty,” noted former U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing in 
1918, “[is] the absence of responsibility.”53 
 In response to the Paris Peace Conference to adjudicate the century’s first international 
war crimes tribunal after World War I for the “crimes” of German Kaiser Wilhelm II, as well as 
former Turkish Interior Minister Mehmed Talaat and Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha, 
Lansing maintained the incompatibility between sovereignty and responsibility. To be sovereign 
is to never be judged accountable for actions perpetrated in defense of what Lansing believed to 
be the highest right to order and protection.   
Lansing, according to President Woodrow Wilson’s advisor Edward House, used 
sovereignty as a way to excuse humanitarian abuses. 54 How can a state be sovereign, Lansing 
insisted, at the same time that it is called upon to punish its officials under universal principles of 
                                                          
53 See: Michael Robert Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-46: A Documentary History (Boston:  
Bedford Books, 1997), 8-10; Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York:  
Basic Books, 2002), 14. 
54 “Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity,” WNET/13, 2009. 
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justice? Logically, it is impossible to both be and not be sovereign. If Lansing were right in 1918 
in his narrow configuration of the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility, ICL 
perhaps would have remained still-born. Theorists and practitioners would have had a difficult 
time defending the legitimacy of a supra-sovereign international order later-convened at the Paris 
Peace Conference to find individuals criminally responsible for humanitarian violations, if the 
traditional notion of sovereignty—and the sovereign state as the primary subject of international 
law—were to dictate definitions of international criminal responsibility.55 
ICL as an institution, therefore, starts with the creation of the IMT Charter at London. 
Philosophical reflection on the degree to which the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) no longer 
automatically avails state officials of immunity from core international crimes, however, begins 
even earlier, around World War I.56 The text of the Report presented to the preliminary Peace 
Conference by the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War on March 29, 1919 
distinguished “two classes of culpable acts: (a) Acts which provoked the world war and 
accompanied its inception; (b) Violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of 
humanity.”57 The formulation ‘laws of humanity’ was probably not a reference to general 
principles of law, per se, but [a] more nebulous idea of what ‘humanity’ required.”58 Such rules 
were” too subjective to admit of criminal liability,” according to positive law skeptics. 59   
While “naturalistic assertions of what ‘humanity’ wanted or needed” was contested by 
US representatives during WWI, the Second World War established the precedent of the 
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Nuremberg IMT, confirmed by President Truman’s October 27, 1946 description of the trial as 
“the first international criminal assize in history.” The President remarked: 
 
I have no hesitancy in declaring that the historic precedent set at Nuremberg abundantly 
justifies the expenditure of effort, prodigious though it was. This precedent becomes 
basic in international law in the future. The principles established and the results achieved 
place International Law on the side of peace as against aggressive warfare.60 
 
 
 Three days later, Warren R. Austin, Chief Delegate of the United States, in his opening 
address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, confirmed President Truman’s 
commitment to international criminal adjudication from the perspective of the American chief-
executive. Austin stated: 
 
Besides being bound by the law of the United Nations Charter, twenty-three nations, 
members of the Assembly, including the United States, Soviet Russia, the United 
Kingdom and France, are also bound by the law of the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal. That makes planning or waging a war of aggression a crime against humanity 
for which individuals as well as nations can be brought before the bar of international 
justice, tried and punished.61 
 
 
Rather than assuming, as representative ICL scholars and practitioners have,62 that 
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Kelsen’s criticisms make him a positive law skeptic rather than a leading supporter of 
prosecution of crimes of the magnitude of crimes against humanity, it is best to briefly note these 
criticisms, including Kelsen’s skepticism of the moral formulation made in the Paris Peace 
Conference report, as well as Kelsen’s worry over the description of Nuremberg as a 
“precedential” ruling based on the presumption of “victor’s justice.” 
Kelsen, as legal adviser to the last Minister of War of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was 
privy to much of the decision-making process at the end of WWI. In a telling anecdote in his 
autobiography, Kelsen writes: 
 
I can still vividly remember one of my last conversations with the minister. I had been 
summoned to the minister via phone in the middle of the night. He received me in his 
dressing gown in his private office in the official residence he had in the building of the 
Ministry of War. He handed me the text of a telegram that President Wilson had sent in 
response to the offer of the Austro-Hungarian government to grant the nationalities of the 
monarchy the right of self-determination, and he asked me to comment on Wilson’s 
statement. While I was reading Wilson’s response, the minister put on his uniform jacket 
and invited me to go into his office. On the way there we had to pass the ballroom that 
was part of the minister’s residence. At that point the minister said to me that it was 
embarrassing to live in such splendid chambers during such a terrible time. “Especially, 
your excellency, if one knows that one is the last Minister of War of the monarchy.” “You 
are crazy,” he responded, “how can you say something so awful!” To the very last 
moment, the old officer, even though he had no illusions about the magnitude of the 
military defeat, could not believe it possible that an empire of four hundred years could 
simply vanish from the stage of history. When I took my leave in person a short time 
later, he stood there in his office deathly pale. On the drive into the Ministry, the mob had 
pelted his car with stones, a shard of glass had injured him on the cheek. He shook my 




Jochen von Bernstorff, a leading scholar of Kelsen’s public international law theory, 
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writes that “Kelsen himself, through his position in the ministry, was directly involved in the 
various plans to save, reform, and liquidate the Hapsburg monarchy. He composed an internal, 
and in the end unsuccessful, memorandum intended to persuade the Emperor to transform the 
monarchy into a federation of independent nation states on the basis of the right of self 
determination of nations.”64  
 In “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard 
to the Punishment of War Criminals (1943),” a sustained argument for the legitimacy of war 
crimes tribunals, Kelsen questioned the formulation of Article 227 of the Peace Treaty of 
Versailles, which reads: 
 
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly 
German Emperor, for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the 
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one 
appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great 
Britain, France, Italy and Japan.65 
 
Kelsen writes that the formula used was inexact. “The true reason for the ex-Kaiser’s 
demanded submission to a criminal court was that he was considered the main author of the war 
and resorting to this war was considered a crime. Article 227 speaks of ‘an offence of 
international morality’ in order to avoid speaking of a violation of international law.”66 Kelsen 
argues that this is a “legal” offense based on two points, modified under the circumstances of 
WWII. First, he endorses the position that wars of aggression are acts contrary to positive law. 
Second, the retroactive nature of Article 227, legal according to the general principles of 
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international law, licensed such prosecution. 
The Paris Peace Treaty confirmed the doctrine of just war theory. “The principle of 
bellum justum,” according to Kelsen, is considered by outstanding authors as a rule of positive 
international law,”67 and since the Kaiser was “the main author of war,” he—and he alone—
could be held accountable. Neither was there any “reason to renounce a criminal charge made 
against the persons morally responsible for the outbreak of World War II.”68In his 1943 article, 
Kelsen, however, limits the scope of individual criminal prosecution for crimes of aggression.  
 
In so far as this is also a question of constitutional law of the Axis Powers, the answer is 
simplified by the fact that these States were under more or less dictatorial regimes, so that 
the number of persons who has the legal power of leading their country into war is in 
each of the Axis States very small. In Germany it is probably the Fuehrer alone; in Italy, 
the Duce and the King; and in Japan, the Prime Minister and the Emperor. If the assertion 
attributed to Louis VIV ‘l’Etat c’est moi’ is applicable to any dictatorship, the punishment 
of a dictator amounts almost to a punishment of the State.69 
 
Kelsen assumed the opposite position of the most famous of modern natural law theorists, 
Hugo Grotius, who affirmed that heads-of-state were always immune from prosecution. And yet 
Kelsen’s limitations reflect a purely legal emphasis on positive law technique, which always 
means the valid transfer of authority from the home country to a jurisdictional court that has a 
vested international interest in prosecuting the legal organ. Since in 1943 no official legal 
document existed that indicated the willingness of parties to affirm humanitarian rather than 
parochial values vis a vis international criminalization, Kelsen suggested a relatively 
conservative approach to head-of-state prosecution. At the time of the London Agreement, 
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however, as the previous section affirms, Kelsen expanded categories of criminalization to other 
high-level officials within the normative legal hierarchy of delegation.  
The point of departure for this dissertation, therefore, is a challenge posed to 
contemporary ICL scholars, such as University of Padua international law scholar Andrea 
Gattini, a leading expert on Kelsen’s contributions to the conception of ICR, who claims that the 
author of pure theory was committed to a strict estimation of the acts of state doctrine, and thus 
immunized state officials against a progressive cognition of ICR. Gattini writes that “Kelsen’s 
scathing criticism of the Nuremberg trial as ‘victors’ justice’ was not only due to his 
disappointment with the Trial’s shortcomings. The reasons can also be found in Kelsen’s 
adherence to a traditional view of ‘act of State’, which had already been challenged at that time, 
and, in the end, a nineteenth century state-centric conception of law.”70 
Even in his earliest writings on ICL, Kelsen recognized that the Kaiser’s guilt could be 
established according to positive legal rules, and that his trial was not based on an “offense of 
morality” but rather valid international law. Thus, the acts of state doctrine did not even apply to 
the Kaiser, according to Kelsen. Through a “sleight-of-hand” implicit to this test case, we begin 
to piece together the true meaning of a general theory of legal responsibility in accordance with a 
pure theoretical model. Kelsen writes:  
 
But if a legal norm—such as a norm established by an international treaty—attaches 
punishment to an offense of morality, a punishment to be inflicted upon the offender by a 
court, the offense assumes ex post facto the character of a violation of law.71  
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As with the IMT at Nuremberg, Kelsen supports the Kaiser’s prosecution on retroactive 
grounds through a legerdemain where the moral offense—mala in se—becomes the defining 
factor in instituting a novel retroactive methodology. 
In the last chapter of his 1905 doctoral thesis on Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy,72 
Kelsen recognizes a counter-example to the theory of the "two swords doctrine" of Pope 
Gelasius: Niccolò Machiavelli’s political realist advice for would-be dictators. For Kelsen, 
Machiavelli represented an executive operating without effective legal restraints on responsible 
conduct. The later Weimar constitutional debate between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt over 
guardianship of the constitution, briefly examined in chapter two, argues for the author of pure 
theory’s commitment to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege (or “not under man, but under 
law”). The extent to which Kelsen resolves the problem of sovereign authority in estimating the 
meaning of ICR from the vantage point of a valid system of adjudication extending to the 
“commander-in-chief” is the main theme of chapter two’s overarching analysis of the 
relationship between legal, political and moral valuations of this critical term of cognition. 
Questioning the general rejection of tu quoque defenses73 in later Nuremberg trials held 
under Control Council Act, no. 10, Reinhard Merkl, a Nuremberg defense attorney and retired 
professor of criminal law and philosophy of law at the University of Hamburg, writes of Kelsen 
and victor’s justice: 
 
If anything, the term ‘victors’ justice,’ hissed through clenched teeth for years after the 
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Nuremberg Trial, has gained a certain justification from this circumstance. Hans Kelsen, 
who perhaps understood more clearly than any of his contemporaries what was at stake, 
demanded already in 1944 an independent, impartial, and genuinely international 
criminal court that was to be established according to an international treaty which was to 
be signed by all the involved parties, including the defeated: ‘Only if the victors subject 
themselves to the same law which they seek to apply to the defeated, will the idea of 
justice remain unscathed.’74  
 
Merkel completes his assessment of the ideal of neutrality by stating that Kelsen’s 
position “remained an unheeded and unthinkable warning.”75  
But like Gattini, whose writings on Kelsen are the most pointed secondary English-
language commentary on the author of pure theory’s description of ICR, Merkel undermines a 
key, enduring fact: Kelsen ultimately approves, despite his well-known criticism, the conduct of 
the IMT at Nuremberg. The philosophy of international criminal law attests to the multi-
disciplinary reading of liability for heads-of-state and other state officials. While neither 
existentialists Karl Jaspers, nor his student Hannah Arendt, for example, is technically a legal 
philosopher, each provides a general statement about the taxonomy of this highly irregular term. 
Jaspers introduced four types of guilt: (a) criminal, (b) political, (c) moral, and (d) metaphysical. 
The first resembled a “fault-based” description; the second represented “guilt” for offenses of a 
collective nature applicable to all citizens of a state for the offenses of certain state officials; the 
third encompasses a recognition that even when the law does not apply coercive measures, there 
is still an internal responsibility to abide by a certain standard of behavior that the law may not 
concern itself with; and the fourth, metaphysical ‘guilt’, applies to a general sense of 
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responsibility for the humanitarian crimes committed anywhere even when individuals feel no 
specific legal or moral compulsion and otherwise have retain no national allegiance.76 Arendt’s 
famous court report that diagnosed the ‘banality of evil’ in a man considered to be one of the 
architects of the genocide of European Jewry followed in the train of many earlier reflections on 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal by some of the world’s most eminent political and legal 
theorists.77 After the Eichmann case, the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial followed with commentary.78 
“This trial, which found considerable difficulty reconciling norms of individual responsibility 
strongly embedded in German criminal law, led German criminal law theoreticians to attempt to 
conceptuali[z]e…forms of responsibility that accurately portray the nature of mass crimes.”79 
Alain Finkelkraut in France, covering the 1987 trial of Klaus Barbie, contested Arendt’s 
“banality” thesis, whereas Argentinian philosopher and politician Carlos Santiago Nino 
recommended an expressly naturalist approach to the trial of the junta.80 
While the major dividing line in the early conception of ICR is between those ICL 
commentators endorsing the natural law tradition, including, on the one hand, Quincy Wright, 
legal advisor to US Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson, Lord Wright, President of the United 
Nations War Crimes commission, and Hersch Lauterpacht, an advisor to the British government, 
and on the other hand, legal positivists, including George Schwarzenberger, Manfred Lachs and 
George Manner, more recent philosophical inquiries, including by adherents of critical legal 
studies (CLS), feminism and third world (TWAIL) approaches have only had limited impact on 
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the ICL discourse. “It is worth bearing in mind,” writes ICL scholar Robert Cryer, “that these 
approaches tended to arise after international criminal law had established itself as an academic 
enterprise in and of its own right as a subject worthy of study, i.e., in the 1990s.”81 
 In the Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, edited by first President of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) Antonio Cassese, Andrea Biachi in 
“State Responsibility and Criminal Responsibility” writes: 
 
Kelsen looked at this concept of ‘collective responsibility’, prevailing in international 
law, as a typical manifestation of primitive societies. He envisaged a progressive shift 
towards a fault-based individual responsibility, which over time would replace entirely 
the causality-based collective responsibility of states. Kelsen’s speculation, strongly 
influenced by the idea that the international legal order would gradually converge, 
together with domestic legal systems, towards the organic unity of a universal legal 
community, has proved to be wrong. Individual responsibility has certainly coupled state 
responsibility but is far from replacing it.82 
 
The notion that Kelsen’s conception of individual responsibility in ICL did not align with 
a realistic assessment of states under ad hoc ICL conditions must be tested. Much like Shklar’s 
position that Kelsen retained a “legalist” or rules-based ideological approach even to the study of 
ICR, Bianchi assumes that Kelsen was incapable of defending a modern, dynamic conception of 
individual criminal responsibility in a period of international fragmentation. This dissertation 
holds that Kelsen’s conception of ICR is especially notable for its durability under ad hoc 
conditions. A fault-based individual responsibility could develop, in accordance with a plausible 
reading of Kelsen’s major works on ICR, through the application of a system of valid judicial 
rulings.  
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Case study analysis, therefore, is integral to understanding the role of judges in the 




What is the source of ICR? What makes ICR valid? What is the main object of ICR—the 
norm or the act? In establishing how these formal questions are answered at different periods of 
ICL, the object of legal cognition is reconfigured to reflect a historically-resonant ICR discourse. 
The ad hoc judge within the normative hierarchy assumes a major contributing role in the 
development of this term. Under different historical circumstances key doctrinal features of the 
law are emphasized. However, despite the title of this project—“Between Politics and Morality: 
The Pure Theory of Law and the Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility”— 
modifications registered here are not necessarily developed beyond a general recognition of new 
patterns for thinking about this concept under historically-evolved circumstances.  
 The second chapter reconciles pure theory with political and moral sources of imputation 
under the immunizing acts of state doctrine, on the one hand, and principles of civilization, on 
the other, through the moralized claim of positive legal validity for ex post facto/retroactive 
lawmaking. This chapter shows the way in which Kelsen reconciles non sub homine sed sub 
lege/"not under man but under law” with a theory that otherwise legitimates the validity of 
autocratic, even totalitarian rule. Kelsen reconciles the conception of judicial review, associated 
with his position in the Weimar constitutional debate against the decisionism of Carl Schmitt, a 
subject previously noted.  
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 Chapter two is not meant to be either a definitive account of Kelsen’s work on ICR, nor is 
the pure theory of law in its conception of imputation, or the “de-personalized” or “de-
psychologized” notion of responsibility, the only theoretical model that can be used to assess the 
degree to which cognition of ICR has evolved over time. The distinct advantage of this approach, 
however, is that it presents a conception of ICR, which permits a strictly positive or human-made 
assessment free of adulteration by “extra-legal” elements. Sociological, political, psychological 
or moral conceptions of responsibility are set aside in comprehension of an autonomous legal 
inquiry. Neutral or objective criterion bolstering the creation of a dynamic institution derived 
from its own relatively predictable, hierarchically delegated, legitimating legal sources, thus, 
animates the pure theoretical blueprint.  
Yet despite the unity of cognition associated with a pure theoretical description of ICR, 
Kelsen cannot so easily remove moral-normative reasoning from within the boundary of “law”. 
Even as the structure of the legal order is shaped by authorized legal normative sources, 
including state parties delegating authority to courts adjudicating core international crimes 
through treaty law, the validation of the violation of the principle of legality when acts of state 
amount to offenses of the magnitude of core international crimes, requires, Kelsen argues, the 
attachment of retroactive sanctions to once-legal acts. By creating an order sourced in such 
persistent indeterminacy, the author of pure theory forces readers to question whether the various 
scholars who categorize the author of the pure theory of law as “conservative” in his support of 
the AoSD are not in fact mistaken regarding the legacy of perhaps the most prominent jurist of 
the twentieth century. The reader is asked both to follow Kelsen in his train of logic, which 
describes the architecture of a “system” able to authorize the prosecution of state officials for 
these crimes, and to join me in considering the implications of Kelsen’s “moral-turn.”  
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 While this study concludes with an assessment of Kelsen’s position on the separation 
between law and morality, or “separation thesis” (see: chapter 6), the reasons Kelsen marshals 
for incorporating “principles of civilization” as the “principle of justice” or primary criterion for 
assessing responsibility animates the rest of this study.  The liminal point of Pure Theory—the 
examination of imputation at the international level—produces a fascinating claim on legality, 
one that has the potential to make sense of its current fragmented vision. While Kelsen often 
affirms that behind law resides “the gorgon head of power,” such power can only be applied if 
the offense normally protected under the AoSD is so immoral as to constitute an international 
crime. 
Contemporary international law scholar Reut Yael Paz, representative of the conventional 
view, asserts that law and morality are two distinctive modes of inquiry for Kelsen: 
 
[Kelsen’s] theory dismisses the law’s requirement to be just. Justice is a moral and/or 
political question that should not be answered by the law. Ergo Kelsen’s genius lies in 
enabling a totally new legal question; namely is law valid? In brief, law is not about 
justice…It is instead all about the legal norm’s validity.83 
 
 
Paz follows, as chapter two describes, the formal understanding of “science” as object-
creation from a mind-centered epistemology. Kelsen draws on both the philosophical position of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)—and David Hume (1711-1776) before him—in asserting that “is” 
and “ought” cognition must be distinguished. In the realm of “ought,” however, a distinction 
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must be made between “the science of law” (jurisprudence) and “the science of morals” (ethics). 
This particularly legal or juristic mode of inquiry provides the clearest designation of the positive 
law criminalization of state officials for acts of state.  Alternatively, jurisprudence must be 
distinguished from actual rules of law. The first describes what “ought” to be; the second, what 
“is”. That the judge at any level of the legal normative hierarchy produces a decision that 
deviates from a strictly positive legal assessment of all the legal norms pertinent to the case at 
hand does not mean that the decision is invalid. The Pure Theory of Law as a strictly positive or 
human-made legal cognition must accept that, provided the rest of the hierarchy of normative 
legal delegation authorizes the judge’s ruling, the judge’s ruling, no matter if it incorporates 
extra-legal elements, is also legal. Kelsen therefore differentiates between a scientific conception 
of a self-creating and dynamic social order based on coercion and judges who deviates from the 
“scientific” frame of legal normativity. Although a judge’s decision may extend beyond the 
“frame” of analysis specific to “science,” the decision, given the judges preeminent role in the 
hierarchy of imputation, nevertheless remains “authentic”.84   
The judge is law to the extent that, authorized to apply the function of judicial decision-
making by those belonging to tribes, nations or the international community, the judge 
transforms—at every stage—the nature of law. While she does not typically supersede the source 
of her authority, which generally guides the judge’s interpretation of custom, statutes, treaties, et 
al, including preconceived, prescribed, future-oriented or prospective rules of law that reflect the 
core characteristic of “legalism” or the “ideology of rules,” she nevertheless may do so. Without 
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judges there can be no such thing as ICR. Unlike exclusively political, moral or metaphysical 
descriptions of ‘guilt’ in the sense ascribed by Jaspers, Kelsen’s designation of responsibility for 
core international crimes relies on an exclusively individual assessment of liability. 
 This thesis, therefore, presents the judge as the foremost inventor of criminal 
responsibility. In an international law setting, as Kelsen indicates, the judge may turn to 
“principles of civilization” or not, though a valid source. At the liminal point—the study of 
individual responsibility in international criminal law—the legal scholar must justify the course 
of imputation, despite the prevailing state-centered (and, hence, politicized) view of the author of 
pure theory’s conservatism on this subject. This dissertation argues for the centrality of the judge 
as the maker of ICR. Not only, however, does the judge make this term, but she must, in turn, 
presuppose a “natural person” with “agency,” two legal markers traditionally extinguished from 
Kelsen’s pure theoretical conception of imputation. Here, as we will find, Kelsen is intent on 
granting judges a central role in creating a moral subject, constituted by the “will” of the 
“international community,” whose “consensus” upholds “principles of civilization” or 
“principles of humanity.”   
Time is the major component factor in the study of ICR. Without recognition of the role 
time plays in constituting the individual moral agent from the perspective of a future 
international communal consensus informing judgment, then Kelsen’s project would inevitably 
fall apart. That pure theory has been designated formal, and its concept of imputation devoid of 
substantive concern, is irreconcilable with the doctrinal flexibility that Kelsen insists upon in 
relation to ICR. Kelsen’s progressive contributions to the changing notion of ICR as manifested 
in three distinct stages of ICL insists upon history’s shaping force. New political, economic, 
technological and other impactful changes, notwithstanding, the technique associated with a pure 
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theoretical methodology must be understood to retain structural features that shape the legal 
discourse at stages of ICL history.  
 Fundamental to the conception of ICR is the idea, according to Kelsen, that culpability is 
predicated on the coercive nature of law. In a section of General Theory of Law and State 
entitled “Legal Norm and Rule of Law in a Descriptive Sense,” Kelsen writes: “If ‘coercion’…is 
an essential element of law, then the norms which form a legal order must be norms stipulating a 
coercive act, i.e. a sanction.”85 Since international law is an order that sanctions criminal acts, 
coercion constitutes a defining feature of the conception of criminal responsibility in this sphere. 
ICR, therefore, corresponds to the development of humanitarian cognition of liability, including 
state and collective forms of responsibility, on the one hand, and individual responsibility, on the 
other. Chapter two consequently frames the debate over the validity of ICR, in order to bolster 
the efficacy of an order devoted to sanctioning core international crimes. 
 Chapter three evaluates Kelsen's contributions to our understanding of the Nuremberg 
proceedings. In contesting international law scholars Scott Shapiro and Oona Hathaway's recent 
claim that Kelsen is responsible for helping to promote the enduring legacy of the Kellogg 
Briand Pact,86 I take the position that Kelsen's recommendations to Jackson about the inclusion 
of a definition of ("fault-based") individual responsibility prior to the London International 
Military Tribunal conference was wedded to his distinct belief that this was something 
completely new, a turn away from the traditional application of collective forms of 
responsibility. Kelsen’s affirmation of a retroactive legal technique in violation of principles of 
                                                          
85 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1945), 45. 
86 Ooona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017). 
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legality applicable to all core international crimes, proves the limitations of Shapiro’s and 
Hathaway’s strong claims for the merit of the Nuremberg trial as derivative of the international 
effort to banish war through collective security agreements. However, the crimes against peace 
charge was not validly or legitimately instituted because of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Paris Pact 
or General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (1928). The law 
of Nuremberg was necessarily new, as Kelsen attests. Through his correspondence with Jackson 
(see section II), it is clear that Kelsen’s finger was on the wording of the IMT charter, which 
became a basis for later multilateral treaties designating substantive jurisdiction. In addition, this 
chapter considers problems associated with the crimes against peace charge from a Kelsenian 
perspective, focusing on problems associated with the just war theoretical framework. 
 Chapter four periodizes the second stage in the modern articulation of criminal 
responsibility in ICL. In analyzing the Eichmann proceedings, the second case study investigates 
ways in which formal descriptions of the rule of law were disposed of in a case that 
chronologically follows the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings. Since the 1961 trial bookends 
cases against major Nazi officials and other axis officials for core international crimes, especially 
crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War period, the proceedings are 
valuable in determining the progress of ICR conceptualization from the time of the creation of 
the modern ICL system with the introduction of a definition of individual responsibility at the 
IMT conference at London in 1945. Amongst others, Eichmann’s stature in the hierarchy of 
delegated authority was recognized early on by Jackson.  In his closing address before the IMT, 
Jackson claimed that:  
Adolf Eichmann, the sinister figure who had charge of the extermination program, has 
estimated that the anti-Jewish activities resulted in the killing of six million Jews. Of 
these, four million were killed in extermination institutions, and two million were killed 
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by Einsatzgruppen, mobile units of the Security Police and SD which pursued Jews in the 
ghettos…and slaughtered them by gas wagons, by mass shooting in anti-tank ditches, and 
by every device which Nazi ingenuity could conceive. So thorough and uncompromising 
was this program that the Jews of Europe as a race no longer exist, thus fulfilling the 
diabolic “prophecy" of Adolf Hitler at the beginning of the war.87 
 
Jackson recognized Eichmann’s role as a chief architect of the Nazi genocide against the 
Jews. In this respect, the Jerusalem trial of Eichmann is often said to play the role of an appendix 
to the Nuremberg IMT. Dieter Wisliceny, SS- (Captain), responsible for the ghettoization and 
extermination of Jews in the Nazi campaign focused on Greece, Hungary and Slovakia, testified 
before the IMT on January 3, 1946, stating that: 
Eichmann told me that the words "final solution" meant the biological extermination of 
the Jewish race... I was so much impressed with this document which gave Eichmann 
authority to kill millions of people that I said at the time: "May God forbid that our 
enemies should ever do anything similar to the German people". He replied: "Don't be 
sentimental – this is a Führer order".88 
 
The changing notion of international criminal responsibility cannot be separated from this 
historic trial. Although other cases that occurred during the Cold War period (1945-1989), such 
as the Auschwitz Trial (1964), or the case against Klaus Barbie (1987), represented key points in 
the jurisprudence of ICL, the Eichmann case—amongst Cold War cases—produced a series of 
especially important legal philosophical appeals to the notion of agency under superior orders.  
In focusing once again on the core challenge presented by Kelsen—application of the 
acts of state doctrine under ad hoc conditions—what is revealed is the extent to which the author 
                                                          
87 Robert H. Jackson, “Closing Arguments for the Conviction of Nazi War Criminals,” Robert H. Jackson Center, 
https:/-/www.roberthjackson.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Closing_Argument_for_Conviction_of_Nazi_War_Criminals.pdf 
88 Stuart Stein, "Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny," Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume VIII  (Washington: 
USGPO, 1946) 606–619.  
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of pure theory’s conception remains applicable to the effort to establish the legitimacy of the trial 
in a way that paralleled Arendt’s work. While Arendt, given her later writings on the operations 
of judgment, remains far more receptive to the possibility that conscience is nevertheless 
cultivable under superior orders, her “banality” thesis shares space with Kelsen’s pure theoretical 
embrace of relatively determined human behaviors under the law.89 Even if doctrinally barring 
such psychological considerations, from the vantage point of strictly positive legal cognition, 
                                                          
89 Seyla Benhabib notes that “…although Arendt, like Kelsen, was a critic of national sovereignty, she remained 
skeptical that international institutions established in the wake of World War II, such as the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), or even legal instruments such as the Geneva Conventions on the 
Status of Refugees, could ever satisfactorily resolve the[] paradoxes of the modern nation-state. Kelsen and Hersch 
Lauterpacht, by contrast, as international jurists, insisted that unless the rights enumerated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights were protected by an International Human Rights Court, they would remain 
ineffectual. For Kelsen, in particular, sovereignty was not the actual or mystical expression of the will of a people, of 
an actual demos, but rather a Grundnorm of the international system of states, which accepted that national law 
would be based upon the authority of some institution or instance recognized as the final arbiter…. What is the 
source of the authority of law: human will or reason? Or some more fundamental order that precedes human acts of 
law-giving? Does the law express principles of human justice, or is the law grounded in some other order that 
precedes but nevertheless contains human justice? And if the law derives its authority from an act of will that is not 
bound by reason but expresses the decision of a mythical lawgiver or a collectivity called the nation, then how can 
the rights of the individual be secured? It is doubtful whether Kelsen himself could successfully resolve the 
‘decisionist’ challenge posed by Carl Schmitt. Rather, Kelsen admits that the Grundnorm of the law must itself be 
posited and cannot be further justified; at its limits law encounters the political.” Seyla Benhabib, Exile, 
Statelessness and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isaiah Berlin (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 20, 22-23.  
This long quote from Benhabib establishes the significant role that Kelsen is beginning to play amongst a 
leading U.S. public intellectual and political scholar of modern German history, whose writings on Carl Schmitt 
dominates her analysis of the Weimar constitutional crisis. On Benhabib’s commentary on Schmitt, see generally: 
Seyla Benhabib, ”Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law,” Political Theory 40, no. 6 
(2012): 688-713; Seyla Benhabib, “Defending a Cosmopolitanism without Illusions. Reply to My Critics,” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 6 (2014): 697-715. We will again encounter 
Benhabib’s writings in chapter four on the Eichmann trial and Kelsen’s and Arendt’s corresponding description of 
agency under the acts of state doctrine (AoSD). Since, according to Kelsen, the “international community” through 
“consensus” determines “principles of civilization” as historically-dependent markers on the beltway to a more 
refined notion of international criminal responsibility, Benhabib’s claim that “at its limits law encounters the 
political” must be interrogated. In focusing on the record or chronicle of ICL cases from 1945-present, judgement 
for heads-of-state and other high-ranking officials, especially, indicates that while the rights of individuals may not 
always be protected, especially under autocratic rule, Benhabib is wrong to endorse the dominance of the political. 
From the perspective of a burgeoning international criminal legal order, even one whose judges and prosecutors 
have been threatened with arrest by the Trump administration, the authority of “law” supersedes decisionism, as the 
leader who once-ordered with seeming impunity acts amounting to crime against humanity and genocide, has 
become a ready subject—if ex post facto—of prosecution for core international crimes. That Kelsen was a leading 
advocate of “consensus” forms the final estimation of Kelsen’s progressive legacy as a challenging critic of state 
sovereignty, who, as Benhabib correctly notes, endorsed the positive law legitimacy of international human rights 
enforcement mechanisms (see: chapter six). 
39 
 
coercive powers, according to Kelsen, shape judgment. Although fear and other psychological 
components are formally excluded from pure theoretical legal conceptualization, Kelsen 
nevertheless recognizes that the technique of law is efficacious or effective in regulating 
behavior. Consequently, one must infer that the law plays a role in psychologically modifying 
behaviors that might otherwise be different if no coercive sanction were in place. As a result, 
Kelsen’s conception of freedom, discussed with respect to the archetypal case of the bureaucratic 
“desk murder,” presents a limited—reductionist or causal—view of human behavior. Within the 
scope of the pure theoretical conception of ICR, Eichmann is nevertheless assumed to possess 
the ability to decide between acts of state that are moral or immoral, and thus legal or illegal, 
dependent on the time and jurisdiction under which liability is assessed.  
Emphasizing the place of Kelsen’s “moral-turn,” this chapter finds agreement with 
international legal scholar Noora Arajärvi, who claims that Kelsen made a significant impact on 
the conception of ICR at the Eichmann trial through the “sleight-of-hand” of retroactive 
lawmaking.90 While the Jerusalem trial retained firmer prospective legal ground than the 
Nuremberg proceedings, from a Kelsenian perspective, the defendant, given the proliferation of 
multilateral treaties, especially the 1945 United Nations Charter, the UN-sponsored International 
Law Commission’s 1947 Nuremberg Principles, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1949 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, was provided 
fairer warning than in earlier trials. But none of these major international documents represented 
prospective laws for Eichmann. On what legal basis then, can we best envision ICR under 
superior orders and the Fuhrer or Leader Principle? 
                                                          
90 Noora Arajarvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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The last case study on ICTY proceedings against Duško Tadić, inter alia, introduces a 
description of judicial interpretation that deviates from Kelsen’s perceived “formalism.” The 
ICTY was chosen as a representative tribunal, due to its emphasis placed on customary 
international law, the fundamental source of international law, according to Kelsen. Custom, 
typically unwritten, registers the practice of states through the acts of state officials. The AoSD 
as immunizing doctrine, however, is now subordinated to more methodologically-inventive 
developments affirmed by ICL judges in the post-Cold War period. The ICTY constitutes an ad 
hoc jurisdictional order where judges assume roles as interpreters of new humanitarian law 
informed by the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), amongst other subjects of 
international legal discourse. The accumulation of “precedential” or other court decisions, as 
well as a general recognition by the “international community” that certain acts, even if in 
accordance with rules of a specific national legal order are prohibited by jus cogens or 
peremptory international norms, points to a deeper recognition of the effort to institute more 
sophisticated justifications for “fault-based” proceedings in the post-Cold War era. While earlier 
tribunals point to the impact Kelsen made on the early period of this modern institution, 
especially from 1945 to 1947, Kelsen’s legacy of progressive investment in the development of a 
conception fitting for international prosecution, is further defined in this period with the 







“If international law is in some ways at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps 




The Mirror of Legal Science: Moral and Political Conceptions of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility under International Law92 
 
I. Introduction 
According to international law scholar Jochen von Bernstorff, Hans Kelsen, author of the 
Pure Theory of Law, aimed “(1) to establish a non-political method for the field of international 
                                                          
91 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War,” British Yearbook of International Law 29 
(1952): 382.  Lauterpacht, a leading expert of international law at the time of the Second World War and a student of 
Kelsen’s, whose definition of “crimes against humanity” entered into the ICL lexicon through the IMT Charter, 
recognizes morality as the source of international law. Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International 
Law” in The British Yearbook of International Law, ed. Hersch Lauterpacht (London: Oxford University Press, 
1946), 1-53. The degree to which Kelsen subscribes to Lauterpacht’s non-essential theory of natural law is explored 
in later chapters. On Lauterpacht’s international law theory, see: Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960—Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 353-412, and Wolfgang Friedmann, Legal Theory (London: Stevens and Sons, 
1953), 124.  
92 This phrase is taken from the title of Kelsen’s skilled description of legal justice based on relative ontology. Hans  
Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1957). Kelsen’s position on the principle of tolerance—introduced in Part IV—is based on Kelsen’s  
commentary in What is Justice? While Kelsen is generally consistent with respect to the separation of law from  
morality, and thus tolerance remains an unnecessary moral ideal constituting a valid legal conception, the purpose of  
this interrogation of Kelsenian doctrinal requirements in cognition of ICR is nevertheless to point to the implied  
moral source of this term. Furthermore, it is a contestable proposition anyway, since, as Andrea Gattini correctly  
points out, Kelsen’s What is Justice? does not necessarily assume an amoral position with regard to the principle of  
tolerance. Gattini states that Kelsen, in order to be true to the relativist standard of “legal science,” must not take a 
position on the rightness or wrongness in supporting the principle or standard of tolerance. Furthermore, Gattini 
insists that Kelsen reveres intellectual and public freedoms, and regards democracy as the only social order in which 
to protect these necessary values. Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen’s Contribution to International Criminal Law,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2, no. 4 (September 2004): 795–809; Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen, Hans,” in The Oxford 




law, and (2) to promote the political project, which originated in the inter-war period, of a 
thoroughly legalized and institutionalized world order.” 93  
Notwithstanding Kelsen’s progressive contributions to the legal architecture of a 
federated world state and the establishment of a permanent and compulsory international court94, 
Bernstorff’s first point of analysis is critical to the estimation of Kelsen’s impact on the changing 
notion of international criminal responsibility (ICR). This chapter identifies how “non-political” 
doctrines of the pure theory of law (PTL), including the separation of norms from social facts 
(“the normativity thesis”) and law from morality (“the separation thesis”) are contravened by 
Kelsen in an effort to define ICR under ad hoc conditions. 
                                                          
93 Jochen Von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in Universal Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
94 Prior to the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations (UN), Hans Kelsen invented a 
rival institutional design—the Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace (PLMP). Central to the PLMP was a 
permanent and compulsory international court adjudicating cases against states and individuals, fifty-five years in 
advance of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (1998). On Kelsen’s blueprint for the PLMP, 
see: Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). Although resembling 
Kelsen’s design, the structural advances of the International Criminal Court (ICC) do not demonstrate the scope of 
ICR, which presumably would be resolved under an efficaciously centralized, federated, permanent and compulsory 
legal order. Provisions related to the principle of legality rule against ex post facto laws, including Articles 22-24 of 
the ICC Statute, neither encompasses a monopoly on authorized force in the ICL sphere, nor shapes our 
understanding of the latitude by which culpability traditionally is determined under ad hoc conditions. The degree to 
which retroactivity remains relevant to the discussion of international criminal prosecution in the era of the ICC will 
be evaluated in the conclusion, Chapter Six. The ICC—it should be noted—encompasses a jurisdictional 
advancement but not the final determination on the scope of ICR interpretation. “Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege 
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the 
time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly 
construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of 
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3.   This article shall not affect the characterization of any 
conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute; Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege A person 
convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute; Article 24 Non-retroactivity ratione 
personae 1.No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of 
the Statute; 2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law more 
favourable to the person be investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.” For an extended discussion on the 
legal interpretation of these articles, see: William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: Commentary on 
the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 539-550.  
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Kelsen classifies international criminal law (ICL) as a valid legal order instituting justice for 
crimes of the magnitude of core international crimes, including crimes against peace (CAP) or 
crimes of aggression, war crimes (WC), crimes against humanity (CAH), and genocide (GEN).95 
While the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) traditionally immunizes legal organs or officials 
performing duties on behalf of national legal orders, retroactive licensing of core international 
crimes, according to Kelsen, are based on “principles of justice” that reflect a necessary 
movement in the evolution of law to a stage of international juridical sovereignty.96  
The jurisprudential conception of sovereignty associated with John Austin’s command theory 
presents the dominant positive law view prior to the London Conference and the ratification of 
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) charter at London on August 8 1945.97 The 
transformation of the AoSD—and with its sovereign immunity—through Article 7, affirms 
international juridical sovereignty over the acts of all state officials, including heads-of-state. 
Article 7 reads: 
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.98 
                                                          
95 The introductory chapter affirmed Kelsen’s support of retroactive lawmaking for crimes against peace, war crimes  
and crimes against humanity. With the promulgation of the Genocide Convention on December 9, 1948, the  
international community affirmed through multilateral treaty the jus cogens status of this offense. But while 
genocide encompassed a customary offense, the severity of which placed it under the rubric of crimes against  
humanity, Kelsen makes scant mention of it in his writings. By deduction, we can assume that if Kelsen had  
assumed an advisory role as he did at the time of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), he would  
have made similar recommendations for the retroactive licensing of genocide cases.  See:  “Convention on the  
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; December 9, 1948,” The Avalon Project: Documents  
in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed on July 3, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/genocide.asp.  
For reference to Kelsen’s brief commentary on genocide, see: Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New  
York: Rinehart & Company, 1952), 334. 
96 Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?” The 
International Law Quarterly 1, No. 2 (Summer, 1947):165.  
97 For the most representative description of Austin’s position on the relationship between sovereignty, command 
and duty, see: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1861); John Austin, 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, Or, the Philosophy of Positive Law (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1875). 
98  “Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1 Charter of the International Military Tribunal,” The Avalon Project:  
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   While the conversion of morality into a source of legality under ad hoc ICL conditions 
is, with few exceptions, considered an aberration by Kelsen scholars, the author of Pure Theory’s 
reconciliation of the principle non sub homine sed sub lege or “not under man, but under law” 
requires such doctrinal deviation.99  Kelsen writes: 
 
Even if [international] atrocities are covered by municipal law, or have the character of 
acts of State and hence do not constitute individual criminal responsibility, they are 
certainly open violations of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized 
peoples and hence, were at least, morally not innocent or indifferent when they were 
committed…There can be little doubt that, according to the public opinion of the civilized 
world, it is more important to bring the war criminals to justice than to respect, in their 
trial, the rule against ex post facto law.100 (my emphasis) 
  
 Andrea Gattini in “Kelsen’s Contributions to International Criminal Law,” one of the few 
sustained interrogations of Kelsen’s position on ICR, neglects to sufficiently address the reality 
of the author of Pure Theory’s “moral-turn”.101 While he writes that, “in my view, it is through 
his personal perspective on justice and morality that Kelsen, although critical of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, eventually came to terms with international criminal law….and international criminal 
                                                          
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed on July 20, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp. 
99 Kelsen’s conceptions of validity, sovereignty and agency in relation to ICR, however, also implicates a “relativist” 
ontology of international law associated with classical and neo-legal positivist traditions. Kelsen demonstrates that at 
the highest level of imputation, moral cognition must be resorted to through the legerdemain of ex post facto 
lawmaking based on “civilizational” criterion of ICR. Kelsen’s endorsement of the retroactive capacity of the 
accused to choose between immoral legal and morally illegal acts, as well as recognition of international judicial 
independence, including non-formal retroactive application of moral criterion in the vein of the Free Law 
Movement, disproves Shklar’s fierce polemic against “the homeless ghost” of Pure Theory. Judith Shklar, Legalism: 
Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 34. Since Kelsen formulates 
the most significant methodological answer to the structural problem of applying only prospective legal norms in 
imputing international responsibility, his philosophy remains the primary object of discussion.  
100 Kelsen, “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals,” 10-11. 
101 Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen’s Contribution to International  
Criminal Law,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 4 (September 2004): 795–809 
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justice,102” he neglects to consider how a retroactive methodology conforms to the ex post facto 
logic of ad hoc tribunals. This chapter is an effort to respond to those scholars like Gattini who 
associate Kelsen with a predominantly state-centered, if at times morally-syncretic, conception 
of ICR. 
Part II begins with a general overview of Kelsen's jurisprudential contributions from the 
perspective of a reviled “formalism”. Unlike Benthams’s imperatival approach, which rejected 
the imposition of penalties for sovereign officials;103 Austin’s command theory, which in 
addition to obligating obedience discounted international law “as being at most a set of principles 
of morality or etiquette that lack binding force,”104 or HLA Hart's neo-positivist105 concept of 
law based on a rule of recognition whose scope of validity is specific to domestic law,106 
                                                          
102 Ibid., 796. 
103 Jeremy Bentham, who first introduced the term “international” with respect to “jurisprudence” in 1789, replacing 
the traditional terminology ius gentium or law of nations, writes that “The word international, it must be 
acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in 
a more significant way, the branch of law which goes under the name of law of nations: an appellation so 
uncharacteristic that, were it not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence.” 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart 
(London: Athlone Press, 1970), 296. By “internal jurisprudence” he means that “law of nations” does not designate 
space outside the domestic law of diverse nations (i.e., between nations). Although Bentham deserves credit for 
instigating theoretical inquiry into the utilitarian or greatest happiness principle applied to the international sphere, 
his imperatival theory affirms sovereign-centered conceptions associated with Austin’s command theory. The will of 
the sovereign is the foundation of law and “cannot be illegal”. Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch 
of Jurisprudence, ed. P. Schofield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 38. Bentham’s recognition of the legal 
limitation of the sovereign that requires “the whole political community…to be in a disposition to pay obedience,” 
notwithstanding, reaffirms a Hobbesian notion of sovereignty as a monopoly of power within a given territory, 
wherein a sovereign is immunized as his authority is always “legal”. Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the 
Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 18, and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1661] 1965), 133.   
104See: Stephen C. McCaffrey, Understanding International Law. (Newark, NJ: Matthew Bender, 2006).; Austin, 
John, Robert Campbell, and Sarah Austin. Lectures on Jurisprudence; Or, The Philosophy of Positive Law (London:  
J. Murray, 1885), 188-190. 
105 See:  Anthony D’Amato, "The Neo-Positivist Concept of International Law," American Journal of International  
Law 59, no. 2 (1965): 321-24.; Mehrdad Payandeh, "The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of  
H.L.A. Hart," The European Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2010):95. 
106Hart asserts that“…to say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the ruleof  
recognition and so as a rule of the system. We can indeed simply say that the statement that a particular rule is valid  
means that it satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.” The rule of recognition is based on a  
convention made within a given system, by which Hart means a domestic order. For example, the rule of recognition 
in the United States is that a bill must be passed by the legislature and assented to by the President. Congress—or  
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Kelsen's theoretical approach is doctrinally plausible as a positive law justification of war crimes 
prosecution. In order to accomplish doctrinal purity, however, Kelsen must obscure the core 
value of his contribution to the study of ICR: the introduction of the temporally-unbound method 
of retroactive prosecution in violation of the principle of legality. Kelsen must endorse a moral 
criterion, which he calls “principles of civilization” that judges must draw on to determine 
whether a certain act—once legal—is later fit for prosecution.   
As the third component of the dialectic triad of ICR, which incorporates a legal (Part II) 
and political (Part III) perspective, moral principles applied retroactively to aberrant acts of state 
(Part IV) demonstrate the invalidity of a strictly positive law cognition of responsibility based on 
the separation of law from morality. Part II introduces a conception of imputation or the “de-
personalized” or “de-psychologized” form of responsibility that aligns with Immanuel Kant’s a 
priori transcendental methodology. Although the principle of legality of delicts and sanctions, as 
well as its corollary the principle of non-retroactivity, corresponds with a pure theoretical 
commitment to the prospective delegation of hierarchically-administered legal norms, the 
prosecution of humanitarian offenses, as “acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time 
they were committed,”107 assumes higher ordinal value. These offenses, Kelsen writes, were 
“certainly… morally most objectionable.”108 Ex post facto lawmaking based on a moral criterion 
of justice, therefore, takes supreme authority, according to Kelsen, in the designation of 
individual responsibility for core international crimes (see: Part IV). 
                                                          
the rule makers—recognize this as the legitimate process for law creation. H. L. A.  Hart, Concept of Law (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1994), 103. 
107 Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?,” The 
International Law Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Summer, 1947): 153-171 in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guenael 




Even if the pure theory of law could be used to validate autocratic rule (Part III), 
retroactive sanctions applied to acts that were not “indifferent in itself,”109 according to Kelsen, 
is what legitimately prevents Hitler—and those Nazis “obligated” to act in accordance with the 
grundnorm or basic norm of the Fuhrer Principle—from claiming post-war immunity. Kelsen’s 
retroactive defense of humanitarian prosecution, in consequence, is what insures doctrinal 
commitment to international juridical sovereignty.110 That the conception of law must be 
reconfigured to incorporate a moral mandate does not preclude recognition that law, not 
“persons” or “facts,” is sovereign. 
In emphasizing the centrality of moral normativity to cognition of ICR, however, 
Kelsen’s retroactive methodology neither upholds a pure theoretical description of imputation as 
“de-psychologized” (Part II), nor protects high-level state officials from prosecution through 
command-centered jurisprudence (Part III). After briefly outlining legal positivist and natural 
law approaches to the principle of legality, Part IV argues against the consistency of Kelsen’s 
positive law justification of this irregular method.  
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Part IV provides a general framework for future case studies built on a refutation of those 
scholars who wrongly claim that Kelsen endorses the amoral positive law prescription “you 
ought to commit genocide,”111 and likewise would “embrace an extermination camp operated 
according to such norms.”112 Kelsen’s normative commitment to “principles of morality 
generally recognized…according to the public opinion of the civilized world”113 negates an 
alternative commitment to prospective positive legality founded on neutral cognition of human-
made acts, a hallmark of positive analytical jurisprudence. 
The morality of criminalizing officials traditionally immunized under the AoSD, 
illustrates the conflict between principles of justice. Part IV asks that Kelsen’s description of ICR 
be understood as a modification of an otherwise unified neo-Kantian epistemological cognition 
of imputation. The “exception” that Kelsen introduces is necessary to hold accountable any 
individual committing immoral acts in an official capacity.  “What someone did in the past,” 
writes Kelsen, “we may evaluate according to a (legal) norm, which assumed validity only after 
it had been done.”114 Whether it is possible to justify international prosecution from the vantage 
point of positive law for cases in which state officials were not apprised of the illegality of an act 
in advance of its commission, structures the following argument. 
By incorporating social facts, legal positivism typically emphasizes law’s political 
dimension by “recogniz[ing] political rulers as the only source of valid law and adopt[ing] the 
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will of the political ruler as its validity standard.”115 Legal positivists Jeremy Bentham116, John 
Austin117 and H.L.A. Hart118 all share the belief that “persons,” not “norms,” ought to define the 
validity standard of any legal regime. While Kelsen agrees that autocratic rulers, for example, 
assume a legally authorized position of power (see: section III), he excludes the possibility that 
sovereign leader(s) are entitled to immunity from ICL prosecution under a state-centered 
conception of legality. 
More expansive than the psychological delineation between “command” and 
“obedience,” Kelsen proposes a purely normative designation of imputation that is neither reliant 
on “morality” nor “social facts”.  Unlike John Austin’s conception of duty in The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (1832), where a “future-oriented” conception is inherent to the factual 
relationship between commander and commanded, Kelsen de-links from the fact of obligation, 
conceptualizing responsibility even for those who may not have directly committed an offense. 
Since a command implies that individuals must obey at a later point in time, the concept of 
retroactivity is necessarily excluded from classical legal positivist cognition.  
While Austin does not deny the legitimacy of discretionary action by a sovereign, the 
following account endorses the position of leading North American Kelsenian Stanley Paulson, 
whose article “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg” (1975) argues that traditional positive 
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law defenses based on the principle of legality rule against ex post facto laws are rooted in the 
Austinian proposition that those commanded can logically only obey future orders.119 Carl 
Schmitt, “Nazi crown jurist”,120 interrogated for eighteen months after the war as a potential 
defendant in the subsequent Nuremberg Trials under American auspices, presents a description 
of national law deviating from Paulson’s view of Austin as endorsing a “future-oriented,” 
presumably non-discretionary or non-retroactive position.  
This chapter frames case studies (chapters 3-5) on Kelsen’s contributions to the changing 
notion of ICR. Kelsen’s strictly positive legal conception of ICR (Part II), which validates 
political regimes headed by autocratic heads-of-state (Part III), nevertheless licenses retroactive 
lawmaking for those officials responsible for core international crimes (Part IV).  
II. Overview of the Pure Theoretical Conception of International Criminal Responsibility 
a. “Pure” Epistemology: Neo-Kantian Expression of Valid Legal Normativity 
 Kelsen writes: 
The pure theory of law is a theory of positive law. It is a theory of positive law in general, 
not of a specific legal order. It is a general theory of law, not an interpretation of specific 
national or international legal norms; but it offers a theory of interpretation. 
 
As a theory, its exclusive purpose is to know and to describe its object. The theory 
attempts to answer the question what and how the law is, not how it ought to be. It is a 
science of law (jurisprudence), not legal politics. 
 
                                                          
119 Stanley L. Paulson, “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
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It is called a “pure” theory of law, because it only describes the law and attempts to 
eliminate from the object of this description everything that is not strictly law: Its aim is 
to free the science of law from alien elements. This is the methodological basis of the 
theory.121 
 
  In his search for a universal definition of law based on a strictly positive or human-made 
legal description, Kelsen draws on the epistemological rather than ethical writings of philosopher 
Immanuel Kant122. Like Kant’s transcendental or critical idealist methodology, Kelsen’s pure 
theoretical approach affirms concepts structuring the perception of legal reality. Whereas the 
study of causality in the natural scientific realm is distinguishable from normative cognition in 
the social scientific sphere, for Kelsen each possesses a similar function: the a priori 
conceptualization of objects of understanding free of “alien elements” or categories extraneous to 
a particular disciplinary understanding. The specific effort to create a valid, objective and unified 
description of normativity in the legal sphere in the mode of transcendental idealism thus 
animates Kelsen’s methodological goal.  
While I do not wish to press Kantian elements too far, given that Kelsen's relationship to 
a transcendental idealist epistemology has been the subject of an intractable debate between legal 
scholars,123 for present purposes I draw on Kelsen's attempt to describe “legal science” as a 
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science of norms, in order to provide a framework of Kant-inspired fundamental concepts, 
including that of imputation or responsibility. Kelsen writes: 
 
It is…true that, according to Kant’s epistemology, the science of law as cognition of the 
law, like any cognition, has constitutive character—it ‘creates’ its object insofar as it 
comprehends the object as a meaningful whole. Just as the chaos of sensual perceptions 
becomes a cosmos, that is, ‘nature’ as a unified system, through the cognition of natural 
science, so the multitude of general and individual legal norms, created by the legal 
organs, becomes a unitary system, a legal ‘order,’ through the science of law. But this 
‘creation’ has a purely epistemological character. It is fundamentally different from the 
creation of objects by human labor or the creation of law by the legal authority.124  
 
 Materials or objects of reality, according to Kant, are molded by the senses under forms of 
thought. “We can have a priori knowledge by means of the categories, only if the categories are 
due to the nature of the mind and are imposed by the mind on the objects which it knows.”125 
These pure concepts of understanding (Verstand) condition the possibility of objects. The 
transcendental categories of cognition in The Critique of Pure Reason, including “quantity,” 
“quality,” “relation,” and “modality” can be compared to “imputation” (Zurechnung), which 
structures understanding of primary legal datum. The “delict” or offense is conditioned by 
“sanctions” or coercive measures, which comprise two component parts necessary for cognition 
                                                          
moral law providing for reward in case of merit or in the legal law providing for punishment in the case of crime…”  
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of the distinctive category—or legal normative concept—of imputation.126 The relationship 
between these datum—based on a conception of “ought” (Sollen) propositions (i.e., “if one 
murders, then one ought to be punished”) creates an ordering of coercive norms. The order that is 
created is based on pure cognition of the relationship between delicts and sanctions; the 
introduction of extraneous categories, on the other hand, does not comprehend law.  
Kelsen distinguishes an “ought” (Sollen) that describes “a legal proposition” (Rechtssatz) 
from “an ethical proposition (Satz der Ethik).127 While a “law of law” (Rechtsgesetz) is 
distinguished from a “law of morality” (Moralgezetz), the study of legal or moral norms can be 
divided from the natural scientific study of physical connections or causal relationships under a 
“law of nature” (Naturgesetz), which are “is” or “factual,” rather than “ought” propositions. 
While the ordinary meaning of normativity is prescriptive, Kelsen introduces imputation 
designated by legal norms in a descriptive sense. A “science of law” is meant to reflect “the 
material produced by the legal authority in the law-making procedure, in the form of statements 
to the effect that ‘if such and such conditions are fulfilled, then such and such a sanction shall 
follow.’”128  
 “Imputation means ‘every connection of a human behavior with the condition under 
which it is commanded or prohibited in the norm.’”129 A priori cognition of the relationship 
between delicts and sanctions as applied to “legal persons” as objects of imputation correspond 
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with Kelsen’s view of normative delegation under the acts of state doctrine (AoSD). An “organ 
of the State” as an “organ of the law,” or a “legal person,” fulfills a norm-creating or norm-
applying function determined by the legal order. Legal protection against prosecution of state 
officials defines a view of imputation in international law between the anarchy of international 
relations, whereby no state can adjudge the collective illegality of any other state, and the 
identity of the international legal order as commonly imputing responsibility to individuals for 
acts of state. The transformation of ICR, and with it the conception of the AoSD under 
international law into an efficacious jurisdictional sphere prosecuting individual for acts that 
were legal under national laws, requires justified validity claims.  
From the perspective of a “science of law,” however, the state official is merely the point 
of imputation of a “bundle of legal norms.”130 Jurisprudence as a distinctive field of legal 
cognition, therefore, derives the concept of imputation from a unity, which encompasses the “de-
personalized” or “de-psychologized” description of responsibility as relations between legal 
norms. Psychological states, including motivations caused by fear of coercive action, must never 
enter into a strictly positive analysis of normative validity. In an effort to establish the legal 
validity of ICR, Kelsen introduces a purely normative legal technique that excludes the reasons 
or intentions of individuals for choosing a particular course of action.  
Like sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918), who responded to Kant’s declaration that 
additional categories could exist by introducing the innate form of “ought” (Sollen), Kelsen 
transforms this new “ought” category into the basis for conceptualizing imputation. But while his 
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relativist epistemology strictly adheres to Kant’s methodological framework, Kelsen nevertheless 
deviates from Kant’s approach with respect to moral philosophy. He writes:   
 
The struggle which this philosophical genius, supported by science, waged against 
metaphysics, which earned him the title of the “all-destroyer,” was not actually pushed by 
him to the ultimate conclusion….The role which the “the-thing-in-itself” plays in his 
system reveals a good deal of metaphysical transcendence…So it happens that Kant, 
whose philosophy of transcendental logic was preeminently destined to provide the 
groundwork for a positivistic legal and political doctrine, stayed, as a legal philosopher, 
in the rut of the natural-law doctrine. Indeed, his Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics 
can be regarded as the most perfect expression of the classical doctrine of natural law as 
it evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on the basis of Protestant 
Christianity.131 
 
Chapter four analyzes the AoSD in relation to the question of human agency by 
demonstrating the movement from a moral relativist conception of pure legal normativity to a 
discussion of the intrinsic moral criterion used to determine ICR. Kant’s ethically informed legal 
argument is introduced in order to conceptualize the degree to which Kelsen accepts the prospect 
of “free will” linked to moral choice under superior orders. 132 While, Kelsen does not reduce his 
conception of human behavior to causally determined lines, or “the idea that every event is 
necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with [fixed] laws of nature.”133134 
based on, 
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From his morally-inspired conception of ICR based on retroactive lawmaking, which 
accounts for “civilizational” standards that deviate from national law extant at the time of the 
commission of an international crime, one may infer that Kelsen recognizes the possibility of 
acting in accordance with a “higher principle of justice”.135 While the focus of Part IV of this 
chapter is on Kelsen’s “moral-turn,” reaffirming the limitations of a morally relativist conception 
of imputation under the strictest positive law conditions, an interrogation of the fundamental 
datum of ICR must not exclude a purely normative reflection of the legal scope of cognition.  
In addition to constituting law as a uniquely autonomous sphere of understanding 
separate from the realm of moral cognition, Kelsen separates normative analysis from the study 
of social facts, which he argues must not factor into a positive understanding of law.136 This neo-
Kantian concern is therefore different than the traditional definition of legal positivism. For 
instance, according to a traditional definition, “legal positivism is the thesis that the existence 
and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits...According to positivism, law is 
a matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc.); as we might say 
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in a more modern idiom, positivism is the view that law is a social construction.”137 The overlap 
between “the social fact thesis” of legal positivism and Kelsen's “pure” determination of law's 
positivity is explored in further detail in Part III on the political conception of ICR associated 
with sovereign or statist claims to immunity.  
b. Norms, Basic Norms and the Structure of the International Law 
Even a “legal person” or “legal subject,” according to Kelsen, is merely a “de-
psychologized” bundle of norms, the point of imputation at which duties and rights are directed. 
Kelsen writes that “the legal person is not a separate entity besides ‘its’ duties and rights, but 
only their personified unity—or since duties and rights are legal norms—the personified unity of 
a set of legal norms.”138 The physiological and psychological human being associated with the 
general conception of “natural person” is thus contrasted with the artificial construct called 
“legal person” or “juristic person”. A human being or the personified “state” can each be 
imputed legal responsibility, since both are technically, according to Kelsen, “legal persons”. But 
even this terminology is a duplication of the relationship between “legal persons” as purely 
normative associations. 
A self-enclosed legal system is constituted by both “legal norms” and “legal facts”, says 
Kelsen. While a legal norm constitutes a rule, Kelsen defines it more specifically as “the 
meaning of an act of will.”139 A legal norm is created or posited by an individual or group of 
individuals and directs its attention towards the behavior of another individual or group of 
individuals. A legislative act, for instance, is a “fact” of human will; it creates the norm. But the 
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act itself only receives its “meaning” through the prescription, permission or authorization 
granted by the norm.  
 The act of will that creates the norm is differentiated from the norm itself, which 
conforms to the logical principle that no descriptive or “is” statement can be derived from a 
prescriptive or normative “ought” statement. Likewise, what “ought” to be cannot be derived 
from what “is”. Although individuals may decide to disregard legal norms, making a particular 
norm inefficacious, the norm, if generally effective, is considered valid in regulating behavior. 
Responsibility for international crimes, for Kelsen, is not derived from a social fact or 
psychological components, but from the statement that one ought, for instance, to obey an 
authorized norm.140 This point is critical in distinguishing Kelsen’s from Austin’s description of 
duty and responsibility, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 Each legal norm is “built” upon a hierarchy of legal normative delegation. All the 
combined general and individual legal norms amount to a unified order, or legal “system”. Legal 
“organs”, such as judicial bodies, derive their legitimacy from prior norm-conferring sources, 
such as legislative enactments, which in turn derive their legitimacy from even higher normative 
sources in a chain extending back to a grundnorm, or basic norm. Even if several constitutions 
exist, an original—or first—constitution is considered the primary justification for a legal order. 
Its validity is based on the basic norm that “the original constitution is to be obeyed.”141 The US 
Constitution and the customary norms that comprise the British common law system are 
examples of a grundnorm. While the reasoning is circular, the grundnorm must be presupposed, 
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according to Kelsen, to insure a unified conception of a legal order where “ought” is never 
derived from “is” but only from valid, higher “ought” statements grounded in a presupposed 
basic norm.   
Kelsen grounds the conception of international law in a basic norm superior to the basic 
norm of all independent states, thus affirming the importance of cognition of a unified 
international legal order where domestic law retains a subordinate role in the hierarchy of norms. 
What, then, is the grundnorm of international law? For Kelsen, this is the customary rule that 
“states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.”142 This gives license to the next 
stage, which is formed by norms created by international treaties based on the Latin dictum pacta 
sund servanda (lit: “agreements must be kept”).143  
As in municipal law, freedom of contract exists on the international plane. Legal organs 
(or state officials) may sign treaties subordinating their lower legal normative order (domestic or 
municipal) to a higher one (international). This has the capacity to enable the transformation of 
state organs into subjects of a higher legal order with the implication that protections afforded 
under the AoSD remain subject to the will of future governments. Once a relatively de-
centralized international legal order is formed, according to Kelsen, it moves towards ever 
greater degrees of centralization144.  
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The sovereign value of international law resolves the dilemma over standards of validity 
between different temporal periods in recognizing normative legal growth patterns. According to 
Kelsen, the unity of the international legal system reflects the structural evolution from the 
predominant nineteenth century conception of imputation associated with statist, state-centered 
or political notions of sovereignty to the development in the twentieth century of a purely 
normative conception of international law with the creation of multilateral treaties licensing the 
prosecution of international crimes committed by state officials. Treaties imputing individual 
responsibility, even for acts not yet regulated by international law (i.e., retroactive treaty norms), 
create the standard of validity for the study of ICR. 
Through greater concentration of coercive power, Kelsen believed that international law 
would begin to resemble national law with the establishment of a permanent court to both 
adjudicate disputes between states, and to try individuals for international offenses. An 
international court would be the first—and most significant—contribution to the establishment of 
a federalized world state. Admittedly, a civitas maxima like that advocated by eighteenth century 
philosopher Christian Wolff, might never be created.  Nevertheless, Kelsen’s introduction of the 
concept of ICR was initially premised on the idea that only a world court as a precursor to a 
world state could adequately insure unbiased judgment. 
Likening international law to law practiced before the birth of the modern centralized 
state, Kelsen saw what he called the “primitive” nature of international law as merely a stage on 
the beltway towards ever greater concentration of powers. As in the tribal period of human 
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development where retribution against an offender's family through “blood-feud” or “vendetta” 
preceded the creation of neutral and independent courts to adjudicate individual culpability, 
Kelsen believed that in the “modern” era the establishment of a permanent court with coercive 
sanctioning powers would eventually supersede the “primitive” application of international 
justice through collective security arrangements and ad hoc jurisdictional authority.145  
A permanent judicial body comprised of representatives of different states would 
determine which states had committed international offenses by, for example, resorting to wars 
in violation of multilateral collective security agreements. This would replace the ad hoc 
determination of crimes against peace (CAP), for example, which, as chapter three concludes, 
creates a bias in favor of what Kelsen recognized to be “imperial” interests. Once this structural 
reformation took place, the accusation of “victors' justice” would be excised from international 
discourse. Centralization of the international system through the implementation of a neutral, 
compulsory international court would staunch criticisms like those lodged at the victorious 
powers after the Second World War when nations that conducted the trial of major war criminals 
at Nuremberg, including the United States, Great Britain, France and the former USSR, were 
accused of conducting “a sham trial for the sake of vengeance”.146  
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Kelsen writes in Peace through Law that: 
 
It is quite possible that the idea of a universal World Federal State will be realized, but 
only after a long and slow development equalizing the cultural differences between the 
nations of the world, especially if this development is furthered by conscious political and 
educational work in the ideological field... The constitution of a World State with a world 
government and a world parliament, however, although international law as the contents 
of an international treaty, is at the same time national law, since it is the basis of the law 
of the World State.147 
 
Kelsen’s preference was clearly for a world state spearheaded by national legal orders 
that subsumed law to higher world bodies through international treaties. His political desire was 
to create a “World State with a world government and a world parliament,”148 which could 
legitimately hold accountable state officials in accordance with a legal structure that paralleled 
codified national legal orders. His political project therefore aimed to create new international 
institutions, such as a permanent compulsory international court through treaties subordinating 
state authority. 
However, in granting states the right to protect citizens from international prosecution in 
the belief that eventually, through delegation of authority to neutral international bodies, a higher 
law would transform acts of state into prosecutable offenses, Kelsen minimizes the real prospect 
that a civitas maxima might never come about. Structural impediments to the application of 
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international legal norms, resulting from lack of a neutral world body, necessitated a theory of 
positive law that could also justify ad hoc jurisdictional authority over humanitarian prosecution. 
Part IV returns to the subject of valid ad hoc prosecution under international law. 
c. Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law 
“[T]he science of law describes its object by propositions in which the delict is connected 
with the sanction by the copula 'ought',” writes Kelsen.149 He designates this relationship 
“imputation.” “The statement that an individual is zurechnungsfaehig (“responsible”) means that 
a sanction can be inflicted upon him if he commits a delict. The statement that an individual is 
unzurechnungsfaehif (“irresponsible”)—because, for instance, he is a child or insane—means 
that a sanction cannot be inflicted upon him if he commits a delict.”150   
The criminal law element of mens rea (Latin for “guilty mind”) used to determine 
whether an accused is capable of distinguishing between legality and illegality corresponds with 
the differentiation Kelsen makes between categories of individuals. In this sense, “responsible” 
and “irresponsible” does not correspond to the intention of a particular act but rather to the 
category of “legal persons”. Children and the mentally insane, according to Kelsen, since they do 
not possess sufficient rational judgment, cannot possess mens rea, and therefore cannot be 
denominated “legal persons”.151 The Pure Theory of Law only requires that a norm be imputed to 
an individual capable of distinguishing legal from illegal acts in general. Those designated by 
international treaties as “legal persons” subject to prosecution are not required, according to 
Kelsen, to have known about the actual offense, only to know that in the instance for which a 
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subordinate violated international humanitarian laws that the act committed would have 
constituted an offense.152 Therefore, the only formal requirement is that an international treaty 
stipulates those “legal persons” subject to prosecution.  
To apply, for instance, collective responsibility or absolute liability for crimes against 
peace to all citizens of a national legal order precludes the criterion of mens rea entirely. Those 
who had nothing to do with the decision to go to war are still to be held legally responsible for 
acts of state committed by officials in an administrative capacity. Even when the mens rea 
requirement is construed in terms of the capability of adhering to a legal norm, a distinction must 
be made between individual and collective responsibility. While the first category requires the 
ability to distinguish legal from illegal acts, the second does not. Children and the mentally 
insane, lacking the rational wherewithal to consistently make decisions in conformity with legal 
norms, however, may still be held responsible. Much like members of a corporation held liable 
for the delinquencies of specific employees, all citizens are collectively held responsible for the 
actions of state officials that would otherwise have constituted individual responsibility. As 
typically construed, mens rea, therefore, is not a necessary element of the collective description 
of ICR. The “legal person” in such cases is the personified “state”.  Kelsen writes: 
 
The statement that according to international law the State is responsible for its acts 
means that the subjects of the State are collectively responsible for the acts of the organs 
of the State; and the statement that international law imposes duties on States and not on 
individuals means, in the first place, that the specific sanctions of international law, 
                                                          
152 Article 8 “The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free  
him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so  
requires.” “United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the  
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August  




reprisals and war, are applied in recognition of collective, not individual, 
responsibility.153 
 
The primary sanctions of international law—war and reprisals— are applicable as 
collective punishment against all subjects of a state for offenses committed by state officials. 
Kelsen’s interest in maintaining a valid conception of an international legal order that shares the 
same formal requirements as national law consequently provokes serious inquiry as to the 
appropriateness of such a comparison. If in most instances “subjects of the State are collectively 
responsible for the acts of the organs of the State,” then international law admittedly is more 
similar to “primitive” law, which emphasizes “blood revenge”. Kelsen’s effort to establish the 
legal grounds in which to impute individual responsibility for core international crimes must 
therefore be understood as an attempt to incorporate forms of responsibility traditionally found 
under national law into the international sphere. 
d. The Problem of Psychological “Command” to the Theoretical Conception of ICR 
Before turning in Part III to an interrogation of the politicization implied by Kelsen’s 
validation of autocratic rule, and Part IV to the author of the Pure Theory of Law’s most 
important contribution to the study of ICR—ad hoc licensing of retroactive lawmaking 
predicated on a moral criterion of responsibility—it is first necessary to understand how 
Kelsen’s strictly positive legal normative conception of ICR is differentiated from a 
psychologized understanding of this term. Here, Austin’s theory of sovereign, command and 
duty is most instructive.  
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In his article “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg” (1975), contemporary North 
American Kelsenian Stanley Paulson analyzes the relationship between Austin’s command 
theoretical doctrine and defenses based on the acts of state doctrine, superior orders and 
retroactive laws. Although Paulson mentions Kelsen as accepting the legitimacy of the 
Nuremberg judgment based on the ex post facto prosecution of acts of state of the magnitude of 
core international crimes, he neglects to interrogate this point for its doctrinal contradictions.154 
Rather, Paulson focuses entirely on Austin’s psychologized reading of responsibility as the main 
justification used by Nazi defendants at Nuremberg. Disregarding both the use of Pure Theory by 
ICL practitioners to clarify points of jurisprudence, and the doctrinal implications of Kelsen’s 
transgression of the “separation thesis,” Paulson reduces his examination of legal positivism, 
more generally, to only the clearest example of immunizing positive law doctrine: the theory of 
sovereign command.  
Since command theory implies a psychological rendering of responsibility reduced to a 
conception of duty or direct obligation under the threat of coercion, Austin’s conception does not 
correspond to the categories of responsibility imputed to individuals, who may not have been 
directly liable for the commission of an act. While norm application only refers to two people in 
the Austinian account (i.e., the commander and commanded), for Kelsen duty and responsibility 
may, though need not, coincide. A third and fourth “legal person” may be imputed responsibility 
for acts of other legal organs obligated to uphold the law. The distinction between duty or 
obligation, on the one hand, and responsibility, on the other, therefore corresponds with an 
artificial designation based on the juristic assignment of “legal persons”.  
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Kelsen describes “legal persons” in a “de-personalized” or “de-psychologized” fashion, 
not as someone that ‘has’ legal duties and rights, not as in the primitive mythological or 
animistic way of thinking of “an invisible spirit who is the master of the object, who ‘has’ the 
object in the same way as the substance has ‘its’ qualities, the grammatical subject its 
predicates.”155 Rather, Kelsen wishes to distinguish between Austin’s way of conceiving of duty 
as a factual relationship between “legal persons” possessing natural qualities, and Kelsen’s 
wholly normative analysis. “The legal person,” Kelsen writes, “is the legal substance to which 
duties and rights belong as legal qualities. The idea that the person ‘has’ duties and rights 
involves the relation of substance and quality. In reality, however, the legal person is not a 
separate entity beside ‘its’ duties and rights, but only the personified unity or—since duties and 
rights are legal norms—the personified unity of a set of legal norms.”156  
Paulson’s discussion enforces the point that Austin’s theory must be accounted for in 
terms of the “factual” nature of the relationship between “legal persons”. Austin describes the 
power relation that psychologically motivates obedience through fear of sanction in terms of 
“superiority,” which represents “might,” or else “the power of affecting others with evil or pain, 
and of forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one’s wishes.”157 
Hobbes’ account of the state of nature and the resolution of anarchy in civil society under the 
sovereign Leviathan158 resembles the central psychology of fear and self-preservation 
instrumental to the analysis of coercive social relations (i.e., law) in Austin’s writings. Only if a 
ruler has the capacity to induce fear is a subject considered obligated to obey the command. 
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Kelsen, on the other hand, counters the actuality of power relations by freeing the imposition of 
sanctions from a direct assessment of psychological motivations.  
That “coercion” as “the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force 
or threats,”159 entails a future-oriented notion of legality, deserves further investigation. Part III 
introduces the psychologically coercive conception of duty associated with Austin’s command-
centered approach alongside Kelsen’s pure theoretical licensing of autocracy, only to dismantle 
in Part IV the notion of future-oriented “human-made” claims to sovereignty through the use of 
retroactive imputation against state officials for core international crimes.  
 
III: The Political Construction of ICR: Statism and the Prospect of Immunity  
a. Validating the “Uncommanded Commander 
Having worked to demonstrate why the Pure Theory of Law” is critical to a strictly legal 
conception of International Criminal Responsibility (ICR), Part III turns to an exploration of 
political challenges to a “pure” cognition of ICR. International adjudication for ruling officials 
remains philosophically tested in Kelsen’s legal theory by what “Nazi crown jurist” Carl Schmitt 
claims is the “helpless formalism”160 of pure theory based on a scientific or value-free notion of 
authority. Schmitt writes that Kelsen’s legal theoretical attempt to subject the state to liberal or 
individualistic values allows “legislative officials” the right to “empower themselves for 
anything if…given the form of a statute.”161 Under a decentralized international legal authority, 
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in consequence, the rule of law would seem to “exercise[] no meaningful constraint on the state” 
and its leaders.162  
Schmitt’s sociology of law especially endorses the position that the existential moment 
generated by the emergency situation requires a sovereign distinction between friend and foe.163 
Schmitt writes:  
 
All law is "situational law." The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its 
totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the 
state's sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to 
coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most dearly the 
essence of the state's authority. The decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to 
formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on 
law.164 
 
Like Austin, whose notion of the “uncommanded commander” insures authority without 
simultaneously obligating “sovereign” officials, Schmitt correctly diagnoses the potential for 
arbitrary rule, which he deems applicable to Kelsen’s neutral structuring of legal orders. Kelsen 
writes:  
 
“Even in a[n] [autocratic State], there are many “tyrants,” many people who impose their 
will upon others. But only one is essential to the existence of the State. Who? The one 
who commands “in the name of the State.” How then do we distinguish between 
commands “in the name of the State” and other commands? Hardly otherwise than by 
means of the legal order which constitutes the State…The ruler of a State is that 
individual who exercises a function determined by this order. It is hardly possible to 
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define the concept of a ruler functioning as “organ of the State” without presupposing the 
legal order constituting the community we call State. The concept of a “ruler of the State” 
thus implies the idea of a valid legal order.”165 
 
Even as Kelsen licenses autocratic rule in accordance with a legal rather than political 
notion of authorization, discretionary command by a ruler bears a similar function to that 
determined by prospective notions of legality: the ordering of social relations. The moral quality 
of a regime is clearly not a problem for the validation of a regime, according to Kelsen. “Many 
‘tyrants’…impose their will upon others” under autocracy.166 No operative difference 
consequently exists between the concept of a ruler functioning as a delegated “organ of the 
State,” on the one hand, and as the embodiment of prerogative sovereign power or dictat, on the 
other. For Schmitt, however, “the political is not simply distinct from the legal but prior to it in 
that no system of norms can be developed or applied without a moment of decision that exceeds 
the regulation of those norms. Thus the state as the political actor cannot be reduced to a legal 
system.”167  
Although Kelsen endorses autocracy as a valid form of governance subject to pure 
jurisprudential cognition, the path to validity requires legal authorization of delegated 
responsibilities. Kelsen’s support of international legal norms sanctioning the conduct of 
autocrats, therefore, precludes the notion of a “sovereign” ruler in the sense that Schmitt 
describes. Perfectly compatible with a pure conception of imputation (even under democratic 
conditions), the state of emergency, Kelsen implies, is regulated by (a) principles of tolerance 
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prohibiting persecution of vulnerable populations, and (b) the prospect of imposing international 
punishment on rulers for violation of principle of tolerance. The moral principle or standard by 
which Kelsen retroactively imputes responsibility for core international crimes, as Part IV 
indicates, is “civilizational,” protective of the right to be free of persecution.  
But retroactive freedom from persecution cannot guarantee protection from actual 
persecution under a despot. Only the despot’s future criminal status can create a retributive, as 
opposed to deterrent sense of justice, insuring victims—and their allies—that civilizational 
standards promoted by a plurality of “humanity” does not permit crimes against humanity, 
genocide, et al, even if that means negation of the principle of legality rule against ex post facto 
laws. Notwithstanding Kelsen’s realism with regard to the international community’s lack of 
police enforcement powers, he places faith in the legitimizing process of treaties ratifying foreign 
prosecution of acts of state. Although later deemed core international crimes, acts of state, are 
typically protected by sovereign right derived from the personified “state,” which is the national 
legal order, or unified object of cognition of imputation. The “state,” albeit the primary “legal 
person” or “subject” of imputation in international law, however, does not encompass all forms 
of “persons”. Nevertheless, if there is to be efficacy in the prosecution of individuals in 
international law, statist demonstrations of immunity must be theoretically disposed of. This 
includes the endorsement of the validity and efficacy of a despotic, if “legal,” order. 
Kelsen’s theoretical consideration of efficacy or the effectiveness of states or national 
legal orders relates to his position that as long as a certain societal population generally adheres 
to the pronouncements of its leaders, even those acting in a tyrannical fashion by persecuting 
oppositional and minority factions, the “state” may be described as a valid authority. This creates 
problems not only for the direct prosecution of that individual but for all those within the 
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hierarchy of power over which he rules. Since subordinate legal organs can claim that each 
adheres to valid legal norms originating in the presupposed grundnorm or basic norm of an 
autocrat, a system of immunity is constituted through doctrinal means. 
Such a view, however, neglects to consider implications to the principle non sub homine 
sed sub lege (“not under man but under law”), a principle of Pure Theory integral to the 
conception of an impersonal norm regulating human behavior in a society.168 The primacy of law 
over man, or normativity over facticity, renders the Fuhrer (or Leader) Principle, for instance, 
void. Insofar as Hitler cannot claim in the Austinian sense that he has a right as “uncommanded 
commander” to total immunity, he remains subject to punishment under international law. As 
such, Part III delineates the threat to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege, a perennial 
challenge to the prospect of war crimes adjudication. Through the assertion of an even more 
foundational principle of justice championed by Kelsen—ex post facto lawmaking in cases 
where state officials acting immorally are to be held responsible for offenses committed in 
conformity with state law, Part IV rebuts political claims introduced in Part III, including the 
categorical immunization of heads-of-state. But to reach this goal it is first necessary to examine 
problems associated with the idea that Kelsen maintains an ineluctable commitment to the 
legitimacy of any authority that maintains efficacy, even under autocratic rule. 
b. Efficacy 
Legal philosopher Andrei Marmor describes Kelsen's notion of efficacy as follows:   
A norm is efficacious if it is actually (generally) followed by the relevant population. 
Thus, “a norm is considered to be legally valid”, Kelsen writes, “on the condition that it 
belongs to a system of norms, to an order which, on the whole, is efficacious”.169 So the 
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relationship here is this: efficacy is not a condition of legal validity of individual norms. 
Any given norm can be legally valid even if nobody follows it...However, a norm can 
only be legally valid if it belongs to a system, a legal order that is by and large actually 
practiced by a certain population. And thus the idea of legal validity, as Kelsen admits, is 
closely tied to this reality of a social practice; a legal system exists, as it were, only as a 
social reality, a reality that consists in the fact that people actually follow certain 
norms.170 
  
Efficacy implies the protection of state officials from international prosecution under the 
supremacy of state authority.  If a population decides that it no longer wishes to abide by the 
rules of its legal order, then the system of legal norms is no longer valid. Insofar as this is the 
case, then the domestic order in which norms exist are either replaced by another system of 
norms constituting the government of a state, or else anarchy ensues for a period before a new 
legal order replaces the vacuum that arises when a population disregards the law. Yet as long as 
laws of the legal order are generally obeyed, even if those laws emanate from an “uncommanded 
commander” who assumes the authority of the grundnorm, then the order is considered valid in 
accordance with a pure theoretical account. 
But as legal scholar Michael Green asserts, once law is reduced to “factual” statements—
efficacy or the “will of men”—then there is little difference between Kelsen's and Hart's 
approach to law.  To fall back on “social facts,” as Hart does in order to demonstrate law's 
validity, Green asserts, undermines Kelsen's belief in a “transcendental-logical 
presupposition,”171 or condition of knowledge associated with any autonomous system. At all 
levels, including the international, the cognition of imputation must be unimpeded by ideological 
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interests. To endorse an autocratic order only on structural grounds as valid because it is 
efficacious, presupposes that “the human being appears in the legal order,” not “as the 
personified bundle of legal norms, establishing duties and rights, that is counted as a 
‘person’,”172 but as an actor free of normative restraint.  
Kelsen writes that “human behavior is enacted, provided, or prescribed by a rule of law 
without any psychic act of will. Law might be termed a ‘depsychologized’ command.”173 Even 
when law is obeyed by citizens out of fear or some other psychological influence, Kelsen refuses 
to consider this an object of normative jurisprudence174. Rather, to go beyond the cognition of 
human behavior in terms of a “personified bundle of legal norms” is to practice “sociological 
jurisprudence.”175 The former is concerned with the validity of law; the latter, with efficacy. As 
Kelsen often asserts, “what must be avoided under all circumstances is the confounding—as 
frequent as it is misleading—of cognition directed toward a legal ‘ought’, with cognition directed 
toward an actual ‘is’.”176   
If Kelsen does indeed, as Marmor suggests, validate the law in terms of efficacy, then 
how different in the end is Kelsen’s legal philosophy from the “social fact thesis,” which asserts 
that “it is a necessary truth that legal validity is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social 
facts”? (see: Part II) Green is right to suggest that if Kelsen actually endorses efficacy, then the 
whole enterprise of international law is potentially at stake, since international law develops 
through an accretion of treaties and customary norms based on transcendental presuppositions, 
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which, in pyramidal fashion, allows states to subsume their laws to higher international legal 
norms (“the primacy thesis”). This is especially problematic with regard to the study of ICR, 
since any legal order—especially an autocracy—can act to protect state officials from 
international prosecution by claiming that social facts affirm the validity of that particular social 
order, and that any claim to regulate the behavior of officials threatens the effectiveness of the 
order.   
Like Marmor, Wolfgang Friedmann asserts that Kelsen’s statement that “the efficacy of 
the total legal order is a necessary condition for the validity of every single norm of the order”177 
implies that Kelsen does not clearly state what constitutes minimal adherence. He argues that 
Kelsen does not specify the point at which, for example, the laws of the German Republic were 
replaced by those of the Nazi legal order. Did Nazi law replace that of the German Republic in 
1933 with Hitler’s ascension to power? Did German Republican law continue to exist between 
1933 and 1945? How about after 1945? Would the Czarist constitution after 1917 or the German 
Republican constitution after 1933 be considered valid? Without a legal process abrogating laws 
of the previous legal order (i.e., Czarist and Weimar Republican), what formal or normative 
criterion can Kelsen turn to in order to indicate the validity of the basic norm of each national 
legal order?  
Friedmann’s criticism of Kelsen’s inability to clearly identify the relationship between 
efficacy and validity bears on the theoretical discussion of ICR in relation to command and 
obedience. The prospect of state officials claiming immunity for core international crimes when 
a regime under autocratic rule licenses errant legal behavior ought to at least signify the time in 
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which that order is valid. Beyond temporal ambiguity in designating when a regime is 
efficacious, Friedman further criticizes Kelsen’s relativism with regard to his inability to 
distinguish whether a grundnorm is “good” or “bad”. A valid legal order, according to Kelsen, is 
predicated exclusively on cognition of the relationship between higher and lower legal norms. 
But establishing a designation of validity between structurally incompatible forms of governance 
neglects to account for substantive moral claims. “That Parliament is sovereign in England, 
writes Friedmann, “is a fundamental norm, no more logically deducible than that the command 
of the Fuhrer was the supreme legal authority in Nazi Germany or that native tribes obey a witch 
doctor.”178 
c. The Fuhrer Principle 
In the Nazi hierarchy, the Fuhrer Principle granted Hitler the right to administer authority 
as “uncommanded commander”. At the pinnacle of the Nazi regime, “all members swore an oath 
of ‘eternal allegiance’ to [Hitler].”179 Hermann Jahreiss, IMT defence counsel for Nazi Alfred 
Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command during World War II, 
describes Hitler's position vis a vis superior orders: “The functionaries,” Jahreiss said, “had 
neither the right nor the duty to examine the orders of the monocrat to determine their legality. 
For them these orders could never be illegal at all.”180  In his closing address, Jahreiss referenced 
the following statement made by Kelsen: 
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The number of persons who ha[ve] the legal power of leading their country into war is in 
each of the Axis States is very small. In Germany it is probably the Fuehrer alone.181  
 
Legal scholar Yoram Dinstein argues that “unquestionably, according to the AoSD, the 
Head of State, not less than any other organ of the State, is immune from prosecution before a 
foreign court for acts committed by him in that capacity.”182 He quotes Kelsen from various 
sources to this effect,183 affirming that the author of pure theory could never have endorsed 
Hitler’s prosecution under the AoSD. 
Robert Jackson, however, presents a scenario in which all Nazis, including Hitler, could 
claim immunity through various defense mechanisms, including the AoSD. For example, A 
could claim he is not legally responsible for an act because B is superior. Since B ordered A to 
perform the act, B is responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior where a party is 
liable vicariously for acts of their agents. But if B is the head-of-state, he cannot use the defense 
of superior orders, even as he is able to impute his act to the state under the AoSD. Jackson 
considers such a circumstance patently absurd, since nobody could then be held responsible.184 
This is the basic pattern of thinking associated with classical legal positivist command theory, 
and sociological approaches at the time, like Schmitt’s, that retained a state-centered conception 
of law. 
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184 Paulson, “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg,” 149.  
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Kelsen’s position in General Theory of Law and State that the Nazi regime was indeed 
legitimate like any other coercive legal system,185 accounts for the possibility that the same 
decisionism that Schmitt advocated under the state of emergency (German: Ausnahmezustand), in 
which a sovereign could suspend the law for the sake of the public good, could indeed be 
reconciled with Kelsen’s aforementioned statement regarding unconditional obedience to a leader 
in wartime. Even though Hitler’s absolute leadership, according to Kelsen, amounted to a 
‘gangster’s-state’,186 and Kelsen’s preference was certainly for democracy, he does not clearly 
reject the validity claims of autocracy.187 Nevertheless, as Francois Rigaux insists, “a veil of 
legality was intended to cover up the anarchical character of the power to defeat any norm through 
an individual decision.”188 The Nazi regime was therefore a ‘prerogative’ rather than ‘normative’ 
state.189 Rigaux states that: 
 
Indeed, positing an individual decision above any rule, the Fuhrerprinzip subverted the 
Kelsenian hierarchy between the rule and particular acts or decisions which had to 
conform to a superior rule right up to the ultimate subordination of the Grundnorm.190 
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The unity of the legal order, Rigaux contends, requires that the law follow a clear 
procedural path with the delegation of legal norms from one level to another.191 This insures that 
those in command are obligated to adhere to higher legal norms. But in spite of Rigaux’s necessary 
clarification, he does not sufficiently counter Kelsen’s endorsement of a prerogative state or 
autocratic rule, since a higher legal norm can license any type of legal order, even one where the 
prerogative decision under the Fuhrer Principle transforms the arbitrary decrees of the highest 
leader into the grundnorm. The only way out of this impasse is to find a legal means by which to 
hold an autocrat like Hitler accountable even when his words constitute the highest law under a 
certain juridical order. 
e. Non Sub Homine Sed Sub Lege 
Before turning in Part IV to an examination of the retroactive methodology used to insure 
the culpability of seemingly “prerogative” decision-makers under higher laws adjudicating core 
international crimes, this section clarifies Kelsen’s position in relation to the principle non sub 
homine sed sub lege. The debate between Kelsen and Schmitt192 over judicial review attests to 
Kelsen’s commitment to liberal practice, which conforms to the belief that all laws, even those 
promulgated by autocrats, ought to be regulated by constitutional authority, in accordance with 
the aforementioned principle. Despite the fact that autocrats, by definition, are prone to arbitrary 
decision-making, Kelsen’s advocacy of the rule of law regulating the behavior of all individuals 
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under democratic forms of governance,193 cannot be disassociated from his embrace of judicial 
review as a means of preventing discretionary authority. 
Whereas Schmitt rejected judicial review on the grounds that “liberal 
constitutionalism...abstract[ed] from the substantive and pre-legal political identity of a people 
that can alone provide constitutional legitimacy and...distinguish between friend and enemy,”194 
Kelsen assumed that an executive branch with unrestricted powers of emergency undermined a 
liberal commitment to the neutralization of conflict. Since modern societies are comprised of 
multi-ethnic, religious and racial orders, the idea of granting authority to a leader representing 
the “political identity of a people” created the ever-present threat of violence, and by extension, 
the structural underpinnings of genocide.   
For Schmitt, the enemy is “existentially something different and alien, so that in the 
extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”195 The state of exception is the moment when the 
rule of law is suspended by an authoritative figure freed of legal restraint, acting in a decisive 
manner against enemies. Dictatorial violence approved by the constitution, Schmitt asserts, 
resolves democratic conflict, even if at the expense of minority protections. In contrast, a 
constitutionally-sanctioned court with the power of judicial review has the capacity to insure 
greater social harmony, as an independent judiciary acts as a check on societies represented by 
demagogic rule.  
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Judicial review is antithetical to laws like Article 48, the emergency decree of July 20, 
1932 initiated by the conservative federal government of Franz von Pappen and signed by 
President Paul von Hindenberg, used to license the usurpation of executive authority. After the 
Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933, Hilter, as the new German chancellor, claimed authority to 
curtail constitutional rights. While Kelsen’s commentary on judicial review does not preclude his 
support of efficacy as a means of assessing the validity of an autocratic regime like Hitler’s, nor 
does it prove that the Fuhrer Principle, for example, does not conform to the concept of the 
grundnorm, it confirms Kelsen’s preference for the juridical regulation of societies. As such, the 
prospect of holding accountable strong leaders is maximized through a structural choice liberal 
in orientation. Even if a national legal order that institutes robust powers of judicial review, by 
definition, is irreconcilable with autocratic rule, as Kelsen cautions, the distinction between 
autocratic and democratic forms of governance are only ideal types in the Weberian sense.196 
Democracies, though traditionally less militant, can also produce war criminals. 
In reference to problems associated with Austin’s identity of the commanding and 
commanded (see: Part II), Kelsen affirms that democratic laws could not exist if conceived of 
merely as “commands”. Kelsen writes: 
 
If we compare [a democratic form of governance] to commands, we must by abstraction 
eliminate the fact that these ‘commands’ are issued by those at whom they are directed. 
One can characterize democratic laws as “commands” only if one ignores the relationship 
between the individuals issuing the command and the individuals at whom the command 
is directed, if one assumes only a relationship between the latter and the “command” 
considered as impersonal, anonymous authority. That is, the authority of the law, above 
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the individual persons who are commanded and who command. This idea that the binding 
force emanates, not from any commanding human being, but from the impersonal 
anonymous “command” as such, is expressed in the famous words non sub homine sed 
sub lege. If a relation of superiority and inferiority is included in the concept of 
command, then the rules of law are commands only if we consider the individual bound 




Kelsen affirms that with respect to democracy, a distinction must be made between a 
psychologized and de-psychologized notion of “norm” as distinguished from “command”. The 
principle non sub homine sed sub lege, however, can only be characterized in normative terms, if 
a further distinction is made between autocracy and democracy, Kelsen’s two-fold, as opposed to 
Aristotle’s three-fold, description of forms of regime-types.198 Kelsen’s dichotomization of types 
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of governance only substantiates the purity of law on one end of the spectrum. Democracy 
conforms to “the ‘command’ considered as impersonal, anonymous authority.” But how can 
Kelsen maintain such a distinction in describing autocratic rule, which must subvert a 
commitment to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege? How can he claim to remain de-
psychologized in cognition, when autocratic rule implies an un-commanded, discretionary 
commander?  
The only way to resolve the problem of authority under a pure theoretical approach is to 
recognize the possibility that even if Kelsen’s description of law initially finds common ground 
with Austin’s command theory, Kelsen is nevertheless able to maintain the principle non sub 
homine sed sub lege under international law. Once an autocratic head-of-state is recognized as 
having performed acts for which he is “morally responsible,” including core international crimes, 
and a state is authorized to transfer powers to a jurisdictional authority instituting ICL, he may 
then be subject to prosecution, since his past commands are no longer sovereign. To do so, 
however, Kelsen recommends the transgression of his own doctrinal commitment to the 
separation of law from morality. Part IV—on the use of ex post facto methodology in relation to 
humanitarian criminal prosecution—demonstrates how a normative conception of authority can 
be retained, albeit at the expense of a pure doctrinal commitment to “the separation thesis”. 
IV. The Moral Construction of ICR: Ex Post Facto Lawmaking and the “Higher” Principle 
of Justice 
a. The Rule against Ex Post Facto Law: Positive or Natural? 
 




This irregular methodological choice, a moral “sleight-of-hand” utilized at the ICL level, 
is distinguished from cognition of discretionary “commands” under domestic conditions. Acts 
warranting prosecution of core international crimes represent the abolition of the principle of 
legality rule against ex post facto laws in accordance with certain “civilizational" prerequisites. 
Retroactive lawmaking in the international sphere for offenses that were not “indifferent in 
itself” (i.e., violent or harmful), according to Kelsen, are essential to prosecution of core 
international crimes.199 
Kelsen writes: 
Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact that under positive law 
they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts made punishable with 
retroactive force. In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each other, the 
higher one prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for the 
international crimes of the [S]econd World War may certainly be considered as more 
important than to comply with the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to 
so many exceptions.200 
 
The difference between the use of retroactive legislation by ICL practitioners, on the one 
hand, and autocrats, on the other, is predicated on the way each makes use of the same technique. 
Retroactivity used to promote the human rights of victims of crimes against humanity and 
genocide is unlike retroactivity utilized for the purpose of repressing minority populations and 
other vulnerable religious, ethnic, racial, gender and class groups under autocracies, including 
fascist and totalitarian regimes. While one can imagine scenarios in which the prosecution of 
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core international crimes is politicized, there is a difference in kind between offenses committed 
at the behest of an autocrat with the intention of protecting parochial norms, even if it means 
persecuting minorities, and the general consensus of the international community that genocide 
is a peremptory norm in which no deviation is permitted. Kelsen must therefore violate his 
commitment to the separation of law from morality or “the separation thesis,” in order to 
construct a methodology that can hold Hitler accountable for “commands” that, at the time of 
their promulgation, in accordance with Austin’s command theory, were free of imputation from 
any higher international law.  
Before addressing the philosophical implications of Kelsen’s rationale for holding state 
officials retroactively accountable for acts of state, it is necessary to first define the parameters of 
the principle of legality expressed through the Latin phrase nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena 
sine lege, meaning "no crime or punishment without a law."201 Since Kelsen emphasizes the 
“positivity” of cognition of ex post facto laws, it is first necessary to situate the debate between 
positive and natural lawyers on the question of retroactive application in the international sphere. 
The next section considers how Kelsen validates retroactivity through a legal positivist frame of 
reference before turning in Part IV, Section C, to the central place of moral normativity as the 
basis for justifying international prosecution. 
Although a basic maxim of continental European legal thought,202 the Anglo-American 
common law traditions203 likewise embrace the prohibition of retroactive lawmaking associated 
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with the principle of legality, either through the custom-dominated criminal laws of Great 
Britain, or else the increasingly codified norms of American criminal law.204 Under the U. S. 
Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 prohibits Congress from passing ex post facto laws, 
and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 prohibits states from passing retroactive laws.205 Before the 
Fourteenth Amendment206, this was one of the few restrictions imposed by the US Constitution 
on both powers of federal and state governments. In international affairs, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
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European Convention on Human Rights, the Geneva Convention and Rome Statute, inter alia, 
affirm this principle.207  
  “[C]riminal law by integrating the rules of the principle of legality within itself,” 
according to contemporary positive international law scholar Dov Jacobs,208 “has actually 
explicitly integrated some of the basic tenets of positivism in its daily functioning.” The debate 
                                                          
207 “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 
criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty 
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to 
the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall 
benefit thereby.” “UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 15(1),” The United 
Nations, accessed July 10, 2018, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-
english.pdf.; “No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.”; “UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) Article 11(2),” The United Nations, accessed July 10, 2018, 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.; “No punishment without law: “No one shall be held 
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one 
that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.” “European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) Article 7,” European Union, accessed July 10, 2018, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.; “No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that 
which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, 
provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.” “Geneva 
Convention Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 75(4)(c)(1977), International Committee of 
the Red Cross, accessed July 10, 2018, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf.; “No one 
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which 
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, 
provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.” “Additional 
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 6(2)(c)(1977),” International Committee of the Red Cross, 
accessed July 10, 2018, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750096?OpenDocument.; “Article 22 
Nullum crimen sine lege 1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in 
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a 
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3. This article shall not affect the 
characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute. Article 23 Nulla 
poena sine lege A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute. Article 24 
Non-retroactivity ratione personae 1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior 
to the entry into force of the Statute. 2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final 
judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.” “Rome 
Statute of The International Criminal Court (1998),” International Criminal Court, accessed July 10, 2018, 
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm. 




between legal positivists and natural lawyers is “resolved in favour of positivism,” and a “jurist 
necessarily needs to be a positivist if he wants to study criminal law.”209 In upholding the 
principle of legality in the international sphere, Jacobs asserts, ICL practitioners maintain a 
positive law orientation. 
Legal positivist Kenneth Gallant in his comprehensive survey of the principles of legality 
as applied to international law lists a set of eight positive law criterions. Jacobs’ summarizes the 
rules comprising Gallant’s survey as follows:  
1. No act that was not criminal under a law applicable to the actor (pursuant to a 
previously promulgated statute) at the time of the act may be punished as a crime; 2. No 
act may be punished by a penalty that was not authorized by a law applicable to the actor 
(pursuant to a previously promulgated statute) at the time of the act; 3. No act may be 
punished by a court whose jurisdiction was not established at the time of the act; 4. No 
act may be punished on the basis of lesser or different evidence from that which could 
have been used at the time of the act; 5. No act may be punished except by a law that is 
sufficiently clear to provide notice that the act was prohibited at the time it was 
committed; 6. Interpretation and application of the law should be done on the basis of 
consistent principles; 7. Punishment is personal to the wrongdoer. Collective punishments 
may not be imposed for individual crime; 8. Everything not prohibited by law is 
permitted. 210 
 
 Gallant emphasizes other purposes of legality beyond foreseeability, including constraint 
on arbitrary governance and the legitimization of constitutional democratic as opposed to 
autocratic regimes.211 ICL as a particular demonstration of criminal law based on the principle of 
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legality may also be motivated by the goals of deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation.212 Restorative justice, restitution and reconciliation—and for our purposes—
accountability, are also reasons for which legality is sought after.213 While the demand of 
foreseeability with its correlate purpose of deterrence is the preeminent characteristic of the 
legality principle, Gallant recognizes the indeterminacy of language, which necessarily implies 
law’s unforseeability.214  
Like Gallant, Lon Fuller, representing a secular or procedural version of natural law 
theory, describes the principle of legality as follows: (1) that decisions not be decided on an ad 
hoc basis (or that rules should be existent or “there”), (2) that rules be publicized widely rather 
than selectively, (3) that prospective or future-oriented rather than retrospective legislation 
insures integrity of rules, which guides action, (4) that rules be stated with clarity and be 
detailed, (5) that law in all its forms (i.e., family law, criminal law, etc) be consistent with one 
another, (6) that law must be possible to obey, (7) that rules be constant and enduring, and (8) 
that rules be applied and administered as stated.215   
To assert that natural law theory precludes the doctrinal possibility of deviation from 
principles of legality, as Kelsen does (Part IV, Section B), is to associate natural law theory 
exclusively with a procedural version of natural law, rather than a conceptual natural law notion 
that emphasizes substantive moral constraints on the content of law.216  Lord Wright, a 
prominent natural lawyer at the time of the Nuremberg proceedings, following a procedural 
                                                          
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid.  
214 Kenneth Gallant, The Principles of Legality in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 40. 
215 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 39. 
216 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); John Finnis, "The Truth in Legal 
Positivism," in Robert P. George, The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 195-214. 
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version of natural law writes that “[t]he period of [international law] growth generally coincides 
with the period of world upheavals. The pressure of necessity stimulates the impact of natural 
law and of moral ideas and converts them into rules of law deliberately and overtly recognized 
by the consensus of civilized mankind.”217   According to William Blackstone, who Kelsen 
associated with the former tradition, "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind…is of 
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at 
all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid 
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."218 
While Kelsen points to Blackstone’s seemingly explicitly statement regarding the rule against ex 
post facto lawmaking, he also recognizes Blackstone’s recognition that this applies to laws 
“indifferent in itself,” not to criminal offenses.219If criminal offenses under conditions presented 
by national law do not necessarily benefit from the requirement that all prosecution be based on 
prospective laws, Blackstone certainly would not have accepted a strict imposition of the 
principle of legality for crimes against humanity and genocide.  
                                                          
217 Lord Wright, "War Crimes Under International Law," Law Quarterly Review 62 (1946), 51.  
218 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1 (New York: E. Duyckinck, G. Long, 
Collins & Co, 1827), 27. Kelsen in “The Rule Against Ex post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War 
Criminals” claimed that Blackstone represented a natural law tradition opposed to retroactive lawmaking. The afore-
mentioned quotation emphasizes substantive, rather than procedural, claims of natural law. This signifies a 
distinction between a “law of nature…coeval with mankind…[and] binding over all the globe,” on the one hand, 
contrasted with procedural natural law that bears a resemblance to the correlative sovereign-positivist alignment that 
preferences the rule of the national legal order above that of international law. Part III described the claim that 
Kelsen was “statist” in his orientation in subscribing to a belief in the validity of all legal orders based on a 
presupposed, authoritative grundnorm, which potentially encompassed the Fuhrer Principle. Part IV denies this 
prospect, reconciling non sub homine sed sub lege (or “not under man, but under law”) with the ex post facto 
prosecution of war criminals, including heads-of-state. In this respect, Kelsen certainly deviates from a traditional 
positive law alignment with a state-centered theory of criminal responsibility. As the next section makes clear, the 
substantive (moral) criterion that Kelsen requires for retroactive lawmaking for core international crimes, mirrors 
Blackstone’s description of laws binding throughout the world, obligating individuals to uphold moral principles, 
even if acts of state. Hans Kelsen, “The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws,” 8. 
219 Hans Kelsen, “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws,” 8. 
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Fuller’s procedural conception of natural law, in contrast, emphasizes law’s essential 
function in modifying behavior, in accordance with prospective legal norms of a specific national 
legal order. Fuller implicitly excludes international law as a system responsive retrospectively. 
The object, writes Fuller, is to achieve “[social] order through subjecting people's conduct to the 
guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their behavior."220 His allegory of 
King Rex, who in order to gain assent from those ruled needed to prove that the legal order that 
he presided over provided procedural benefits to those who would authorize his rule, testifies to 
Fuller’s focused concern with prior warning through generalizable rules that could be known, et 
al. Fuller’s principles, therefore, operates internally, not as moral ideals in the sense described by 
Blackstone and Wright. While Kelsen, like Fuller, claims that ex post facto lawmaking is an 
exception, the legal positivist (Kelsen), not the natural law theorist (Fuller), produces a novel 
justification for retroactive lawmaking for a broad range of humanitarian offenses.  
In the classic 1958 Harvard Law Review debate between HLA Hart and Fuller, both 
conclude that, while not ideal, in certain cases ex post facto lawmaking ought to be allowed. In 
Legalism, Judith Shklar insists that though differing over the meaning of the moral ideal of 
“fidelity to law,” both are nevertheless in agreement that retroactive judicial decisions ought to 
be averted. Questioning the distinction that Hart and Fuller make between ex post facto 
legislation and retroactive judicial decision-making, Shklar writes:  
 
One of the subjects of disagreement (between Hart and Fuller) was the right policy of 
courts in regard to a woman who had denounced her husband to the Nazis and so caused 
                                                          
220 See: The fable of King Rex in The Morality of Law where Fuller describes the component part of law’s “inner 
morality” by showing what a good intentioned ruler might be resolved to include in the conception of law to make it 
palatable to the ruled. Legitimacy, as Fuller shows, would include all the elements of the principles of law, including 
generality, publicity, non-retroactivity, et al. Failure to observe these requirements would delegitimize a legal 
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his death. Both Professors Hart and Fuller agreed that retroactive judicial decisions are, 
on the whole, undesirable, though both seemed to feel that if a retroactive statute had 
been passed by the Bonn parliament, this would have been far less disturbing. It is, of 
course, true that almost any new law upsets someone’s expectations based on existing 
rules, but it is difficult to see why legislative retroactivity is any better than judicial, 
unless one has a strong prior notion as to the ends and functions of the law courts.221 
 
In neglecting to distinguish between retroactive judicial decisions and retroactive 
legislation in determining ICR, Shklar ignores the role of states, which Kelsen recognizes as 
essential to validating this form of responsibility. As traditional subjects of international law, 
states (through their organs) are tasked with ratifying treaties. Once transfer of authority takes 
place, the procedure endorsed by courts adjudicating core international crimes depends on a 
lawful conception. To assume, as Shklar does, that there is no difference between retroactive 
judicial and legislative pronouncements ignores the role of states in authorizing the process of 
war crimes adjudication. Legislation that formally licenses the jurisdictional right to try the 
accused, though retrospective, provides security of expectation for states that the authority under 
which judicial decisions take place is indeed authorized by parties to a dispute.  
The application of ex post facto lawmaking, however, only makes sense if a moral 
criterion is also agreed upon. 222 Although a relativist ontological position cannot resolve the 
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222Does “primitive” tribal consciousness like the fascist distinction between “friend” and “foe” used to justify 
“organic” forms of twentieth century totalitarianism, not dictate the level by which international law should adjudge 
the capacity for responsibility? Kelsen argues that it is not consciousness or psychology, but the degree of the 
offense inherent in acts of state, which makes retroactive imputation valid. How can an international legal norm 
retrospectively adjudicating core international crimes be based on a purely legal, rather than a moral standard?  
A moral standard implicates more than the “community” (i.e., a “tribe,” a “state,” etc). When acts of state 
are immunized or shielded from prosecution, the “individual” is collectivized—part of a web of amoral (i.e., legal) 
ordering. Whether the “legal person” who committed the act belongs to “primitive” or “civilized” culture, for 
Kelsen, matters no more than the ethnic, racial, religious or other spiritualized qualities of the accused. Kelsen does 
not require an assessment of personal psychology or consciousness, only an analysis in the spirit of Austin’s 
analytical approach, of positive legal norms. “The bundle of legal norms” that signifies “legal persons” and 
associated “responsibilities” are the methodological abstraction that create the object of jurisprudential cognition.  
Kelsen’s introduction of a “civilized” moral standard by which ICL judges assess whether an act ought to 
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problem presented by “bad” laws, a commitment to standards of human conduct can.223 By 
retroactively agreeing as signatories to an ICL treaty that a particular offense is immoral, parties 
to a conflict rectify an injustice caused by wrongly-conceived prospective laws. In chapter five, 
the “purposive” interpretive methodology introduced in the post-Cold War era is examined in an 
effort to clarify the application of retroactive judicial decision-making based on moral criterion. 
                                                          
be made illegal retroactively does not, however, apply to the perpetrator’s capacity to know the difference between 
right and wrong, only whether the act amounted to a violation of crimes of the magnitude of crimes against 
humanity, genocide, et al. In assessing the capacity of state officials from less “civilized” cultures to understand the 
illegality of core international crimes, one creates an infinite psychological regression. By “civilized,” Kelsen 
imparts a two-fold meaning linked to (1) structural or organizational features of a national legal order or personified 
“state”, and (2) levels of consciousness. The introduction of individual responsibility as a form of imputation bridges 
(1) and (2). “Primitive” de-centralized social orders based on collective forms of liability and an animistic view of 
social and natural reality forge a consciousness different from that which came with early forms of individual 
adjudication, and, subsequently, with the individuation of consciousness associated with a causal conception of 
reality. That “civilizational” standards are introduced by Kelsen to claim priority for the status quo of imperial 
powers in adjudging the distinction between just and unjust wars, and punishment for crimes against peace 
perpetrated by revolutionary anti-colonial forces, reaffirms the fact that “civilization” also has the capacity to be 
unbiased. 
“Civilization” can also be used to destroy the concept of a tolerant organization of humans—or “humanity” 
through colonial wars. The utilitarian challenge is always a question of greatest peace. For what is more 
pleasurable—in the aggregate— than peace or security from fear of harm—for both colonizer and colonized? None 
of this is to suggest that Kelsen does not distinguish between relative capacities of the accused. The power 
differential between the colonizer and colonized creates an inherent bias. Kelsen’s blueprint for (relative) world 
peace, therefore, in order to be most effective, necessitates a neutral legal normative ordering for colonizer and 
colonized to be judged equally with respect to the commission of core international crimes.  
It is necessary to recognize the limits of a deterministic—or causal—conception of individual responsibility 
under the law in evaluating the capacity to choose between immorally legal acts and morally illegal ones (see: 
chapter four). Those Germans integrated into the Hegelian universal of the Fuehrerstaat where Hitler “represent[ed] 
that rational will, [and] must alone be judge” were to be treated no differently than those belonging to a liberal 
republican order of governance under international criminal adjudication. Responsibility’s “depersonalization” 
requires that no distinction be made as to the performance of acts, only the relationship between the norms 
authorizing or prohibiting certain behaviors.  The delict or offense in violation of international law is what 
constitutes the condition for the imposition of a sanction, not the personality or psychology of the individual who 
must answer to the charges. From the perspective of the “science of law,” neither the natural person, nor the cause of 
his actions, matter to the question of imputation. As conditioning element of the sanction, the delict is typically 
described by a legal rule in advance. In the study of ICR, and the particular notion of responsibility described here, 
imputation can no longer be “de-psychologized,” especially—and perhaps ironically—because Kelsen introduces a 
retroactive methodology. The methodology itself presumes a psychological ability to decide between moral and 
legal norms.   
223 The case of Laurent Ggabo, former President of the Ivory Coast, transferred to the Hague to stand trial before the 
ICC for four counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts, 
resulting from his alleged orchestration of post-electoral violence in Ivory Coast between December 16, 2010 and 
April 12, 2011, is illustrative. In this case, Ggabo refused to accept defeat to rival Alassane Ouattara. To what extent 
was Ggabo’s arrest and transfer politically motivated? Reuters Staff, “Former Ivory Coast president Gbagbo to 




But the imprint made in early stages of ICR with demonstration of the validity of retroactive 
legislation, from the ratification of the London Agreement (1945) to the creation of the ICTY 
(1994), reveals a unified trajectory. First comes the subordination of states to the ICL regime 
through retroactive legislation based on a moral (arguably naturalist) identification of 
criminality; next, the introduction of a refined interpretive methodology that recognizes judicial 
independence; and, last, retroactive judicial decisions granted license to freely decide penumbra 
cases.224  
Shklar, however, never even evaluates Kelsen’s contravention of the “separation thesis” 
in the context of war crimes prosecution. This is noteworthy considering that the second part of 
Legalism concerns the limits of an “ideology of rules” as pertains to international criminal trials. 
As the apotheosis of a purely normative jurisprudential method of cognition free of “alien 
                                                          
224 The impressive work of Aharon Barak, former chief justice of Israel’s Supreme Court and a leading innovator in 
the area of purposive lawmaking, inspires chapter five’s analysis of Kelsen’s contributions to ICL decision-making 
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the basis for its opinion and susceptible to wild mood swings.” Rosalie Abella, “Without An Independent Judiciary, 
Israel’s Cherished Democracy Will Be At Risk,” The Times of Israel, April 19, 2018, 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/without-an-independent-judiciary-israels-cherished-democracy-will-be-at-risk/. 
Although this dissertation does not comment on the threat of majoritarian sentiment, the neutral composition of a 
permanent and compulsory court adjudicating international cases presumes independence from the political will of 
either state officials or citizens intent on undermining the legitimacy of international criminal jurisdiction. Despite 
Judith Shklar’s conflation of Kelsen’s “formal” cognition of law and judicial construction, the author of the Pure 
Theory of Law grants ICL judges especially broad discretion, resulting from structural fluidity of a sphere of 
lawmaking that has not yet attained the degree of centrality found under national legal orders (or personified 
“states”). Shklar writes, “Formalism, on the level of history, is thus also an effort to say ‘is’ about a legal system 
where ‘ought to be’ would be more appropriate. It is necessary to emphasize this because it makes so much of its 
own ‘purity’ and freedom from morals and political ideology…[] the creators of the theory of ‘legal science,’ 
especially Kelsen and his followers,…are again and again said to be distinguished by a perfect remoteness from 
‘external’ influences.” Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, [1964] 1986). 35-36.  For now, the distinction between retroactive legislation and retroactive judicial 
decision-making must be made. Shklar is twice-wrong in her diagnosis, as she ignores Kelsen’s anti-formal 
contributions to the changing notion of ICR through both retroactive legislation and judicial decision-making. The 
latter will be explored in-depth in Chapter Five.   
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elements,” especially political terminology like “states,” Kelsen remains a primary object of 
Shklar’s polemic against legalism.  
Shklar’s failure to factor in what must be considered the critical element of Kelsen’s 
retroactive methodology, a “higher principle of justice,”225 aligns with Kelsen’s own obfuscating 
relativist or amoral claim to structural completeness in conformity with positive lawmaking. 
Shklar, therefore, neglects to consider the implications of Kelsen’s “moral-turn” likely because 
Kelsen himself obscures the places in which his theory contravenes its purity.  
The next section addresses these structural claims bracketing the moral foundation of 
Kelsen’s cognition of ICR. Kelsen argues that legal positivism alone licenses ex post facto 
lawmaking. His position that “according to the public opinion of the civilized world it is more 
important to bring the war criminals to justice than to respect, in their trial, the rule against ex 
post facto law”226 is set aside for the moment. Part IV, Section B, therefore, reaffirms the “pure” 
or “neutral” conception of imputation found in Part II, while the final section—Part IV, Section 
C—demonstrates the limits of a traditional positive law conception.  
b. Pure Theoretical Licensing of Ex Post Facto Lawmaking 
In “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War 
Criminals,” Kelsen differentiates between legal positivist and natural law approaches to 
retroactive lawmaking for humanitarian offenses. His doctrinal endorsement of ex post facto 
lawmaking along positive legal lines, plausible from the perspective of structural completeness, 
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recognizes the principle of legality as a principle of justice derived from natural law.227 Kelsen 
writes: 
 
…[T]he rule of law as formulated by legal positivism refers to the conduct of, at least, 
two individuals; the organ authorized to execute a sanction and the subject against whom, 
on behalf of his illegal conduct, the sanction is directed. The rule of law as formulated by 
the natural law doctrine refers only to one individual: to the subject whose legal conduct 
is prescribed by the rule. This rule of law cannot be retroactive; but the rule of law 
providing sanctions can: not, of course, with respect to the action of the organ, the 
execution of the sanction; this action can be prescribed only for the future; but with 
respect to the conduct of the subject which is the condition of the sanction. A rule of law 
can attach a sanction to be executed in the future, that is to say after the rule has been 
enacted, to human conduct which has been performed in the past, that is to say before the 
rule was enacted…The postulate not to enact retroactive laws cannot be derived from the 
nature of law in the sense of legal positivism, as it can be derived from the nature of law 
in the sense of natural law doctrine. Within the system of legal positivism the rule against 
retroactive legislation is not an absolute principle as the corresponding rule of the 
natural law doctrine is, expressing a logical necessity. (my emphasis)228 
 
Unlike legal positivism, which refers to the conduct of two individuals—officials 
responsible for applying coercive measures to offenses designated by legal norms and 
                                                          
227 Stanley Paulson, the foremost contemporary North American Kelsenian, in “Classical Legal Positivism at 
Nuremberg,” presents Kelsen’s application of retroactive lawmaking as the reason that Kelsen cannot be classified 
as immunizing Nazi defendants, as per the argument of IMT defense counsel Hermann Jahreiss. Paulson writes: 
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individuals sanctioned for deviating from legal norms—natural law, Kelsen writes, stipulates 
only the individual whose behavior is regulated by prescribed rules.229 Kelsen claims that the 
natural law doctrine emphasizes the “logical necessity” of the rule against ex post facto laws, 
since “to regulate human conduct which has taken place in the past is impossible,” and therefore 
only future, not past conduct, can be prescribed.230  
The same holds true, however, for Austin’s command theory. Contrary to the claim that 
legal positivism permits the enactment of measures to be applied to acts performed before the 
rule was enacted, Kelsen ignores the power relations inherent to classical legal positivism’s 
command doctrine.231 Austin, for example, presupposes an “obligation [which] regards the 
future. An obligation to a past act, or an obligation to a past forbearance, is a contradiction in 
terms.”232 When a past action is sanctioned after-the-fact, no possibility of compliance exists. 
The command doctrine requires that those in a subordinate role in a hierarchy emanating from 
the sovereign comply with directives. Compliance entails a future-oriented application of legal 
norms, since duty-bound obedience to an imperatival pronouncement implies the capacity to 
follow commands. Compliance with a directive to perform a past act is nonsensical.  
Sanctions are essential to the legal positivist description of law. A specific organ is 
designated by the community to execute coercive actions. While the norm is prescribed, it is the 
organ, not the individual accused of committing an act whose conduct is “undesirable” that 
makes something illegal. According to Kelsen, there is no reason, even if “such 
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retroactivity….may not be morally or politically desirable,”233 that the prescription cannot be 
introduced through the valid delegation of sanctions by an order. This includes one constituted 
by parties to a conflict that ratify an international treaty to past acts, which were not sanctioned at 
the time of the alleged offense. 
 “Retroactive laws,” Kelsen asserts, “are held to be unjust because it hurts our feelings of 
justice to inflict upon an individual a sanction which he did not foresee…”234 But if a law repeals 
another law that disadvantaged a subject or provides a lighter sanction to a previous law, it is not 
retroactivity, but “the fact that the individual had no chance to avoid a sanction or a more severe 
sanction provided by a subsequent law.”235  Likewise, notification or publicizing the law, a core 
tenet of the principle of legality, implies that the law must be known in advance in order to be 
applicable. This principle of justice associated with the rule against ex post facto legislation, is 
“not less generally recognized” than the counter-principle “that ignorance of law is no 
excuse.”236  
Once the law is applied it is up to the individual to become knowledgeable of a potential 
sanction. If ignorance of the law were to become a defense, then those accused of illegalities 
could in all cases claim immunity. Such would lead to an interminable psychologization of the 
intent of the delinquent. Consequently, “the rule against against retroactive legislation is the 
result of the necessary restriction of the rule against the application of laws unknown to the 
subject.” There is no impunity for those who could possibly know. The principle that laws must 
be known by an individual to be applicable is not only restricted by the rule that ignorance of the 
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law is no excuse, however, but also by omission of a sanction that is “considered as a violation of 
morality or another higher rule, although not illegal.”237 Here, as the next section demonstrates, 
Kelsen introduces a moral criterion for retroactive lawmaking through “sleight-of-hand.” He 
uses, for example, the theft of electricity, where no punishment is provided in advance. Although 
the legislator may not have anticipated that electrical power would be stolen, the enactment of a 
law punishing this act would nevertheless be just.238 
Although Kelsen’s structural account remedies gaps in Austin’s conception of non-
retroactivity, it is questionable whether a legal positivist approach can ever license contravention 
of the principle of legality. “In the opposite case—that is, if Kelsen had not identified the 
principle of legality as a principle of justice derived from natural law,” writes legal philosopher 
Sévane Garibian[,] “his line of reasoning would have run as follows: (1) the principle of legality 
falls within the province of positive law; (2) the Nuremberg Tribunal consequently found itself 
confronting a conflict between two principles of different provenance (the principle of legality, 
which falls under international positive law vs. the principle of justice or morality, which falls 
under natural law); and (3) since, from the standpoint of positive law, morality does not exist, or, 
more precisely, does not count in a system of valid norms, the IMT judges would have had no 
choice but not to condemn the accused out of respect for legality.”239  
Garibian’s recognition of Kelsen’s influence on the changing notion of ICR through 
justification of ex post facto lawmaking, however, generally concedes the positivity of Kelsen’s 
contributions. There is much to be said for Garibian’s acknowledgment of what she refers to as 
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“a legality restricted by the superior principle of morality.”240 But Garibian’s choice to elude a 
further examination of the peculiar “moral-turn” attached to Kelsen’s violation of the “separation 
thesis” produces the general sense that the author of Pure Theory remained true to positive law 
principles. A similar problem is introduced by Andrea Gattini, who believes that Kelsen’s 
conservative endorsement of the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) denied the value of Kelsen’s 
moral application of retroactive lawmaking.241 
The next section interrogates the implications of Kelsen’s violation of the separation of 
law from morality. Part III described the Fuhrer Principle, for instance, as immunizing Hitler 
from any higher laws, and a fortiori lending protection to all state officials under Nazi rule. To 
free Kelsen of the accusation that he endorses a version of Austin’s command theory, which 
precludes prosecution of core international crimes, it is therefore necessary to introduce a 
“moral” source determining international imputation. Once a state official is transferred to an 
authority like that at Nuremberg, the principle non sub homine sed sub lege (“not under man but 
under law”) is returned to its rightful place as an operative force dictating the validity of law as a 
normative, albeit morally-structured, rules-based conception.  
c. The Moral Authority of Law  
 
The problem of metaphysical absolutism remains a significant challenge for ontological 
skeptics like Kelsen. He correctly acknowledges the many ways in which natural law has been 
used to justify conflicting ideological positions, writing that “since humanity is divided into 
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many nations, classes, religions, professions and so on, often at variance with one another, there 
are a great many very different ideas of justice; too many for one to be able to speak simply of 
'justice'.”242 His decision to reject “justice” as a moral idea conforms to his realistic assessment 
of the nature of opposing “ideological” factions within any centralized, “modern” or “civilized,” 
social order. Kelsen writes: “[This] goes hand in hand with the tendency to withdraw the 
problem of justice from the insecure realm of subjective judgments of value, and to establish it 
on the secure ground of a given social order.”243  Kelsen associates “subjective judgments of 
value...with a wish or a feeling of the judging subject,”244 including “the tendency of ideological 
groups or interests to justify or absolutize their beliefs.”245  
 Kelsen's criticisms of the natural law doctrine are consequently based on an overarching 
concern with establishing the peace of a given social order through a technique that “seeks to 
achieve a compromise between opposing interests.”246 Metaphysical dualism as a “subjective 
judgment[] of value” only confuses matters. To assume an imperfect positive law and a perfect 
natural law that is absolutely just is akin to the classic division between reality and Platonic 
idealism247 where “the world is divided into two different spheres: one is the visible world 
perceptible without senses, that which we call reality; the other is the invisible world of ideas. 
Everything in this visible world has its ideal pattern or archetype in the other, invisible world.”248 
The “imperfect copies” or “shadows” in Plato's philosophy or any other metaphysical 
interpretation of reality, says Kelsen, are only a “reduplication of the world,” which undermines 
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the effort of positive law to create a true estimation of formal delegated powers.249 Natural law 
doctrine, insofar as it encourages an ideal description of a world that can only be known in an 
empirical sense, is based on a “wish or feeling of the judging subject.” 
 Natural law, Kelsen writes, may be invoked by liberals or conservatives; capitalists who 
advocate private property or communists who recognize only public property; materialists or 
idealists.250 The subjectivity of the natural law doctrine, Kelsen believes, could only mean that 
the person invoking natural law has an ideological agenda that he prefers to dress in the trappings 
of absolute right. However, as Kelsen's contemporary, Gustav Radbruch, a German legal 
philosopher who prior to Hitler’s ascension to power held a positive law viewpoint similar to 
Kelsen's conceded after the war, some laws indeed transgress “higher” moral principles. 
Radbruch's shift to a concept of natural law through his “jurisprudence of values” attests 
to this fact.251As in the exchange between Hart and Fuller where Hart argued for the validity of 
the Nazi regime, despite acknowledgment of its predations, against Fuller's contention that the 
regime was manifestly illegal because of its immoral actions, “Radbruch contested the purely 
formalistic (“value-free”) view of legal validity as expressed by the founders of positivist legal 
philosophy—notably Hans Kelsen.”252 The “Radbruch Formula” stated that “when statutory 
rules reach a level of extreme injustice, so that the contradiction between positive law and justice 
becomes intolerable, they cease to be law.”253  
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There is no mala in se or conduct which is evil in itself, according to Kelsen, only mala 
prohibita or evils prohibited by the norms of a positive social order.254 Aristotle in the 
Nicomachean Ethics distinguishes between the “natural” and “legal,” which corresponds with the 
division between mala in se and mala prohibita. “The natural: that which everywhere has the 
same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or that; the legal: that which is originally 
indifferent, but when it has been laid down, is not indifferent.”255 In contrast, Kelsen writes that 
“before the sanction is provided…the behavior is no malum in a legal sense, no delict…This is 
nothing but the consequence of the principles generally accepted in the theory of criminal law: 
nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege—no sanction without a legal norm providing this 
sanction, no delict without a legal norm determining that delict.”256  
Kelsen, however, contradicts this statement in licensing retroactivity for prosecution of 
core international crimes. Here, Kelsen finds agreement with Radbruch in distinguishing 
“higher” and “lower” conceptions of justice. Kelsen writes in “The Rule against Ex Post Facto 
Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals” (1945) that “even if the atrocities are 
covered by municipal law, or have the character of acts of State and hence do not constitute 
individual criminal responsibility, they are certainly open violations of the principle of morality 
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generally recognized by civilized peoples and hence were, at least, morally not innocent or 
indifferent when they were committed.”257  
Like Aristotle’s notion of “the legal [as] that which is originally indifferent,” and 
Blackstone’s claim that retroactive lawmaking is an “unreasonable method” only when an 
offense is “indifferent in itself,”258  Kelsen emphasizes the moral criterion in stating that since 
the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis “were, at least, morally not innocent or indifferent when 
they were committed,” they made the major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg ideal candidates 
for prosecution. 
Beginning with “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with 
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals” (1943), Kelsen writes:  
The principle forbidding the enactment of norms with retroactive force as a rule of 
positive national law is not without many exceptions. Its basis is the moral idea that it is 
not just to make an individual responsible for an act if he, when performing the act, did 
not and could not know that his act constituted a wrong. If, however, the act was at the 
moment of its performance morally, although not legally wrong, a law attaching ex post 
facto a sanction to the act is retroactive only from a legal, not from a moral point of 
view….Morally they were responsible for the violation of international law at the 
moment when they performed the acts constituting a wrong not only from a moral but 
also from a legal point of view. The treaty only transforms their moral into a legal 
responsibility.259(my emphasis) 
 
The metamorphosis from a moral to legal conception of liability occurs at the liminal 
point when acts performed by state officials are so egregious as to warrant coercive measures. 
Although unnecessary as a deterrent for individuals for whom a sanction is proposed ex post 
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facto, the application of retroactive laws does not mean that prosecution, according to Kelsen, 
lacks a deterrent effect for future war criminals. Officials may begin to realize, writes Kelsen, 
that “the violation of international law at the moment when they performed the acts constitute a 
wrong not only from a moral but also from a legal point of view.”260  
In Peace Through Law (1944), where Kelsen advocates for the creation of a permanent 
and compulsory international court adjudicating core international crimes, he writes that “an 
international treaty authorizing a court to punish individuals for acts they have performed as acts 
of their State constitutes a norm of international criminal law with retroactive force, if the acts at 
the moment when they were committed were not crimes for which the individual perpetrators 
were responsible.” 261 An international treaty may be introduced “authorizing a court to punish 
the persons morally responsible for the Second World War.”262 While the phrase “persons 
morally responsible for the Second World War” can be interpreted in the narrow sense of those 
responsible for crimes against peace or crimes of aggression, the broader interpretation 
encompassing prosecution of those responsible also for crimes against humanity during the 
Second World War is reconcilable with Kelsen’s recommendations to Jackson in his 
correspondence prior to the International Military Tribunal conference at London held between 
June 22 and August 2, 1945. (see: chapter one) 
Kelsen then reaffirms the same phraseology from the previous year, writing in Peace 
Through Law that “If…the act was at the moment of its performance morally, although not 
legally wrong, a law attaching ex post facto a sanction to the act is retroactive only from a legal 
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not from a moral point of view…The treaty only transforms their moral into a legal 
responsibility.”263 Likewise, in “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a 
Precedent in International Law? (1947),” Kelsen further asserts the validity of retroactive 
prosecution on moral grounds. Although claiming that a retroactive law should “provid[e] 
individual punishment for acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were 
committed,”264 Garibian points out that crimes against humanity, which was certainly not illegal 
prior to the ratification of the London agreement, was nevertheless prosecutable. A broad 
interpretation of retroactivity that encompasses “crimes” that were not even “illegal” must mean 
that what was not illegal is not necessary to denominate criminality. Only the immorality of an 
act mattered. A prior notion of illegality was not relevant to the determination of legality at 
Nuremberg.  
Kelsen writes: 
Individual criminal responsibility represents certainly a higher degree of justice than 
collective responsibility, the typical technique of primitive law. Since the internationally 
illegal acts for which the London Agreement established individual criminal 
responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the persons who 
committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of 
the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with  
justice.”265 (my emphasis)  
 
 We know from the introductory chapter that Kelsen’s recommendation to Jackson was to 
transfigure collective responsibility into individual criminal responsibility through the London 
Agreement, and that this extended to all core international crimes ratified ex post facto, including 
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crimes against humanity, which had no pedigree of illegality. We must consequently recognize 
Kelsen’s prioritization of immoral acts, which “the persons who committed” were “certainly 
aware of.” Notice or forewarning in the sense of “illegality” was not essential. By “morally most 
objectionable,” he means that “the retroactivity of the law applied to [those individually 
responsible] can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with justice.”266 Although 
based on a circular logic, Kelsen’s invention of an agent who is “certainly aware” of the 
immorality of an act of state, creates the condition for legal imputation. (The question of agency 
and free will is a subject of discussion in chapter four on the trial of Adolph Eichmann in 
Jerusalem). 
While Kelsen’s relativist ontology as described in his 1952 Berkeley lecture “What is 
Justice?”267 affirms the impossibility of deciding on any absolute standard of justice, democracy 
rather than autocracy is still the form of governance Kelsen believes most suitable to realizing 
the goal of justice in the sense of insuring peace or social stability, protecting freedom of 
expression and upholding the principle of tolerance. Kelsen’s major English-language forays into 
democratic theory—the publication of his book The Essence and Value of Democracy (year of 
publication) and his 100-page article in the October 1955 issue of Ethics, and "Foundations of 
Democracy”—demonstrate his preference for democracy. While a coercive action is a valid 
object of legal cognition, whether democratic or autocratic, the structural logic of pure theory 
must disregard “facticity” based on the discretionary powers of autocrats as immunizing of acts 
committed by the putative “sovereign” commander. The principle non sub homine sed sub lege 
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(“Not under man, but under law”) otherwise is contravened, insofar as an autocrat can decide to 
make arbitrary rules immunizing all state officials, including himself, for humanitarian 
violations. 
The distinction that criminologist Jerome Hall makes between democratic and autocratic 
approaches to the principle of legality is instructive. He writes: 
 
For the abolition of nulla poena provides a sieve through which can flow not only 
humanity and science but also repression and stupidity. Dictatorship will not brook 
interference by law (unless in particular instances the goal can be achieved nonetheless); 
the wise and humane community seeks the freedom to utilize its resources to aid the 
weak and the maladjusted. Only by careful study of the actual results of the abandonment 
of law can one arrive at a valid judgment. (Hall Nulla Poena Sine Lege/1937) 
 
While democracy can certainly be unwise and inhumane, democracy, not autocracy, is 
the best assurance of the principle of tolerance. Without general adherence to this principle, no 
protection against the suspension of rights, foremost, the implicit right within any democracy to 
live free of the threat of annihilation, can be assured. With protections for those most vulnerable 
to the predations of regimes responsible for aggressive wars, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, ICL abolishes the rule against ex post facto laws to “aid the weak and 
maladjusted.”  
“In the remote past,” writes Kelsen in General Theory of Law and State (1945), “it was a 
religious duty to sacrifice human beings to the gods, and slavery was a legal institution. Today 
we say that these human sacrifices were crimes and that slavery, as a legal institution, was 
immoral. We apply moral norms valid in our time to these facts, though the norms which forbid 
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human sacrifices and slavery came into existence long after the facts occurred that we judge 
now, according to these new norms, as crimes and immoral.268  
Like Hall, Kelsen recognizes that retroactivity can apply to immoral acts, such as human 
sacrifices and slavery, but may also apply to circumstances where a legal system promotes state-
sponsored murder. “A special example,” writes Kelsen, “is the German law by which certain 
murders, committed by order of the head of the State June 30, 1934, were retroactively divested 
of their character of delicts.”269 Human sacrifice and slavery, however, could be deemed not only 
immoral but criminal, with the application of “moral norms valid in our times to these 
facts.”270New norms are therefore transformed into criminalizable sanctions. Imputation, which 
would have been forbidden when the offense occurred, assumes a punishable form free of any 
future-oriented notion of “coercion”.   
The artificial or human-made creation of the object of legal imputation out of a 
normative, albeit retroactive, conception of the immorality of a past action that at the time was 
perfectly legal, can be employed, says Kelsen, to criminalize past action. Even as Hitler’s 
mission to destroy European Jewry was protected by German law through discretionary 
provisions, the author of pure theory recognizes that “it would also have been possible 
retroactively to give the character of sanctions to these acts of murder.”271 
V. Conclusion 
                                                          






The classical legal positivist idea of an “uncommanded commander,” free of legal 
limitation in exercise of powers, sovereign and therefore “above the law,” is confirmed by 
Austin’s statement that “subjects must be in the habit of obeying [the commander] because of his 
coercive power to impose sanction.”272 The will of the ruler is the standard of validity. While 
Hart’s Concept of Law, a sociological critique of Austin's “command theory,” has achieved 
superior status in Anglo-American jurisprudential circles, Kelsen’s analysis of Austin’s 
conception of “duty” or “obligation” is certainly of greater value to international legal 
scholarship. Despite Austin’s inability to account for sources of law separate from the “state,” 
including indigenous laws, normative functions that are not “commands,” and legal 
responsibilities of states, “the theory persists as a conceptual picture of law, ‘accepted,’ as 
Ronald Dworkin puts it, ‘in one form or another by most working and academic lawyers who 
hold views on jurisprudence.’”273 
The designation of the concept “duty” to a psychological compulsion to act in accordance 
with fear-inducing commands (Austin) must be distinguished from the “de-psychologized” 
notion of responsibility derived from a purely theoretical legal cognition of the “impersonal” 
sanction (Kelsen). Even though Hart encourages a robust debate about the grounds for validity of 
a unified national legal order, since Austin’s description of sovereignty introduces a direct line of 
criticism of the legitimacy of international prosecution, the latter is chosen as representative of 
legal positivism. While Austin did not actually say anything specifically applicable to the 
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subject,274 he is the seminal interlocutor in the study of ICR from the perspective of positive 
law’s political dimension. His description of sovereign command provides theoretical 
justification for immunizing ICL defenses based on acts of state and superior orders (see: 
Chapter Four).  
 On the question of authority, Austin is in agreement with social contractarian Thomas 
Hobbes, whose Leviathan describes an ontologically relativist conception of political society 
where self-preservationist human inclinations dominate. In international relations theory, 
political realism endorses Hobbes’ skeptical view of natural law theory, which denies a divine, 
moral or reasonable source of authority. Like the tradition of political realism, Austin’s 
command theory introduces the prospect that the source of legitimacy, not only is power, but 
power devoid of any legal normative regulation.  
“Non sub homine sed sub lege ("Not under man but under the law") is a well-known 
principle of democracy,” Kelsen writes. “It is a principle of any legal order.”275 To subscribe to 
this principle, according to Kelsen, sovereignty must be re-conceptualized as the “de-
personalized” or “de-psychologized” unity of legal norms regulating behavior in any social 
order. Kelsen resolved the conflict that arises with the introduction of sovereign claims by 
identifying a pure path to the conception of international criminal responsibility. At the same 
time, contrary to Gattini’s claims, Kelsen’s project is an effort to demonstrate the impossibility 
of creating a system of rules regulating the behavior of state officials for humanitarian crimes 
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without turning to a dynamic moral source. In defining ICR from a moral vantage point, Kelsen 
saves law from the idea that the sovereign, at the highest level of international adjudication, is 





Beyond Just War Theory and Crimes against Peace as the “Class A” Charge: The Pure 
Theoretical Validation of Retroactive Prosecution at Nuremberg 
 
I. Introduction 
In his opening address at the Nuremberg proceedings, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, in his role as lead US prosecutor for the International Military Tribunal (IMT), stated 
that: 
Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means that are inherently 
criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, deprivations of liberty, and 
destruction of property. An honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those 
lawfully conducting it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended 
by showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war itself is 
illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties making aggressive wars 
illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them of every defense the law ever gave, and 
to leave war-makers subject to judgment by the usually accepted principles of the law of 
crimes.276 
 
Although Jackson’s philosophical justification for criminalizing aggressive war was largely 
influenced by Hans Kelsen’s former student, University of Cambridge Professor Hersch 
Lauterpacht277, Kelsen’s theoretical contributions to Jackson’s argument were nevertheless 
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significant.278 This chapter is an effort to reframe the dialogue between Kelsen, the international 
criminal law (ICL) theorist, and Jackson, the practitioner. While it does not purport to establish a 
causal linkage between Jackson’s and Kelsen’s estimation of crimes against peace (CAP), a 
revisionist account identifies a common purpose with respect to criminalizing aggressive wars.  
Defined in Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter, the subject matter jurisdiction of crimes 
against peace (CAP) is: 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.279 
 
In December 1940, Lauterpacht consulted with then-US Attorney General Jackson on the 
legality of President Roosevelt’s vow to provide allied powers with “all assistance short of 
war.”280  He authored a memorandum on neutrality that claimed that the prohibition of war as a 
method for enforcing legal rights, in accordance with the multilateral Kellogg-Briand Pact or 
Paris Peace Pact, officially designated the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an 
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Instrument of National Policy (1928) 281, allowed neutral states to distinguish between aggressors 
and harmed nations.282 
The main provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact reads: 
ARTICLE I: 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that 
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, 
as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. 
ARTICLE II: 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts 
of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall 
never be sought except by pacific means.283 
 On March 27, 1941, in his Havana speech before the Inter-American Bar Association, 
Jackson borrowed from Lauterpacht’s memo, referring to the outlawry of war and the creation of 
an international regime intent on establishing peace between nations.284 Lauterpacht, therefore, is 
rightly credited with providing a leading argument against isolationist skepticism. 
But while he directly inspired Jackson’s effort to establish that neutrality does not depend on 
impartiality, and later lent assistance in preparing the order of charges for the July 1945 IMT 
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conference at London285, Kelsen’s contributions, underestimated,286 and even regarded as 
immaterial,287 are perhaps of greater consequence. In addition to corresponding with Jackson 
over the distinction between collective and individual forms of liability,288 Kelsen’s views on 
retroactive lawmaking, vital to the application of the crimes against peace charge at Nuremberg, 
provides an under-reported exchange that fundamentally alters our understanding of the 
changing notion of international criminal responsibility. 289 (For a detailed discussion of Kelsen’s 
contested positive law justification of ex post facto lawmaking, see: chapter two). 
In preparation for the London conference, which established a quasi-constitutional290 
framework for ICL with the ratification of the IMT charter, Jackson, acting as chief negotiator 
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for the Truman administration, circulated a memorandum to staff attorneys291. The message 
reads: 
Hans Kelsen is worried over the absence of any international law on the subject of individual 
responsibility. He thinks a definite declaration is essential. I think it may be desirable. The 
language he suggests is as follows: 
“Persons who, acting in the service of any state (of one of the Axis powers) or on their own 
initiative, have performed acts by which any rule of general or particular international law 
forbidding the use of force, or any rule concerning warfare, or the generally accepted rules of 
humanity have been violated, as well as persons who have been members of voluntary 
organizations whose criminal character has been established by the court, may be held 
individually responsible for these acts or for membership in such organizations and brought 
to trial and punishment before the court.” 
I think it may be worth including to stop the argument about whether the law does so 
provide.292 
 
As a consultant in the Judge Advocate General’s office under the direction of General John 
Weir, Kelsen made a critical contribution in recognizing an error in a document about to be 
introduced at London. The draft reads: “The Tribunal shall be bound by this declaration of the 
Signatories that the following acts are criminal violations of International Law.”293  
To suggest that the domestic law principle of individual responsibility was comparable to 
modes of punishment in the international sphere, Kelsen asserted, was an error in construction. 
Acts cannot be “criminal violations of International Law,” since there was no individual in the 
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international sphere who could be punished for war offenses. This meant that only collective 
responsibility could be imputed. Because no treaty had yet stipulated criminality, retroactively 
administered law would first need to create a legal subject that could be held criminally 
accountable. Kelsen even drafted the language that would become Article Six of the IMT charter, 
recommending that those who violated “international law…may be held individually responsible 
for these acts,”294which aligned with the charter statement that “the following acts, or any of 
them are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be 
individual responsibility…”295 (my emphasis) 
“Kelsen conceded,” according to international law theorists Oona Hathaway and Scott 
Shapiro, “that this provision would create new law….In that sense, the law would be ex post 
facto. But, Kelsen pointed out, this retroactivity, would be innocuous. For retroactive legislation 
is unjust when it surprises defendants, but here there would be no element of unfair surprise.”296  
Hathaway and Shapiro, however, misinterpret the rationale behind Kelsen’s inclusion of 
retroactive lawmaking. While correctly diagnosing Kelsen’s determination that if all Germans 
were liable for crimes against peace, then certainly imputing individual responsibility would be a 
more moral outcome, since the nation would not have to answer to the crimes of a few, the 
authors, nevertheless, incorrectly claim that the reason ex post facto legislation was justified was 
that Nazis would have known that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was already-illegal.297 But if the main 
                                                          
294 See: Memorandum of Hans Kelsen, n.d., box 104, reel 10, pp. 4-5, RJP LOC;  Hand Kelsen, “Collective and 
Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals,” 
California Law Review 31 (1943): 533. Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists, 270. 
295 International Military Tribunal Charter, Article 6(b), “Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1 Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Accessed 
November 9, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.  




reason Kelsen justified retroactive lawmaking was that a multilateral peace treaty denunciating 
war stipulated illegality, and hence collective responsibility, why did he extend retroactive 
prosecution to the other two core international charges—war crimes and crimes against 
humanity—the latter of which had no similar normative pedigree?298 Through retroactive legal 
construction incorporating a criterion of “moral responsibility,” where “persons who committed 
these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character,”299 Kelsen exhibits a methodological 
approach suitable, not only to the prosecution of crimes against peace, the “class A” or supreme 
international charge, but to the other two core international charges, as well. As with subsequent 
case studies, this chapter builds on the argument laid out in the Literature Review (chapter two), 
where “syncretic” or “alien” elements, including morality and politics, infiltrate Kelsen’s 
ostensibly “pure” conception of ICR. 
Before turning to the chapter outline, it is necessary to underscore that though 
representatives from each of the allied countries, including the United Kingdom, United States, 
France and the USSR emphasized varying degrees of culpability for aggressive war300, Jackson's 
was arguably the most strident defense along positive legal lines. Jackson stated that: 
                                                          
298 Why does he emphasize that “since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established 
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable and the persons who committed 
these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be 
considered as absolutely incompatible with justice,” if not to acknowledge that international criminal responsibility 
is based on a moral criterion free of any cognizance of a prior international agreement? Hans Kelsen, “Will the 
Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent?” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël 
Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 284; For an argument for prosecution of crimes against 
humanity, where no prior treaty agreement is necessary, and incorporating Kelsen’s retroactive methodology, see: 
Sevane Garbian, “Crimes against Humanity and International Legality in Legal Theory after Nuremberg,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 9, no. 1 (2007): 93-111. 
299 Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent?”, 284. 
300 The four articles referenced indicate a general reluctance amongst the four-powers, including the United States, 
to try war criminals. However, while the other three nations’ representatives marshalled skepticism, Jackson was 
unwavering in his commitment from the London Conference through the Nuremberg Tribunal to prosecuting Nazis 
for crimes against peace. It should be noted that FDR, while endorsing the Moscow Declaration’s Statement of 
Atrocities (1943) where Nazis were to be “judged and punished according to the laws of….liberated countries and of 




[T]he way Germany treats its inhabitants…is not our affair any more than it is the affair 
of some other government to interpose itself in our problems. The reason that this 
program of extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an 
international concern is this: it was a part of a plan for making an illegal war. 301 
 
 Above all, Jackson desired to prove that the commencement of aggressive war was the 
supreme international offense, of which axis officials alone were to be held responsible. Even if 
allied powers committed traditional war crimes under Article 6(a), including “murder, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labor…or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the 
seas, killing of hostages…wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity,”302, Jackson only affirmed the right to prosecute other 
international crimes based on an initial determination of aggressive war making.303 By first 
                                                          
Churchill, and the Morgenthau Plan, which would have reduced Germany to an agrarian society, while imposing 
summary execution on high Nazi officials, viable options. “The American commitments to ‘aggression’…found the 
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Brown, “The American Perspective on Nuremberg: A Case of Cascading Ironies,” in The Nuremberg Trials: 
International Criminal Law Since 1945 : 60th anniversary International Conference, eds. Herbert R. Reginbogin, 
Christoph Johannes Maria Safferling and Walter R. Hippel (München: K.G. Saur, 2006) 2006, 25; In addition to the 
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accusing the Germans of conspiring to wage aggressive war the British could only reflect uncomfortably on their 
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that the Nazi war was illegal, and the French people and other people of the occupied countries just want to show 
that the Nazis were bandits.” Telford Taylor, “The Nuremberg Trials,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. 
Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 383. 
301 Robert H. Jackson Jackson-London Conference, “International Conference on Military Trials : London, 1945 
Minutes of Conference Session of July 23, 1945,” ,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and  
Diplomacy, Accessed November 6, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack44.asp. 
302 “WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be 
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity”. International Military Tribunal Charter, Article 6(b), “Nuremberg Trial Proceedings,” The Avalon 
Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.  
303 “Unless we have a war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no basis for dealing with 
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insisting that the other side had contravened collective security agreements, Jackson’s intention 
was to validate allied prosecution on positive legal grounds, while simultaneously immunizing 
allied offenses.  
Unlike the crimes against peace charge, crimes against humanity possessed an even more 
tenuous positive law foundation, as the term “humanity” remains foreign to classical legal 
positivist vernacular.304 Article 6(c) or crimes against humanity is defined as:  
 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated.305 
  
                                                          
atrocities. They were a part of the preparation for war or for the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside 
of Germany and that makes them our concern.” American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign 
Ministers at San Francisco, April 1945, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES 
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 22, doc. IV 
(1945). Jackson further explained, "We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring retribution to 
individuals or to states only because the concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common 
plan or enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no other basis on which 
we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were committed inside Germany, under German law, or even in 
violation of German law, by authorities of the German state." Minutes of Conference Session of July 23,1945, 
reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 328, 331, doc. XLIV in Beth Van Schaack, "The Definition of 
Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37, no. 3: 799-800. 
304 “Contemporary legal positivists have generally not acknowledged the legitimacy of international legal norms,  
let alone universal or jus cogens norms. Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge,  
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29.  
305The IMT Charter specified that crimes against humanity could take place “before or during the war”. The 
Nuremberg judgment, on the other hand, concluded that since crimes against humanity possessed a weaker link to 
customary international practice than CAP the Court could only prosecute for crimes that ensued after the Nazi 
attack on Poland in September 1939. This formulation, referred to as the “war-nexus” requirement, justified the 
extension of international prosecution into what normally constituted domestic jurisdiction, while retaining the 
doctrine of state sovereignty. Beth Van Schaack, "The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity,” 791. This coincided 
with Jackson's own effort at Nuremberg to make war illegal following the pronouncement of former US Secretary of 
State Henry Stimson, who stated in 1932 that “War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the 
Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become throughout practically the entire world...an illegal thing.” 
Francis Biddle, “The Nurnberg Trial,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 205.  
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 Jackson minimized the crimes against humanity charge relative to crimes against peace, 
due to a traditional belief that a country’s internal affairs were not subject to outside interference. 
When Andre Gros, the French representative at the London conference, insisted that Article 6 (a) 
could be used for that purpose, Jackson argued that crimes against peace created a sovereign 
barrier against humanitarian intervention.306 Since Jackson had no intention of allowing other 
nations to interfere in Jim Crow policies of racial discrimination, he was especially adamant to 
prove that Nazi wars were unjust or illegal, and therefore warranted the allied right of ad hoc 
prosecution.307  
Jackson consequently affirms three inter-dependent propositions in making his case: (a) 
that violations of just war theory through aggressive warfare incurs the collective responsibility 
of axis powers, (b) that Nazi officials are subject to individual criminal responsibility for the 
commission of unjust wars, and (c) that the allies at Nuremberg operated a neutral court. 
Although Kelsen agreed with Jackson with respect to the first two constituent elements, parting 
ways as a leading critic of “victor’s justice,” he nevertheless insisted that (b) was not dependent 
on (a). And even though critical of ad hoc jurisdictional authority, he remained confident of the 
validity of the judgment at Nuremberg (c).   
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part II situates Kelsen’s and Jackson’s statements 
on bellum justum within the orbit of a moral, if politicized, theory of international law. Despite 
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the impartiality each invests in the abstract claims of just war theory, their views on the subject 
demonstrate partisanship towards imperial interests prior to the post-colonial effort to assure self-
determination in the aftermath of the Second World War. The status quo logic embedded in 
Kelsen’s theoretical construct, and Jackson’s declarations, confirm such partiality. In addition to 
revealing problems inherent in the justificatory grounds for imputing responsibility based on the 
theory of bellum justum, this section draws a further correspondence by introducing a phrase that 
each adopts to signal supremacy: “Christian civilization”. Exploring the paradox in criminalizing 
those possessing “primitive” rather than “civilized” consciousness, this section points to reasons 
why Kelsen’s anthropological view of stages of societal evolution may have contributed to his 
hesitance to ground international prosecution on the distinction between just (legal) and unjust 
(illegal) actions.  
Part III explores Kelsen’s well-known criticism of the Nuremberg tribunal predicated on the 
claims of “victor’s justice,” 308 while simultaneously questioning these evaluations given 
Kelsen’s overarching endorsement of the integrity of the trial. While sharing a preference for a 
permanent and compulsory court to adjudicate war crimes proceedings, Kelsen’s departure from 
Jackson’s support of a tribunal controlled by the victorious allied powers must not be interpreted 
as a rejection of the proceedings. If Kelsen is content to endorse collective responsibility under 
just war theory, notwithstanding a lack of impartial juridical authority to determine if the action 
was indeed just, why would he hesitate to endorse ad hoc prosecution? This section suggests that 
Kelsen’s denunciation of “victor’s justice” is irrelevant. Despite scattershot criticism of 
jurisdictional authority at Nuremberg, his choice to de-link bellum justum theory from the 
                                                          
308 Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent?” in Perspectives on the 
Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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prosecution of individuals for crimes against peace may be regarded as a further 
acknowledgement by this foremost international publicist that a more convincing methodology 
would be necessary to provide the legal authority for international criminal prosecution.  
Having demonstrated the reasons for (a) Kelsen’s hesitance to endorse the theory of bellum 
justum as the basis for prosecuting individuals (contra Jackson), and (b) his acknowledgement of 
the validity of ad hoc trials, Part IV evaluates why Kelsen recommended that Jackson endorse 
retroactive lawmaking. In addition to demonstrating correspondence between the court’s 
decision and Kelsen’s ex post facto approach, this section shows how Jackson was forced to 
concede the priority of Kelsen’s methodology. 
Retroactive lawmaking based on the criterion of “moral responsibility” as the methodological 
basis for designating international culpability, however, creates an antinomy for a philosopher 
whose legal doctrine is based on the separation of law from morality (see: Chapter Two). The 
shift from a positive law emphasis on “justice as peace” to a general recognition of justice as an 
inherently moral element recognizable as part of the criterion of retroactive lawmaking confirms 
Kelsen’s cardinal concern for the protection of victims of human rights atrocities. By de-linking 
from the theory of bellum justum and the criminalization of aggressive war as stipulated in prior 
international agreements, Kelsen’s retroactive endorsement proved of enduring value with the 
advent of a crimes against humanity-centered ICL discipline.   
II. Just War Theory—Law or Morality?  
At the inaugural 1940-41 Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard Law School, which 
became the basis for his book Law and Peace in International Relations309, Kelsen stated that 
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“whether or not international law can be considered as true law depends upon whether it is 
possible to interpret international law in the sense of the theory of bellum justum.”310 
Collective responsibility or absolute liability resulting from just wars, according to 
Kelsen, resemble tribal forms of justice for the murder of kinfolk.311 In the primitive analogy, the 
relatives of the person killed, in an entirely decentralized manner, since there is no court, nor 
centralized administrative authority, initiates a vendetta or “blood feud.” An individual whose 
father has been murdered, for example, can exact revenge, but only as an organ of the 
community.312 To kill under different circumstances would make the act illegal. “The relatives of 
the murdered person, the mourners, must themselves decide whether an avenging action should 
be undertaken, and if so, against whom they should proceed.”313  
In the international realm, states similarly interpret the legality of the social order based 
on the right of self-help. A state’s sphere of interest is protected through the mechanism of 
sanction—war—insuring a measure of security against the threat of violence. “If any state is at 
liberty to resort to war against any other state,”314 international law’s “law-ness” would be 
jeopardized. War is therefore “in principle forbidden, being permitted only as a sanction, that, is 
as a reaction against a delict.”315 While wars conducted without the benefit of a neutral body to 
arbitrate matters may appear unjust, the very act of presenting reasons for attacking another 
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nation, writes Kelsen, is an evolutionary advancement over the state of anarchy or bellum 
omnium contra omnes, the “war of all against all.”316  
The justification of war creates an antinomy for a philosopher whose ontologically 
relativist theory is predicated on the separation of law from morality (see: chapter two).317 
Reticent to admit its moral underpinnings, Kelsen claims that bellum justum theory can be found 
in “highly important” positive international law documents, including the Treaty of Versailles 
(1919)318, the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919)319 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
(1928)320. But even without these documents, Kelsen affirms that national and international 
public opinion customarily “disapproves of war and permits it only exceptionally as a means to 
realize a good and just cause.”321 He asserts that: 
Even if such justification is of moral rather than strictly legal significance it is of great 
importance; for, in the last analysis, international morality is the soil which fosters the 
growth of international law. It is international morality which determines the general 
direction of the development of international law. Whatever is considered ‘just’ in the 
sense of international morality has at least a tendency of becoming ‘law’.322323  
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Kelsen quotes Coleman Phillipson’s The International Law and Custom of Ancient 
Greece and Rome: “No war was undertaken without the belligerents alleging a definite cause 
considered by them as a valid and sufficient justification thereof.”324 Marcus Tullio Cicero (106 
BC-43 BC) remarks: “Wars undertaken without reason are unjust wars, for except for the 
purpose of avenging or repulsing an enemy, no just war can be waged.”325 Christian writers, such 
as Saint Augustine (354-430)326 and Isidoro de Sevilla (560-636)327, influenced by Cicero’s just 
war theory, in turn inspired Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) to write on the subject in the Summa 
Theologiae. 328 Spanish writer Alberico Gentili (1552-1608)329 and Dutch international law 
scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) formally introduced just war theory into the canon of modern 
public international law.330  
Until the end of the eighteenth century, determining a “just cause” was, according to 
Kelsen, a prerequisite for war-making.331 Only during the nineteenth century, writes Kelsen, was 
war conceived as a reflection of a state manifesting its sovereignty. “Undoubtedly, any norm 
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which forbids a state to resort to war against another state, save as a reaction against a wrong 
suffered by it, is contrary to the idea of the sovereignty of a state.”332 But is Kelsen’s historical 
description accurate?  
Grotius, “The Father of International Law," for instance, was far from the anti-war 
thinker he has been made out to be. Unlike Salmon O. Levinson (1865-1941) and James T. 
Shotwell (1874-1965)333, prominent Americans who lobbied members of the Hoover and 
Roosevelt administrations before the passage of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in an effort to outlaw 
aggressive war, Grotius exemplified what critics have described as the program of an 
“interventionist.”334 Grotius, writes Hathaway and Shapiro, “argued that war was a legitimate 
method for enforcing rights in the absence of a world government…and constructed an 
intellectual foundation for a legal order built on war.”335  
Rather than “internationalists,” who believe that the best way to resolve conflicts between 
states is through international institutions, interventionists like Grotius granted states primacy. 
Even as he indicated principles prohibiting the killing of women, children, prisoners of war and 
                                                          
332 Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace, 45. 
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In concert with Kelsen’s theory of bellum justum as positive law, Shotwell’s position conformed, according to 
Shapiro and Hathaway, with American foreign policy after Lend-Lease. While their thesis mistakenly conflates the 
outlawry of war with the thrust of international criminal law—and the methodological construction of the concept of 
international criminal responsibility at Nuremberg—their historical contributions to the subject of outlawry 
nevertheless proves critically important.   
334 Hathaway and Shapiro, The Internationalists. 
335 Ibid., Xx.  
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slaves, he also affirmed in The Law of War and Peace (1625) that “might makes right,” since “it 
is evident that the sources from which wars arise are as numerous as those from which lawsuits 
spring.”336 While just wars, according to Kelsen and Jackson, are considered a mandatory legal 
sanction granted the discretion of members of the international community, if they are (a) an act 
of defense, including a reprisal, retaliation or reparation, and (b) applied by those states victims 
of aggression or states seeking to assist the victims of such injustice,337 Grotius described just 
wars in a more circumscribed fashion.  
Hathaway and Shapiro write that “for Grotius…war is a morally acceptable way to 
prevent or remedy the violation of rights,”338 including the rights of individuals, states, native 
peoples and trading companies. ‘War’ is an “armed execution against an armed adversary…A 
war is said to be ‘just’ if it consists in the execution of a right, and ‘unjust’ if it consists in the 
execution of an injury.”339 But an unjust war is not subject to coercion through licensed 
collective security action, as it is in Kelsen’s theoretical construct. If the stronger side wins, 
according to Grotius, then the legal claim belongs to the victor, not the aggrieved. Parties to a 
dispute were considered sovereign with no higher authority required to resolve conflicts. States, 
therefore, could use any means necessary to gain advantage without recourse. 
To claim that an international society not only exists but that just wars are objectively 
determinable when states decide to attack one another, writes the English School’s Hedley Bull 
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in “Hans Kelsen and International Law,” “strains against the facts.”340 Even if Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter grants the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the authority to 
determine the existence of an international offense341, replacing right by duty, organizational 
deficiencies associated with limitations imposed by the veto powers of the five permanent 
members of the Council demonstrate the endurance of “self-help”.342 Bull writes: 
It is not the case that there is normally agreement in international society as to which side 
in an international armed conflict represents the law-breaker and which the law-enforcer. 
There is commonly disagreement on this matter, or there is agreement that the conflict 
should be regarded as a political one in which each side is asserting its interests, and its 
rights as it sees them, and neither can be said to represent international society as a 
whole. Kelsen’s doctrine excludes the category of wars that are neither delicts nor 
sanctions, the category in which neither side has a just cause, and the category in which 
both have just causes.”343 
 
Notwithstanding Bull’s compelling criticism, which shares with political realism an 
emphasis on “interests…and rights as it sees them”344, pointing to the tendency of states to 
rationalize the justness of their cause, Kelsen draws on historical sources, including declarations 
of war and treaties between states to maintain that state representatives agree that acts are to be 
“permitted only as a reaction against a wrong suffered.”345 The technical condition of 
international law means that “the only possible reaction that can be provided by general 
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international law against an unpermitted war is war itself, a kind of ‘counter-war’ against the 
state which resorted to war in disregard of international law.”346 While acknowledging that it is 
“logically impracticable to prove the thesis of the bellum justum theory,”347 since it is of equal 
formal value to its opposite interpretation where war may be fought “against any other state on 
any ground without violating international law,”348 Kelsen nevertheless makes a political choice 
with moral resonance. The problem in making such a choice, as it relates to a status quo logic 
that benefits the most powerful and putatively most ‘civilized’ nations under imperialist 
conditions, will be examined later in this section.  
Like Kelsen, Jackson agreed that “aggressive wars are civil wars against the international 
community.”349350 In his March 1941 Havana Speech at the First Conference of the Inter-
American Bar Association, Jackson could not deny the moral characteristics associated with just 
war theory, even as he attempted to reinforce the positive validity of the trial. The Lend-Lease 
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Act,351 passed at the time of Jackson’s address352 was based on the premise that comprehensive 
aid to one belligerent party—in this case the United States to the United Kingdom in the Second 
World War— was neither an act of war, nor “incompatible with the obligations which 
international law imposes upon a state, not a belligerent in the war.”353 Jackson asserted that the 
nineteenth century doctrine of impartial neutrality associated with The Hague Conventions had 
been transformed by the events of the Second World War, and that that doctrine wrongly 
assumed that since there was “no legal duty to any other nation…all wars are legal and all wars 
must be regarded as just.”354 English positive international law scholar William Edward Hall 
concurred. Writing in 1904, Hall asserted that “International law has…no alternative but to 
accept war, independently of the justice of its origin.”355 Invoking the “return to earlier and more 
healthy prospects,”356 Jackson, in contrast, drew on the seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
natural law distinction between just and unjust wars. He insisted that “members of the 
international society, bound by the ties of solidarity of Christian civilization,” had a duty to 
“discriminate against a state engaged in an unjust war.”357  
According to Jackson, Grotius asserted that when one nation was in violation of another’s 
territorial rights, neutrality—or impartial treatment—could be dispensed with.358 Grotius wrote 
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that “it is the duty of neutrals to do nothing which may strengthen the side which has the worse 
cause, or which may impede the motions of him who is carrying on a just war."359 However, as 
Shapiro and Hathaway affirm, Grotius likewise “argued that war was a legitimate method for 
enforcing rights in the absence of a world government.”360 The decision to justify Lend-Lease as 
a preliminary right of sanction prior to the United States’ official declaration of war against axis 
powers must consequently be deemed a moral decision with political ramifications. To claim the 
“ties of the solidarity of Christian civilization,” as Jackson does, is to insist upon the moral 
superiority of a certain segment of humanity. 
III. “Christian Civilization”: The Paradox of Retributive Justice  
Jackson’s statement about “Christian civilization” is indeed peculiar. Understood in the 
context of Kelsen’s anthropological discussion of primitive consciousness, which Pure Theory’s 
author attributes to tribal societies, the preference Jackson reserves for “Christian civilization,” 
however, is not particularly anomalous. The higher form of mental acuity that Kelsen links with 
ego-development under “civilized” conditions, described in detail in Society and Nature 
(1943)361 and “Causality and Imputation” (1951) 362creates a paradox: if the retributive 
conception of punishment is only fully-formed under civilized conditions, what use is there in 
imputing guilt to those who do not belong to “Christian civilization”?  
Despite atrocities wrought in the Second World War period, Kelsen places high hopes in a 
revolution of consciousness born of catastrophe. Kelsen writes in the preface to Peace through 
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Law (1944) “have we men of a Christian civilization really the right to relax morally?”363364The 
construction of a system of international criminal adjudication reflects civilizational advances, 
according to Kelsen, insuring the best chance of creating the foundation for a peaceful 
international order after the cessation of war.365 However, before this can happen the assumption 
is that a transformation in consciousness must first take place. “[M]en of a Christian civilization” 
it is assumed can spearhead such changes. 
In contrast to “civilized” consciousness, says Kelsen, “primitive” consciousness 
emphasizes the prevalence of the emotional component. “The consciousness of primitive man is 
essentially characterized by the fact that with him the rational component, which is aimed at 
objective cognition, lags far behind the emotional component, which arises from feeling and 
volition; originally this emotional component almost exclusively dominated the mind of early 
man.”366 Kelsen insists that primitive consciousness is bound by an inability to think in causal 
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terms. Fear of retribution by unseen forces, rather than sober evaluation, dictates action. “Upon 
these ideas are based concepts of value: of what is useful because desired, of what is harmful 
because feared, of what is morally good and bad because it is the expression of a group, rather 
than an individual interest.”367 Decisions are dominated, not by rational cognition able to relate 
cause and effect, but rather by attribution of retributive powers associated with the gods or some 
other animating spirit. Assigned meaning based on accounting, not causality, a person murdered 
must have angered a supernatural force, either god(s) or nature. Violence perpetrated against the 
victim must have been prompted by spiritual misdeeds committed by him or his family, rather 
than derived from the caused actions of his pursuer. The conception of “will” can be deduced 
from such causal recognition, even if, as the case of Adolph Eichmann demonstrates (see: 
chapter four), freedom under coercive orders is circumscribed, compelling obedience that must 
be accounted for with any conceptualization of responsibility.  
Kelsen’s anthropological investigations demonstrate his belief that a graduated 
consciousness consonant with predictable, coercive organizational principles leads in the 
direction of the full development of a neutral legal order where not just collective—but 
ultimately individual—responsibility can be imputed.368 First, however, human consciousness 
must develop from an early, primitive stage where no predictable coercive mechanism (i.e., 
anarchy) prevails to an intermediate stage where collective forms of responsibility based on the 
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customary practice of vengeance or “blood feud” is commonly employed. The difference 
between this earliest and intermediate phase is far more pronounced than the progressive 
evolution from the stage of primitive vengeance to a period where retributive punishment based 
on the pronouncements of an impartial court prevail. Kelsen writes: 
The degree of progress from primitive vengeance to the higher social technique of 
retributive punishment is indeed great. It consists in the fact that the reaction against the 
delict no longer has solely the character of self-help; it must not be exercised anymore by 
the individual directly or indirectly injured but by an impartial authority. Nevertheless, 
the difference between the essentially social reaction of primitive vengeance and the 
retributive punishment is purely a quantitative one, whereas the difference between 
vengeance and the instinctive reflex of defense is qualitative. One should not overlook 
the fact that even today a very important branch of law, namely international law, still 
remains, for the most part, in the technically primitive state of self-help.”369  
 
To hold accountable those individuals who have yet to attain a level of consciousness that 
differentiates between responsibility attributable to retributive gods and human-caused actions 
neglects to account for disparate states of cognitive development. Even if primitive and 
international social orders share decentralized structures, consciousness under tribal laws is 
certainly, according to Kelsen, not on a parallel level to that of the cosmopolitan world. This 
temporal differentiation must likewise not preclude a plurality of levels of consciousness at any 
given moment in time. But who can determine the level of civilizational evolvement, and with it 
the degree of responsibility that ought to be attributed, first to the collective, and afterwards, 
individuals, but those who have the power to claim such enlightenment? This leads to a vicious 
cycle of moral justification. 
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By invoking “Christian civilization” neither Kelsen nor Jackson avoids Bull’s criticism of 
the “doctrine [which] excludes the category of wars that are neither delicts nor sanctions, the 
category in which neither side has a just cause, and the category in which both have just 
causes.”370 Rather, as the next section reaffirms, the choice to invoke the theory of bellum justum 
to prove the right of the allies to try Nazis for crimes against peace, founders on the status quo 
logic used by Jackson to justify his case. That Kelsen de-linked bellum justum theory from the 
prosecution of core international crimes, especially crimes against peace, perhaps is an 
acknowledgment of the limitations he detected in holding axis war criminals accountable 
according to a criterion laden with prejudice. 
IV. The Status Quo Logic and Justice as (Imperially-Administered) Peace 
As early as 1941 at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, Kelsen 
and international relations scholar and former student, John Herz, presented the paper “Essential 
Conditions of International Justice,” in which the theory of bellum justum was relativized to such 
an extent that the prospect of designating even Nazi aggression an illegal offense became nearly 
impossible. Kelsen writes:  
To the extent that the opposition between the right of all peoples to self-determination 
and the claim of certain peoples to Lebensraum rests upon different ideas of the value of 
the peoples this conflict is not capable of being decided by science. It is not so even if the 
claim to Lebensraum and the correlative claim to domination of one people by another 
presents itself with the argument that the domination is exercised in the interest of the 
people that is not able to govern itself, with the argument that it is only a question of a 
special way different from self-determination, in this case a better way to assure the 
welfare of the dominated people. For, this justification, too, rests on a judgment of value 
which cannot be objectively verified.371 
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The policy of Lebensraum (“Living Space”) based on the racial theory that Aryans were 
entitled to farmland and trade in the east, especially Russia’s, since the German people, 
according to Hitler, were superior to Slavs, was certainly antithetical to Kelsen’s views as both a 
Jew and humanist.372 But as an advocate of “legal science,” the author of the Pure Theory of Law 
admits that in “a judgment of value which cannot be objectively verified,” Lebensraum “and the 
correlative claim to domination of one people by another” is comparable “to the right of all 
people to self-determination.”373 His moral relativism on the matter—as the following discussion 
of imperialism in relation to the status quo logic employed by Jackson demonstrates—proves the 
limitations of any judgment that elevates crimes against peace to a supreme position in the 
hierarchy of charges.  
Much like Lebensraum, if excised of racialist overtones, Grossraum (“Greater Space”) 
theory, emphasized a sphere of influence for Germany protected from external interference. 
Introduced by Carl Schmitt, Kelsen’s (1888-1985) rival in the Weimar debate over whether 
supreme powers ought to be delegated to a dictatorial Reich president under Article 48 (Schmitt) 
or a constitutional court (Kelsen),374 Grossraum theory was used as propaganda for Nazi 
aggression. Hitler instructed Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to inform United 
States Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles on his visit to Germany on March 1, 1940 that 
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“[j]ust as on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine the United States would firmly reject any 
interference by European governments in Mexican affairs, for example, Germany regards the 
Eastern European area as her sphere of interest.”375  
In “Essential Conditions of International Justice,” Kelsen described justice as indeterminable 
by rational cognition. Though the object of justice is to assure peace between varying interests, 
and in turn provide “social happiness,” he asks how any society can decide, for example, that the 
equality of all individuals ought to be preferenced over personal freedom, or materialist interests 
over spiritual ones? Since social science, writes Kelsen, cannot demonstrate the means by which 
to achieve ends that optimally benefit societies, the problem of justice is reliant on subjective, 
emotionally-driven, ideological judgment rather than objective insight. The same holds true, he 
argues, with respect to the contradictory impulses of international justice with regard to 
“regulation of the territorial problem.”376 He writes: 
According to one formula…the principle of self-determination of peoples…all nations, races 
and religions are equal, and hence have an equal right to exist, to maintain their own culture, 
and to determine their own fate. The other formula is the claim to Lebensraum [or] living 
space. It proceeds from the supposition that there are superior and inferior peoples, and that 
the former, and only they, have the right to dominate a territory whose extent and natural 
resources suffice to assure a satisfactory, i.e., self-sufficient existence of its people, and that 
even at the expense of the inferior peoples. It is a principle which was applied in previous 
centuries only to the relation between Christian and heathen, between civilized and primitive 
peoples, but which today is invoked to justify the imperialistic claims of certain totalitarian 
states vis-d-vis other civilized nations. To the extent that the opposition between the right of 
all peoples to self-determination and the claim of certain peoples to Lebensraum rests upon 
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different ideas of the value of the peoples this conflict is not capable of being decided by 
science.377 
 
Kelsen’s legitimization of Lebensraum as a valid principle of international justice on par with 
the principle of self-determination, and his acknowledgment that this aggressive approach to 
international relations had been the common practice of imperialism with respect “to the 
relations between Christian and heathen, between civilized and primitive peoples,” demonstrates 
a deficiency in Kelsen’s reasoning. With this statement, Kelsen claims that the “international 
community” is not even able to decide on a valid criterion for sanctioning breaches of the peace. 
For what does the theory of bellum justum even matter, if any nation can claim Lebensraum—or 
Grossraum—theory as equal to the values embedded in the United Nations Charter, which states 
that the charter’s purpose is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace"?378  
Kelsen confounds those seeking a clear and consistent understanding of his position on 
international criminal responsibility. With the formulation of “justice as peace”, Kelsen evidently 
does not mean “universal peace” in the sense of an ordering that would discourage the gross 
violations of human rights associated with Lebensraum, which he relativizes. Still, he writes in 
“Essential Conditions of International Justice” that: 
 
International justice means international peace, peace secured by international law. The 
international legal order is to be maintained, especially in the sense that necessary 
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changes in the legal relations among states are to take place peaceably, not by the use of 
force. International justice means prevention of war.379 
 
He, of course, does not mean all wars. Like Jackson, Kelsen asserts that defensive wars are 
certainly allowable as collective security measures to restore the state of peace in international 
relations. Since international law is a social order, states that commit acts of aggression must be 
treated like violent individuals under national law, sanctioned by other states. While peace, of 
course, is a moral prerequisite for civil relations and may coincide with human rights concerns, it 
is not necessary for implementing humanitarian protections. The Nuremberg trial proves this 
point. If just war theory, an antidote against the threat of aggressive war, is proven to be not only 
detrimental but inessential to the cognition of international criminal responsibility, another 
methodological approach deprived of the presupposition of peace is warranted.   
As with Kelsen’s moral relativism as regards the territorial problem, Jackson, in his opening 
address at Nuremberg, was even more conspicuous in his endorsement of imperial interests. He 
stated, “Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however objectionable it 
finds the status quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances or for 
altering those conditions.”380 Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal at the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (IMTFE) condemned the U.S. led prosecution for this reason.  
He wrote in his dissenting opinion: 
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Certainly dominated nations of the present day status quo cannot be made to submit to 
eternal domination only in the name of peace. International law must be prepared to face the 
problem of bringing within juridical limits the politico-historical evolution of mankind which 
up to now has been accomplished chiefly through war. War and other methods of self-help by 
force can be effectively excluded only when this problem is solved, and it is only then that 
we can think of introducing criminal responsibility for efforts at adjustment by means other 
than peaceful. Until then there can hardly be any justification for any direct and indirect 
attempt at maintaining, in the name of humanity and justice, the very status quo which might 
have been organized and hitherto maintained only by force by pure opportunist ‘Have and 
Holders’….The part of humanity which has been lucky enough to enjoy political freedom 
can now well afford to have the deterministic ascetic outlook of life, and may think of peace 
in terms of political status quo. But every part of humanity has not been equally lucky and a 
considerable part is still haunted by the wishful thinking about escape from political 
dominations. To them the present age is faced with not only the menace of totalitarianism but 
also the ACTUAL PLAGUE of imperialism.381 
 
Pal disagreed with the chief prosecutor of the IMTFE Joseph Keenan, and the similarly 
conservative sentiment held by Jackson regarding the maintenance of geographical boundaries.382 
The status quo meant merely the most convenient rationale, according to Pal, to keep at bay 
aspirations by subaltern populations under western colonial domination.383 As with Jackson’s 
and Kelsen’s determination that just wars ought to be decided by “Christian civilization” where 
an evolved conception of individual responsibility was implied, a status quo logic, said Pal, 
granted imperial powers, including the allied nations, “eternal domination…in the name of 
peace.”384  
A status quo logic that insisted that those countries that wished to vie for their independence 
were committing acts of aggression by changing the outlines of the world map implied that the 
crimes against peace charge distorted fair proceedings against the accused. Since a number of 
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countries at the time, especially in the East (including Pal’s own nation, India) were under 
colonial domination, the western architects of the IMTFE were imposing their notion of right on 
the vanquished Japanese.385 He concluded, therefore, “that every one of the accused must be 
found not guilty of every one of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted on all 
those charges."386 Although he included war crimes and crimes against humanity in his general 
denunciation, he took special issue with the crimes against peace charge.387  
The choice to focus on crimes against peace was certainly political. Like U.S. Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson, who wished to vindicate America’s position on the Neutrality Act and Lend 
Lease,388Jackson felt it imperative that the trial determine that the Nazis were the ones who 
began aggressive action, and, thus, were in violation of collective security measures meant to 
insure peace. Similarly, Japanese officials, albeit in accordance with a deliberately natural law 
approach devised by Kennan,389 were to be held responsible for acting in an unjust manner in 
breaching the peace of nations. Pal’s criticism of Kennan extended to Japanese involvement in 
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the Nanking Massacre, which, though brutal, was not the “product of government policy” for 
which Japanese officials were to be held directly responsible under the conspiracy to commit an 
aggressive war. He claimed that there is "no evidence, testimonial or circumstantial, 
concomitant, prospectant, restrospectant, that would in any way lead to the inference that the 
government in any way permitted the commission of such offenses".390 He added, however, that 
neither from the beginning of the six-week assault on Nanjing by the Japanese starting on 
December 13, 1937, nor at any point after, was conspiracy to wage aggressive war illegal. Pal’s 
decision, however, to place the Japanese in the same category as his colonized home country, 
India, remains inappropriate. Having colonized several countries, including Manchuria and 
eastern Mongolia, which the Japanese invaded in 1931, and subsequently turned into the puppet 
state of Manchukuo, and having committing gross violation of human rights,391 the Japanese 
were more like Nazi aggressors than India, ruled by the British Crown from 1858 to 1947.  
If a similarity did exist it was in the fact that Japan traditionally had not been considered 
civilized by European states.392 The problem is that two sets of rules for European and non-
European, colonizer and colonized, existed. While the Victorian era that coincided with the 
period of Queen Victoria’s rule (1837-1901) was a period of relative peace amongst the great 
European powers, colonial expansion in Asia and Africa made the British Empire, for example, 
the largest empire in history. Martti Koskenniemi in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise 
and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 chronicles a plural, if heavily-weighted social 
Darwinian “anthropological” view of gradations of civilization. He writes that “by the 1870s the 
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assumption of human development proceeding by stages from the primitive to the civilized had 
come to form the bedrock of social anthropology and evolutionary sociology that provided much 
of the conceptual background for cultivated European reflection about what Europeans often 
sweepingly termed the Orient.”393 The Japanese, though assuming control over their sphere of 
influence, were considered less civilized in the estimation of European imperialists. Nowhere 
was this more apparent than in the decision of signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact not to 
recognize Japanese rule over Manchukuo, whereas the Italian invasion in the Second Italo-
Ethiopian War, a colonial war that took place from October 1935 to May 1936 did not 
delegitimize Italian conquest. This double-standard reflected preferential treatment granted to a 
fellow European colonial power. 394 
 Although Kelsen continued to uphold bellum justum theory in his last major work on the 
subject, Principles of International Law (1967), he acknowledged the “equally 
serious…objection [to just war theory] resting on the argument that only a state which is stronger 
than its adversary state is in a position to use war as a legitimate instrument of coercion.”395 Still, 
the theoretical foundation he provided for a status quo logic preferencing an international order 
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dominated by western imperial nations, aided Jackson’s effort to establish the allied right of 
prosecution. 
 Part III describes the reasons Kelsen, though skeptical of ad hoc jurisdictional authority, 
believed the Nuremberg proceedings to be internally affair.  
V. Victor’s Justice 
 
 Those who focus on Kelsen’s skepticism towards the Nuremberg proceedings396 have 
determined that he was uncompromising with respect to prosecution under ad hoc jurisdictional 
authority. While his preference was certainly for a neutral, permanent and compulsory 
international court adjudicating humanitarian crimes, there is no reason to believe that he was not 
just as likely to endorse the imputation of individual responsibility under less-than-ideal 
conditions as he was to impute collective responsibility for unjust—or aggressive—warfare 
when no impartial international body had yet been established to decide on such matters.  Kelsen 
nonetheless writes that: 
 
If the principles applied in the Nuremberg Trial were to become a precedent, then, after 
the next war, the governments of the victorious States would try the members of the 
governments of the vanquished States for having committed crimes determined 
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unilaterally and with retroactive force by the former.  Let us hope that there is no such 
precedent.397 
 
The Italian philosopher Danilo Zolo, critical of the undercurrent of imperialism in 
Kelsen’s writings on just war theory, nevertheless affirms Kelsen’s status as a leading critic of 
the Nuremberg proceedings. Zolo asserts that: 
 
The severest critique of all, what has found almost universal consensus, is the one 
formulated by Kelsen. The punishment of war criminals—not only Nazis—was supposed 
to be an act of justice and not the continuation of hostilities by means purporting to be 
judicial, but in fact betraying the desire for revenge. For Kelsen, it was incompatible with 
the function of justice that only the defeated nations were obliged to submit their citizens 
to the jurisdiction of a criminal court. The victorious nations should also have accepted 
that citizens of theirs who had committed war crimes should be brought to trial. 398 
 
 That Kelsen preferred that an international law system be established that conformed to 
his blueprint for a Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace (PLMP) with a compulsory 
international court deciding on the merit of claims to just warfare and individual criminality (as 
described in chapter two), he also recognized the importance of trying war criminals, even under 
ad hoc conditions. The remainder of this section argues that despite his enduring criticism of ad 
hoc jurisdictional authority—and the prospect of “victor’s justice”—Kelsen understood that 
without a permanent international court, justice still recommended the prosecution of major Nazi 
war criminals. 
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Due to the composition of the Nuremberg tribunal, and the fact that Germany was not a 
signatory to the IMT charter, Kelsen held that the trial was suspect. The London Agreement 
concluded by the four victorious powers and “adhered to by other states of the United 
Nations,”399 provided the legal basis for the trial, said Kelsen, not a legislative act of the four 
occupant nations as “the legitimate successors of the German government.”400 Without Germany 
as a signatory to the agreement or else jurisdictional licensure under debellatio, Pure Theory’s 
author questioned the authority of the allies to impose justice.401  
Debellatio, as one modern writer has described it, occurs when "one party to a conflict 
has been totally defeated in war, its national institutions have disintegrated, and none of its allies 
continue to challenge its enemy militarily on its behalf".402 In the case of Germany, most of its 
territory before the Anschluss (i.e., the annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany that occurred on 
March 12, 1938) had not been integrated under the dominion of the Allied Control Council. The 
German state, therefore, de jure continued to exist. When the Federal Republic of Germany was 
established at the end of the Allied occupation, a continuous claim of sovereignty was 
maintained.403 As legal successor to the Third Reich, the Federal Republic confirmed this 
jurisdictional problem, which Kelsen argued contravened the public international law principle 
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that “one sovereign power cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign power [which] is 
the basis of the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity.”404  
Although “in the realm of law the formal aspect [was] essential,” Kelsen said, “the objection 
against the Nuremberg trial arising out of this deficiency [was] not the most serious one.”405 For 
Kelsen, the tribunal judgment was even more problematic because it imposed the will of the 
victorious powers on the vanquished. Notwithstanding these valid concerns, Kelsen provides 
compelling reason for why ad hoc jurisdiction, even as practiced at Nuremberg, was a viable 
option in the absence of a permanent and compulsory international court. While he would have 
preferred an “international court endowed with the competence to try individuals…for those 
grave violations of international law which of necessity will have the character of acts of state” 
he recognized the “studiously general terms in which the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal was cast.”406 In recognizing the effort to afford defendants’ rights guaranteed under 
domestic jurisdiction, including the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, the fair 
chance to present a defense, including access to counsel and evidence to counter claims made 
against Nazis, including alibi evidence, the equity of the case could not be dismissed.  
Even Kelsen’s fiercest critics, including Judith Shklar in Legalism: Law, Morals and 
Political Trials, who concludes that the Pure Theory of Law’s structural account remains devoid 
of political and moral qualities, and therefore is of little use to understanding how the law 
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actually works, is in agreement on this point.407 She writes that “what distinguishes most, though 
not all, political trials is that…to some degree most political trials [do] not begin with the idea of 
law, but with the idea that this man must go. The judge will be subservient to the prosecution, the 
evidence false, the accused bullied, the witnesses perjured, and rules of law and procedure 
ignored. This is, as it were, the classical model of a political trial.”408 At Nuremberg, despite the 
retroactive creation of criminal laws applicable to the defendants, “the Trial,” she writes, “was 
internally fair. Each defendant [had] a German counsel of his own choice, the guilt of each was 
individually established before punishment, two of the defendants were acquitted entirely, and 
several were acquitted of one or more charges.”409 
Kelsen stated that contravention of the rule of law should not be reduced to the rule against 
ex post facto lawmaking alone. While the US Constitution under Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 
asserts that “No state shall…pass any…ex post facto law…,”  retroactive lawmaking, Kelsen 
states, is “an absolute principle expressing a logical necessity. Its value is highly relative and the 
sphere of its validity restricted.”410 Therefore, the decision of the International Military Tribunal 
to affirm retroactive lawmaking is not a violation of a general rule applicable under all 
jurisdictional authority, rather, claims to fairness, where every person is subject to the same law, 
whether head-of-state or low-level state official, must be considered in accordance with a higher 
normative principle 
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 Once Kelsen’s view of international criminal responsibility with its emphasis on prosecution 
of individuals for having committed core international crimes is accounted for, a fundamental 
moral expectation rather than “justice as peace” becomes the central pivot of a philosophy of law 
that otherwise is assumed to banish “alien elements”. In refocusing our attention on the meaning 
of international criminal responsibility for this leading twentieth century legal positivist, “the 
moral minimum” that Kelsen himself claims must be kept separate from a pure legal cognition411 
appears impossible to exclude. 
Kelsen makes this clear when he writes: 
 
Even if atrocities are covered by municipal law, or have the character of acts of State and 
hence do not constitute individual criminal responsibility, they are certainly open violations 
of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized people and hence were, at 
least, morally not innocent or indifferent when they were committed.412  
 
The next section (Part IV) explores the method of ex post facto lawmaking. Often neglected 
in the effort to prove the positivity of the case, prosecution, if for different reasons than the 
courts, subscribed to a retroactive logic. While difficult to prove that Kelsen caused allied 
practitioners to assert a retroactive line of reasoning, the view, for example, that Kelsen’s 
student, Hersch Lauterpacht, deserves greater credit than Kelsen for influencing Jackson’s 
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methodological approach must be reconsidered.413 While Lauterpacht insisted on the criminality 
of treaty laws banishing war, Kelsen asserted a mode of reasoning independent of prospective 
international legal norms. In this respect, not only should the recent claims of Hathaway and 
Shapiro that the trial proved “that those who waged aggressive war could be put in the dock” 
deserve qualification, but denominating “Hersch The Great…the father of the New World 
Order” detracts from a sober assessment of his teacher’s role in the formation of the concept of 
international criminal responsibility at this early stage. While Hathaway and Shapiro are certain 
that Lauterpacht’s “legacy…was nothing less than [validating] a system of rules embodying the 
idea that war is an illegitimate tool for establishing or enforcing legal right,”414 Kelsen in 
licensing retroactivity created the legal foundation in the post-war era for ad hoc international 
tribunals that would place crimes against humanity at the forefront of subject matter 
jurisdiction.415   
VI.  Criticism of the Application of Crimes Against Peace at Nuremberg 
The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907, which established the rules of war, including 
prohibitions on the use of poisons and the attack or bombardment of undefended towns, as well 
as the Geneva Conventions of 1929 regulating the treatment of war prisoners, were “signposts on 
the road toward a growing conviction that aggressive war must somehow be abolished.”416  
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Jackson remarked in his opening address at Nuremberg that “any resort to war—to any 
kind of war—is a resort to means that are inherently criminal.”417 He insisted that defendants 
were aware that at the time of commission of illegal wars, they were committing a criminal act. 
In “Nuremberg in Retrospect: Legal Answer to International Lawlessness,” Jackson stated that 
after Germany violated treaties of friendship and non-aggression with “a dozen unprepared 
countries,” “came a series of unequivocal warnings that the course of its leaders was regarded as 
outside the bounds of modern warfare and criminal.”418  
These warnings included the St. James Declaration (1942) by representatives of nine 
occupied “governments-in-exile” meeting in London, who stated that their principle war aim was 
“punishment, through the channels of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for 
these crimes…”419; the Moscow Declaration (1943), signed by the foreign secretaries of the 
United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Nationalist China, which insisted that 
“fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and 
handed over to justice”420; and the United Nations War Crimes Commission (1943-48), 
comprised of seventeen nations421 tasked with collecting evidence of war crimes perpetrated by 
axis officials.  
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In addition, Jackson made use of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) sponsored 
by the League of Nations, which declared in  Article 1 “that aggressive war is an international 
crime,” and that more than a dozen parties to the treaty obligated themselves to “undertake that 
no one of them will be guilty of its commission”422; the preamble to the League of Nations’ 
Protocol of the Settlement of International Disputes or ‘Geneva Protocol’ (1924), accepted by 48 
Members of the League of Nations, which stated that “a war of aggression constitutes a violation 
of…[the solidarity of the members of the international community]  and an ‘international 
crime’”423; the Locarno Pact or Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, 
Great Britain and Italy (1925)424; the Eighteenth Plenary Meeting of the Assembly of the League 
of Nations (1927)425 pronouncing a Declaration Concerning Wars of Aggression; the Unanimous 
Resolution of the twenty-one American Republics at the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American 
Conference (1928) stating that “wars of aggression constituted international crimes against the 
human species’” 426; the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and 
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Arbitration (1929)427; and the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (1933)428 
ratified by 25 states.  
The 1927 US Senate Resolution introduced by Idaho Senator William E. Borah stated 
“that it is the view of the Senate of the United States that war between nations should be 
outlawed as an institution or means of the settlement of international controversies by making it 
a public crime under the law of nations”429Finally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Treaty of Paris, 
or more formally, the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy (1928), ratified by representatives of nearly all the nations of the world, demonstrated “a 
widely prevalent juristic climate which has energized a spreading custom among civilized 
peoples to regard a war of aggression as not simply ‘unjust’ or ‘illegal’ but downright 
criminal.”430  
Kelsen disagreed. He contended that neither Kellogg-Briand, nor any of the other treaties, 
did anything more than designate certain wars as illegal, granting the right of reprisal and war 
directed against states violating the agreement. Thus, the pact did not constitute individual 
criminal responsibility, only collective responsibility. While it confirmed a general conviction 
among States to resolve conflicts peacefully, Kelsen considered it problematic to deduce 
individual criminal responsibility from acts denominated illegal under the Pact, as the 
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International Military Tribunal did in its judgment “that those who plan and wage such a war, 
with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.”431 It “is in 
contradiction,” says Kelsen, “with positive law and generally accepted principles of international 
jurisprudence.”432  He remarks in “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a 
Precedent in International Law?” (1947) that: 
The treaties for whose violation the London Agreement establishes individual criminal 
responsibility are in the first place the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, and certain non-
aggression pacts concluded by Germany with States against which Germany, in spite of these 
treaties, resorted to war. All these treaties forbade only resort to war, and not planning, 
preparation, initiation of war or conspiracy for the accomplishment of such actions. None of 
these treaties stipulated individual criminal responsibility.433 
 
 Still, Kelsen did not criticize Jackson for emphasizing the crimes against peace charge, 
only his reliance on treaty law to prove the right to try Nazis. In “Collective and Individual 
Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals” 
(1943), Kelsen, writes that “the demand to punish the war criminals is, or should be, above all, 
the demand to punish the authors of the second World War, the persons morally responsible for 
one of the greatest crimes in the history of mankind.”434 Kelsen uses moral normative language 
(i.e., “persons morally responsible”) to demonstrate that crimes against peace was to be the 
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preeminent charge. 435 Yet his endorsement of the primacy of the crimes against peace charge 
does not necessitate agreement with the method used to prove its criminality. 
Retroactive lawmaking, according to Kelsen, is the only other choice when no 
international treaty stipulates criminality.436 Whether retroactive legislation ought to be 
introduced is therefore dependent on the state of development of the international law system. 
While it is not ideal to apply retroactive laws, an ad hoc order may require prosecution of 
offenses that under national law would certainly be criminalizable. With time, the development 
of legal norms applicable prospectively, heralding a federated world state with a permanent 
compulsory international court adjudicating cases against war criminals, would, he believed, 
replace ad hoc international justice. However, as long as international law remained in a de-
centralized form, retroactive lawmaking based on substantive criterion would need to be 
enforced. 
Kelsen writes, “since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement 
established individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, 
and the persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the 
retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with 
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justice.”437 (my emphasis).  The application of retroactive legislation does not necessitate an 
evaluation of the preeminence of the allied cause, only whether the act was ‘morally most 
objectionable’.  
 After determining that “in the second place, the crimes for which retribution may be 
claimed are breaches of the rules of international law regulating the conduct of war”438—or war 
crimes—Kelsen hesitated to implicate crimes against humanity, which he referred to under the 
rubric of “principles of humanity”. He writes: 
The demand for retribution is sometimes extended to violations of the principles of humanity, 
that is to say, to acts which, though not illegal from the point of view of international or 
national law, are breaches of the norms of morality against which neither international nor 
national law provides any sanction, and for which no legal responsibility is established.439  
 
Despite remarking in his correspondence with Jackson that such violations did not constitute 
law,440 “it was Kelsen’s conviction that on the eve of the intended prosecution of Nazi criminals 
the legal basis ought to be re-established in order to be able to try former members of the 
German government for having started the war and for their violations of the principles of 
humanity.”441 Kelsen’s recommendation that this charge be designated an offense by which 
retroactive lawmaking be employed under the London Agreement proves that, statements to the 
contrary, he confirmed that crimes against humanity were not only valid, but “morally most 
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objectionable.” With the post-Second World War ratification of humanitarian treaties applicable 
to internal atrocities, such as the Genocide Convention (1948) and Geneva IV (1949), subsequent 
case studies demonstrate Kelsen’s intensified support for sanctions with respect to violations of 
“principles of humanity”.  
While Kelsen rejected Kellogg-Briand as criminalizing core international offenses, violations 
of state practice were not the reason for his dismissal. George Schwarzerberger, a political realist 
and scholar on international criminal law at the time of the Second World War, claimed that 
neither Kellogg-Briand nor any of the other pronouncements on aggressive warfare were legally 
binding, because state practice proved that prior agreements were void. In addition to Nazi 
aggression towards Poland (1939), Schwarzenberger included the invasion of Manchuria by the 
Soviet Union (1929), and later by Japan (1931), as well as the Soviet Winter War against Finland 
(1939-40) to demonstrate that state practice could not be established in advance of the 
proceedings.442 This is important to any discussion of Kelsen’s contributions in the post-Cold 
War era (see: chapter five), where the construction of customary international law has been 
based, in part, on a far less rigid determination of state practice. 
Kelsen also disagreed with the rationale of judges. According to the IMT Judgment (as 
quoted by Kelsen): 
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and 
that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are 
committing a crime in so doing…But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly enact that 
such wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such wars. To that extent the 
same is true with regard to the laws of war contained in the Hague Convention. The Hague 
Convention of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging war. These included the 
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inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned weapons, the improper use of 
flags of truce, and similar matters. Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long before 
the dates of the Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes, punishable as 
offenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere designates such 
practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try 
and punish offenders. For many years past, however, military tribunals have tried and 
punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare laid down by this 
Convention. In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that 
which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the 
Hague Convention.443 
 
Kelsen was critical of the court’s analogy. While the Hague Convention regulating the 
conduct of war had been transformed into positive national criminal law, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact had not. No state had changed the rules of international law into sanctionable criminal 
offenses after the ratification of Kellogg-Briand. Moreover, no individual had been tried or 
punished by a military tribunal for having resorted to an illegal war prior to the London 
Agreement. Therefore, “neither by the doctrine of the American prosecutor,” writes Kelsen, “nor 
by the doctrine of the tribunal is it possible to prove that existing international law, especially the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact, has already established individual criminal responsibility for acts by which 
a State resorts to an internationally illegal war…For the tribunal they were criminal, and that 
means punishable, only under the law created by the London Agreement, which is the only legal 
basis of the judgment.”444 
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While prosecution and court reasoned that aggressive war was criminalizable based on 
previous international agreements, especially Kellogg-Briand, a review of Jackson’s writings and 
the IMT judgment demonstrate that retroactive lawmaking assumed primacy, and thus Kelsen’s 
rationale dominated the consensus opinion amongst practitioners.  Jackson writes:  
If no moral principle is entitled to application as law until it is first embodied in a text and 
promulgated as a command by some superior effective authority, then it must be admitted the 
world was without such a text at the time the acts I have recited took place. No sovereign 
legislative act to which the Germans must bow had defined international crimes, fixed 
penalties and set up courts to adjudge them. From the premise that nothing is law if not 
embraced in a sovereign command, it is easy to argue that the Nuremberg trial applied 
retroactive, or ex post facto law.445 (my emphasis) 
  
 While Jackson admits that the common law tradition, based on the inductive logic of 
general rules developed from particular decisions, preferences a less text-bound approach, he 
nevertheless “does not deny the authority of the London charter.”446 “The judge reaches a 
decision more largely upon consideration of the inherent quality and natural effect of the act in 
question…[in] what has sometimes been called a natural law that binds each man to refrain from 
acts so inherently wrong and injurious to others that he must know they will be treated as 
criminal.” 447 In so doing, Jackson admits to the same substantive prerequisite of retroactive 
justice that Kelsen used to determine international criminal responsibility. 
The Literature Review (chapter two) described Kelsen’s positive law rationale for 
retroactive lawmaking. While Kelsen’s position contradicted Austin’s classical legal positivist 
approach, which contended that command was always future-oriented, since commanding a past 
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event would be a contradiction in terms, Kelsen nevertheless asserts that retroactivity is a 
legitimate, if exceptional, positive law approach to criminalization. By claiming that natural law 
theory prohibited ex post facto lawmaking on the grounds that individuals subject to the rule of 
law, “whose legal conduct is prescribed by the rule,”448 are protected from prosecution, Kelsen 
assumes that those natural lawyers who describe the “inner morality” of law as protecting 
individuals from the predations of dictatorships and other forms of government that flout the 
inviolability of human freedom, represent the totality of natural law thinking.449 Rather, natural 
law thinking, as Jackson noted, retroactively “binds each man to refrain from acts so inherently 
wrong and injurious to others that he must know they will be treated as criminal.”450 Thus, it is 
the substantive nature of an act that is the condition of prosecution. Even Kelsen, who argues 
along structural lines for the positive validity of retroactive lawmaking, admits as much. 
IMT judges stated that “the maxim nullem crimen sine lege (Latin: “no crime without 
law”) is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.”451 Kelsen 
similarly remarks that state constitutions often prohibit ex post facto lawmaking, a reflection of a 
more centralized legal order insuring legal protections for individuals. General international law, 
however, does not prohibit retroactivity. While IMT judges attempted to anchor their view in 
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legal positivism, like Kelsen they ended up endorsing a line of reasoning centered around “a 
higher-ranking principle of natural justice.”452 As Kelsen writes: 
In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each other, the higher one prevails; 
and to punish those who were morally responsible for the international crime of the 
second World War may certainly be considered as more important than to comply with 
the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to so many exception.453 
VII. Conclusion 
Since the Nuremberg Tribunal was heavily weighted in the direction of criminalizing 
aggressive war making, this chapter reviewed the ways in which just war theory was applied to 
favor “Christian civilization” and a status quo logic benefitting imperial nations. While Kelsen’s 
endorsement of the theory of bellum justum provides a legal rationale for assigning collective 
responsibility, the author of the Pure Theory of Law indicates a general recognition of the 
problems associated with the application of this theory as the grounds for imputing individual 
criminal responsibility. In contrast, Jackson’s reluctance to concede bias creates the foundation 
for victor’s justice, as allied powers were a priori considered innocent of war offenses.   
Despite questioning the authority of the allies to conduct a trial without German ratification 
of the IMT charter, Kelsen nevertheless fundamentally considered the ad hoc proceedings valid, 
since the trial was internally fair. Moreover, while Kelsen is often assumed to advocate an 
unyielding view of “justice as peace” (see: chapter two), he is nevertheless committed to 
developing a conception of ICR that prioritizes protections for victims of human rights abuses 
separate from any value placed on the peaceful resolution of conflict. In this respect, his decision 
to endorse ad hoc jurisdiction at Nuremberg, based on a moral criterion associated with 
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retroactive lawmaking ought to be viewed, not as anomalous, but integral to his pure theoretical 
project. 
Since every German was collectively responsible for crimes against peace, in accordance 
with traditional rules of international law, Kelsen’s recommendations related to individual 
responsibility, which Jackson integrated into what became the final draft of the IMT, advancing 
the cause of international law. If the focal point of all law, according to Kelsen, is imputation, as 
designated in the Literature Review (Chapter II, Part I), then international criminal 
responsibility, even if assigned through a creative juridical methodology (retroactivity) rather 
than a more conservative one (prospective lawmaking) bolsters the prospect of a more 
centralized legal authority, since centralized organization is gauged based on the degree to which 
a society has moved away from collective forms of responsibility towards imputing individual 
responsibility. 
While Jackson insisted that the Kellogg-Briand Pact gave fair warning to the suspects, and 
was the preeminent reason crimes against peace assumed a central place in the hierarchy of 
subject matter jurisdiction, like IMT judges, he acknowledged the distinct possibility that Nazi 
were responsible for their actions because of offenses committed in the past, despite no 
normative law in place to sanction those offenses. In examining how retroactive lawmaking 
based on moral estimations of responsibility shifted attention away from this “Class A” charge, 
“which protects the sovereignty of all states, even criminal states, so long as they do not launch 
wars,”454 it is possible to re-think the place of crimes against peace relative to more human 
rights-oriented international charges.   
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The defense would apparently have preferred [Adolph Eichmann] to plead not guilty on the 
grounds that under the then existing Nazi legal system he had not done anything wrong, that 
what he was accused of were not crimes but ‘acts of state,’ over which no other state has 
jurisdiction (par in parem imperium non habet)455, that it had been his duty to obey and that, 
in [Defense Attorney] Servatius’ words, he had committed acts ‘for which you are decorated 







Twilight of the Acts of State Doctrine: Ex Post Facto Lawmaking and the Making of 




This chapter analyzes the evolving theory and practice of international criminal responsibility 
(ICR) using Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law (PTL) as a continuing point of reference. Whereas 
the last case study reflected on the tension between Kelsen’s licensing of just war theory and his 
criticism of the approach introduced by the allied prosecution to justify the application of crimes 
against peace at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, this chapter analyzes 
rival claims in the 1961-62 Jerusalem trial of Nazi SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer (Lieutenant 
Colonel) Adolph Eichmann. On the one hand, Eichmann’s defense counsel Robert Servatius 
attributed to Kelsen a convincing rationale for immunizing his client on the basis of the acts of 
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state doctrine (AoSD), and on the other, Israel’s prosecutor, Gideon Hausner, and judges in the 
case, turn to Kelsen in support of retroactive lawmaking based on moral criterion.  
While no direct evidence of Kelsen’s view of Eichmann’s culpability exists, read in the 
context of his moral licensing of ex post facto lawmaking, Pure Theory’s author arguably would 
have accepted the judgment rendered by Israel’s court. Kelsen’s brief, if inconclusive, reference 
to the Eichmann case in a footnote in Principles of International Law (1967) does not deny the 
possibility that he would have endorsed prosecution. “As for the retroactive aspect of the Israeli 
law,” he writes, “the Court stated ‘the penal jurisdiction of a state with respect to crimes 
committed by ‘foreign offenders’ insofar as it does not conflict on other grounds with the 
principles of international law, is not limited by the prohibition of retroactive effect.”457 This 
chapter is an exercise in thinking through Kelsen’s position on ex post facto lawmaking as the 
higher form of justice in cases where an act of state does not immunize an official from assuming 
“moral responsibility”. 458 
As with other case studies, chapter four confronts the main obstacle at a given moment in 
ICL history to realizing a moral conception of ICR. A seemingly unlikely candidate to guide us 
along this path to recognition, given his express commitment to the separation of law from 
morality or “the separation thesis” (see: chapter two), Kelsen is nevertheless critical to proving 
the limits of ICR as an object of positive legal cognition. Acts of State were defined by Kelsen as 
“acts performed by individuals in their capacity as organs of the State and therefore acts imputed 
to the State.”459 In Eichmann’s trial, these ‘protections’ proved to be useless. Both Israel’s 
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district court and appeals chamber held that previous case law, including the IMT charter and 
judgments, invalidated the AoSD. The “penal provisions of international law would be a 
mockery,”460 the Supreme Court of Israel adjudged, if states immunized offenses that under 
normal circumstances would constitute a breach of national law. Since Eichmann’s acts could 
not be sheltered by the “character of [his] task or mission,”461 the Supreme Court determined that 
he was no longer protected by sovereign right. 
Head of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Adolph Eichmann was responsible for the 
deportation of European Jewry to ghettoes and extermination camps of German-occupied 
Eastern Europe during the Second World War period, which made him a prime target after his 
post-war escape from Germany to South America.462 Assuming the identity Ricardo Klement, a 
foreman at an Argentine Mercedes Benz dealership, the Austrian-born Eichmann escaped 
detection until 1960 when he was abducted in a suburb of Buenos Aires by operatives of Israel’s 
intelligence agency, Mossad. Brought to Jerusalem without the permission of Argentina’s 
government, and perhaps in violation of international law, to stand trial for 15 counts of crimes 
against the Jewish people, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in a hostile 
organization, the case brought worldwide attention as the most significant war crimes trial since 
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the IMT.463 Due to the high profile status of the accused, the clandestine nature of the operation, 
The Jewish State’s role in trying a representative of a regime responsible for the genocide of 
two-thirds of European Jewry, and several enduring debates about the culpability of this “desk 
murderer”464, the case against Obersturmbannführer Eichmann remains a significant reference 
point for any study of ICR. Louis Henkin in How Nations Behave (1968) speculated that “one 
may expect that the Eichmann case will [one day] be cited as some authority for ‘universality’ 
for the crime of genocide, and…as a basis of jurisdiction...”465  
The judgments of the District Court in Jerusalem and Israel’s Supreme Court’s judgment 
in appeal differed. While the District Court was mostly concerned with the specific atrocities 
perpetrated against European Jewry, the Supreme Court focused on the “universal dimensions of 
the Holocaust.”466 The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment ) Law (NNCL) passed by 
Israel’s Knesset in 1950 was the basis for the indictment. The NNCL stated that: 
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A person who has committed one of the following offences - (1) done, during the period 
of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country, an act constituting a crime against the Jewish 
people(2)…an act constituting a crime against humanity;(3)…an act constituting a war 
crime, is liable to the death penalty…(7) "crime against humanity" means any of the 
following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, 
racial, religious or political grounds…467 
 
The Supreme Court, for example, classified the charge of crimes against the Jewish 
people (section 1)468 as a particular type of crimes against humanity that symbolized the 
interdependence of all the categories under the NNCL. These also included crimes against 
humanity as a general offense (section 2). By grouping categories together, the Supreme Court 
affirmed that the differences between them were only artificial distinctions. Despite focusing on 
the specific crimes Eichmann perpetrated against Jews, Israeli law nevertheless affirmed that it 
was indeed guided by the universalizing thrust of international law.469  
The AoSD, however, did play a significant role in the case—and Kelsen has often been 
introduced as a leading defender of this doctrine. International law scholar Andrea Gattini in his 
entry on Kelsen in the Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice writes: 
 
If it is true that Kelsen’s theory was open to the idea of recognizing the individual as a 
subject of international law, it is also true that Kelsen remained throughout his life 
faithful to a traditional and strict view of legal responsibility and its consequences. Every 
act performed by an individual in command or with the authorization of his government 
is ipso facto an ‘act of state,’ over which no other state can claim jurisdiction, regardless 
of its being characterized as a crime under domestic or international law.470 
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While Gattini is correct to point to the traditionally narrow scope of Kelsen’s description 
of the AoSD, he neglects to consider that categories of humanitarian offenses committed against 
a state’s own citizens, for example, expanded in the years from the end of the Second World War 
to the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (1961-62), as a result of the multilateral ratification of the 
Genocide (1948)471 and Geneva IV472 (1949) conventions.473 Kelsen also acknowledges the 
prospect of ad hoc jurisdiction when he states that a “number of writers contended during and 
after World War II that ‘universality of jurisdiction extended to war crimes and that any state—
even neutrals—might apprehend and punish war criminals found within their jurisdiction.”474  
After introducing a discussion of Kelsen’s view of the AoSD and the principle of 
universal jurisdictional right in the first part of this chapter, the second part considers Kelsen’s 
philosophical critique of the court’s criterion of “manifest illegality” where alleged war criminals 
were expected to draw on their “conscience” to distinguish legal from illegal acts under superior 
orders. Kelsen’s description of how “conscience” is produced by legal norms parallels Hannah 
Arendt’s thesis in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil475 as each considers 
the impact of the Nazi legal order on the formation of Eichmann’s behavior. Both question 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophical claim—invoked by the courts—that inclination and obedience to 
the law ought to be distinguished. What if one is inclined, however, to obey the law but the law 
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licenses immoral acts? This section explores Kelsen and Arendt’s shared critique of the court’s 
criterion of manifest illegality.     
After determining shortcomings in the court’s estimation of standards for subordinate 
prosecution, this case study examines Kelsen’s support of retroactive lawmaking for acts for 
which Eichmann ought to have been held “morally responsible,” including the subject matter 
jurisdiction of crimes against humanity. The gravity of Nazi offenses presumably forced Kelsen 
to shift his doctrinal position on the separation of law from morality, as the previous chapter 
confirms. This section argues that Jorg Kammerhofer’s claim that Kelsen would affirm that since 
there are no moral absolutes the normative imperative “You ought to commit genocide” is a 
statement irreconcilable with pure theoretical cognition.476 The application of ex post facto 
lawmaking based on moral criterion, in spite of Kelsen’s doctrinal commitment to the separation 
of law from morality, disconfirms Kammerhofer’s position.  
The last section explores Eichmann’s capacity to judge. According to legal scholar 
William Ebenstein, Kelsen retained a causal conception of human behavior throughout his life. 
Ebenstein writes that: 
 
In the perspective of a normative order, man is free to the extent that sanctions are 
imputed to certain types of behavior, although in the perspective of causality such 
behavior must be presumed to be causally determined. Far from excluding causality, the 
linking of freedom and imputation presupposes it.477  
 
While Arendt remarks that Eichmann possessed an ‘inability to think’ from the 
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standpoint of someone else,478 and ‘blind obedience’479 impeded his ability to judge due to the 
compulsion of his ‘oath’,480 she nevertheless indicates that he made a choice. In contrast to 
Arendt’s belief that Eichmann’s initial decision to join a criminal regime made him culpable, 
Kelsen diminishes the capacity for ‘agency’ by virtue of his belief that any social order 
instituting coercive legal norms predominantly structures thought patterns. Eichmann’s choice to 
join the Nazis, for Kelsen, would not be the reason he was guilty; he was guilty because he 
committed a universally condemnable act: genocide. 
Like the previous chapter on the theme of peace, the object here is to reconcile Kelsen’s 
notion of freedom associated with “induc[ing] men to be motivated by ideas in accordance with 
the conduct indirectly prescribed by the legal order” 481 with an endorsement of retroactive 
lawmaking for acts deemed ‘immoral’. The central paradox of this thesis is that Kelsen both 
supports a causal-deterministic description of human agency, while implicitly recognizing the 
choice to disobey immoral commands by virtue of his retroactive methodological licensing.  
Part I 
II. The Acts of State Doctrine 
That Kelsen is seldom referenced in contemporary ICL proceedings should not serve to 
diminish his importance as a leading international publicist who spurred evolved practice. 
Defense counsel Robert Servatius writes that: 
 
Kelsen, a scholar of international law, respected all over the world, has recently given 
[The Acts of State] doctrine its most lucid expression. In this context, a personal remark 
has to be added immediately namely, that Kelsen, formerly a professor teaching at the 
University of Vienna, had suffered personally from National Socialist persecution and 
had been compelled to emigrate to the United States. Therefore it would only be human 
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and absolutely understandable, if, owing to the effect of the “Acts-of-State-Doctrine”… 
turning out in favour of the main German war criminals…Kelsen would have tried to 
reject or to weaken the validity of this doctrine in international law. It bears witness to the 
human integrity and the juristic impartiality of this scholar that, being under the influence 
of obvious and only too understandable resentments, he has not succumbed to this 
temptation, but has affirmed time and again the validity of [the Acts of State Doctrine] 
with forceful determination.482 
 
The deference Servatius showed Kelsen was equally matched by associate IMT defense 
counsel Hermann Jahreiss’s favorable remarks on the Pure theory of Law at Nuremberg.483 Even 
Carl Schmitt, appealed to his Weimar legal rival in his own defense during allied interrogation 
after World War II, after Schmitt was almost tried for his role as “crown jurist” of the Nazi 
regime.484485  
  Critical of the view of the AoSD associated with Kelsen, lead-IMT U.S. Prosecutor 
Robert H. Jackson, recognized that if those in lower ranks were protected from prosecution by 
orders of their superiors, and superiors were protected because their commands were sheltered by 
                                                          
482The Nizkor Project, “The Eichmann Trial (First Instance), Defense Submission,” B’nai Brith  
Canada. http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Defence-Submission-01-02.html  
(accessed February 1, 2015). 
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Major War Criminals One Hundred and Seventy-First Day: Thursday, 4th July, 1946  
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Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals."  
California Law Review 31, no. 5 (December 01, 1943): 530-71.  
484 Carl Schmitt and Timothy Nunan, Writings on War (Oxford: Wiley, 2014), 40; William E. Scheuerman, Carl  
Schmitt: The End of Law (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 176. According to Schmitt’s estimation,  
Kelsen’s constitutional theory was a Jewish creation that began with Baruch Spinoza and extended through the  
writings of Moses Mendelssohn and Friedrich Stahl. On the international plane, Schmitt’s theory of the grossraum  
(“the large space” or “wider space” of German domination) was contrasted with what he considered Kelsen’s Jewish  
“universalism”. Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence (New York, NY: New Press, 2003), 140. See also:  
Peter M.R. Stirk, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: On Preemptive War, Military Occupation, and  
World Empire (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 2005). 
485The difference between the motivation of the author of the pure theory of law for limiting war crimes’ 
prosecution and Schmitt’s, however, must not be confused. While Schmitt clearly denied the prospect of a robust 
system of ICL, Kelsen retained a liberal commitment to international criminal law through the establishment of a 
Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace (PLMP) with a compulsory international court adjudicating war 
crimes. Schmitt believed in the division of the world into spheres of influence mirroring the United States’ control 
over the western hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine (1823). See: Carl Schmitt and G.L. Ulmen, The Nomos of 
the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum (New York: Telos Press, 2006). 
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the acts of state doctrine, then no one could be held responsible for their actions. “These twin 
principles working together have heretofore,” as Jackson noted in his opening address, “resulted 
in immunity for practically everyone concerned…”486 Article 7 of the IMT Charter reads:  
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment. 487 
 
The authority to decide whether to hold axis officials responsible was determined by the 
allied powers under the London Agreement. Article 8 of the IMT Charter, in contrast, accounted 
for mitigating factors related to the severity of an order taken under superior command. The 
Article reads:  
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior 
shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment 
if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 488                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                          
486 Justice Jackson’s opening address at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Nizkor Project,  
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487Avalon Project at Yale Law School, “International Military Tribunal Charter, August 8, 1945,” Lillian Goldman 
Law Library. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp (accessed December 15, 2014). 
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His commitment to this doctrine, however, seems to have wavered. 489490 Before taking 
into  
account how acts committed by state officials under superior order were deemed contrary to 
international law and subject of inquiry by foreign states, it is necessary to engage the view that 
Kelsen indeed affirmed the AoSD. In “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State 
in International Law” (1948), Kelsen defines the doctrine as follows: 
 
Acts of State are acts of individuals performed by them in their capacity as organs of 
State, especially by that organ which is called the Government of the State. These acts are 
performed by individuals who belong to the Government as the head of State, or 
members of the cabinet, or are acts performed at the command or with the authorization 
of the Government. It is within the competence of the national legal order, the law of the 
State (or municipal law), to determine under what conditions a certain individual is acting 
as an organ of the State, or, in other terms, what acts of human beings are imputable to 
the State and hence have the character of acts of State. Since the contents of the 
obligations, responsibilities and rights established by International Law are acts of State, 
International Law does not directly determine the individuals whose acts are prescribed 
or authorized by International Law. It leaves the determination of these individuals to the 
national legal orders.491 
 
                                                          
489 Despite acknowledging the limits of the acts of state doctrine, the last edition of Principles of International Law  
in certain passages reaffirm a traditional view he consistently held throughout the majority of his career. He writes, 
“No state is allowed to exercise through its own courts jurisdiction over another state unless the other state expressly  
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other state consents. Hence the principle applies not only in case a state as such is sued in a court of another state but  
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prosecuted has the character of an act of state.” Hans Kelsen and Robert Warren Tucker, Principles of International  
Law. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 358. Kelsen does not revise earlier assessments of the AoSD  
in Hans Kelsen "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to Punishment  
of War Criminals,” California Law Review 31, no. 5 (1943), 530-571; Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Chapel  
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1944); and Hans Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts  
of State in International Law,” Jewish Yearbook of International Law 1, no. 1 (1948) 
490 Kelsen died on April 19, 1973 near Berkeley, California. See: Reut Yael Paz, A Gateway Between a Distant God  
and a Cruel World: The Contributions of Jewish German-Speaking Scholars to International Law (Leiden, Martinus  
Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 183 
491 Hans Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in International Law,” Jewish Yearbook 
of International Law 1, no. 1 (1948), 228. 
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Individuals performing acts of state are indirect subjects of international law; only a state 
is a direct subject. While each state delegates responsibility to officials in roles specified by their 
normative legal order, any offense committed on behalf of a state is sanctioned by international 
law indirectly through a ‘primitive’ form of ‘blood-revenge’ attributable to the state as a social 
group. Like a family or tribe, which in ancient times was considered the locus of political 
responsibility, the state is directly sanctioned through wars and reprisals for international 
offenses.492 This correspondence between tribal and international law has already been discussed 
with reference to just war theory (see: chapter three). 
With few exceptions (i.e., espionage and treason), the state is solely responsible to repair 
damages caused by their legal organs.493 Meaning, both officials of the state and ordinary 
citizens are subject to sanction under a form of collective responsibility, even if certain state 
officials and the citizenry did not personally commit acts in violation of international law. While 
the violation of international norms independent of an act of state, such as the self-governing 
commission of breach of blockade, carriage of contraband or piracy can be tried under general 
international law (i.e., customarily), no authority, without explicit permission of the home state 
may adjudicate over acts (i.e., with the exception of espionage and treason) that an official 
performs in his authorized role. Only the nation from which the alleged offender hails retains this 
right. 494 
Since consent between states is necessary for adjudication of offenses committed on 
behalf of a state, self-help, including war and reprisals, are the common form of punishment.495 
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The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), for example, is a collective treaty that reflects the customary 
right to ‘self-help’ against countries that breach the peace.496 Even those officials who have 
“violated the laws and customs of war (so-called war crimes),” according to Kelsen, are 
sanctioned under “rules obliging States to punish their own subjects.”497 This presumably creates 
a different problem of ‘neutrality’ than the punishment of state offenders by ad hoc international 
courts, since biased judgment accompanies any national court adjudicating its own state 
officials.498 
Notwithstanding this restrictive reading, there is proof that Kelsen’s view on the AoSD 
evolved at the time of the final publication of Principles of International Law (1967). He writes: 
Whatever the position taken toward this principle—commonly termed the acts of state 
doctrine—‘that the courts of one state are not entitled to question the validity of acts of 
another state performed with its jurisdiction,’ the courts of most states…may and 
occasionally do refuse to give effect to, that is, refuse to recognize and to enforce, the 
laws of another state if these laws are considered contrary to the state’s public policy.499 
 
 If the courts of one state decide not to endorse acts of another state that are contrary to 
public policy, Kelsen insists that a state may also refuse to implement acts of another state if they 
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contradict international law. “It is quite true,” he writes, “that by refusing to give effect to acts of 
another state because these acts are deemed contrary to international law, the courts of a state 
necessarily judge the conformity of the acts with international law and thereby question the 
international validity of acts of another state.500 Kelsen endorses the expansive right of states to 
determine if states have contravened international law, in which case, not only are states not 
required to implement acts of another state, but those acts that violate international law 
presumably would be subject to prosecution. 
The previous chapter affirms—against Gattini’s judgment—that Kelsen was far less 
concerned with upholding the AoSD than in finding legal, albeit retroactive, grounds for trying 
individuals responsible for core international crimes. In fact, he introduced individual criminal 
responsibility into the lexicon of ICL. In his correspondence with Jackson prior to the London 
Conference, he recognized that drafts of the IMT charter assumed that individual rather than 
collective responsibility had already been defined by international law. Rather than quibble about 
procedural concerns related to the AoSD, the allies he suggested ought to create new law to be 
applied ex post facto. The imputation of individual responsibility was clearly preferable, since it 
identified the exact perpetrators, who were equally subject to penalty under collective 
responsibility. Was not Hermann Goring “well aware that the Allies could drop a bomb on him 
as a result of his country’s violation of the law—[so] what complaint could he then have if they 
decided to hang him from a gibbet instead?”501  
III. The Right to Universal Jurisdiction 
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According to the Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, “universal 
jurisdiction is the criminal jurisdiction exercised on the basis of the universality principle. 
This…jurisdiction entitles states to prosecute specific crimes regardless of the place of 
commission, the nationality of the perpetrator, and the nationality of the victims.”502 ‘Third-
states invoke the principle of universal jurisdiction as a rule of customary international law when 
core international crimes are either not prosecuted by the state of commission, which may be 
unable or unwilling to prosecute its own public officials for state crimes or else an international 
court, which due to issues of capacity, is incapable of assuming authority.  
While piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking and torture are deemed by some subject to 
universal jurisdiction, none of these crimes technically fall under this principle. Piracy, which 
typically is defined as a crime that takes place on the high seas503 outside the jurisdiction of any 
state for obvious reasons is an offense that can be prosecuted anywhere without violating the 
AoSD. Alternatively, terrorism, drug trafficking and torture are more appropriately classified 
under the active nationality principle, which entitles states to exercise jurisdiction over their 
nationals. These offenses are based on inter-party agreements between signatory states.  
The response of the Court was four-fold to the complaint that Israel was exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction when no national connection existed between the victims and Israel, and 
that Germany (or any of the eighteen states where Eichmann was alleged to have committed 
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crimes) could have assumed jurisdiction.504 First, under the ‘passive nationality principle,’ which 
is based on the nationality of the victim, a link did in fact exist between the Jews that were 
Eichmann’s victims and the State of Israel. Since Israel retained an historical, internationally 
recognized connection with the Jewish people as the national homeland of the Jews, it asserted 
its ‘natural right’ to determine its own fate.505 Second, without a specific rule restricting extra-
territorial jurisdiction, every state retains jurisdictional power over its ‘people’.506 Third, only 
states, not the accused, have the right to protest extra-territorial jurisdiction. Since no state either 
protested Israel’s case against Eichmann or petitioned to bring the accused to trial, Israel was 
granted tacit right to adjudication.507 Last, if only a permanent compulsory criminal court was 
sufficient to hold hearings against Eichmann, he never would have been tried.508  
According to the judgment in the Eichmann case, “crimes of the magnitude of 
Eichmann’s offenses, “struck the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations,” 
granting Israel the right to punish these acts, which “[shook] the international community to its 
very foundation.” 509  “The countries of the world” were therefore mandated, according to the 
Supreme Court of Israel, “to mete out punishment for the violation of its provisions.”510 While 
there was no clear legal claim only a moral one, given the undeveloped nature of methodological 
construction in 1961-62, judges merely declared custom in Eichmann’s case, in accordance with 
natural law theory.511 
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Although Kelsen granted states the right to prosecute those “acts which are directly 
forbidden by general international law and for which…law provides individual responsibility,”512 
including “the right to punish individuals for acts of piracy,” he nevertheless was skeptical of 
ICL scholars and practitioners who invoked the right of universal jurisdiction.”513 That, however, 
does not necessarily mean that he was opposed to universal jurisdiction.  
 Unlike Germany, Israel could not claim a direct sovereign relationship to the offender or 
his crimes. Servatius held firm to this line of reasoning. In the defense submission, he drew on 
Kelsen’s description of acts of state: 
 
If the wording of the [Acts of State Doctrine] adopted by Kelsen…will serve as a point of 
departure for the examination of the question, no Israeli tribunal has jurisdiction over the 
Accused. The exceptions from the [Acts of State Doctrine] considered as permitted by 
Kelsen (espionage and treason in times of war) do not apply in Eichmann’s case. 
 
…The exception permitted according to [the restrictive theory of immunity] 
doctrine…does not apply in Eichmann’s case: for a state of war does not exist—and has 
not existed—between the State of Israel and Germany, and the State of Israel keeps him 
in custody not by virtue of a capture made in the course of military operations—and 
therefore as a prisoner of war—but as a result of his abduction from the territory of a 
foreign state. 
 
It must therefore be emphasized…that already the ‘Acts of State Doctrine’ excludes the 
existence of any claim for criminal jurisdiction of the State of Israel over the accused 
Eichmann. If nevertheless he would be tried by an Israeli tribunal, this would amount to a 
violation of international law.514   
 
Formal restrictions, following Kelsen’s instructions, did not permit the Jerusalem court to 
try Eichmann, since he was kidnapped from a foreign territory, in this case Argentina, nor would 
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a pure theoretical definition of acts of state515 permit Eichmann’s trial to take place in Israel 
rather than Germany unless he was captured as part of a military operation.516 While it is 
questionable whether Eichmann even retained German citizenship after he assumed the status of 
non-state national after the war517, other biases and impairments would also need to be accounted 
for, including the role of ex-Nazis in West German government518; the memory of the ill-fated 
national trials conducted by Germany against its First World War veterans at Leipzig519; and 
Germany’s lack of experience in handling proceedings after WWII, which had been the purview 
of Americans and other allied powers.520 
Kelsen’s student, the international law publicist Hersch Lauterpacht’s wrote an article, 
"Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens," that Hausner 
introduced to affirm Lauterpacht’s position that territoriality "is not a requirement of justice or a 
necessary postulate of the sovereign state."521 The reconstitution of sovereignty by Lauterpacht 
evidently contrasted Kelsen’s ambiguous pronouncements with respect to a state’s binding right 
to assume responsibility over its nationals to Lauterpacht’s explicit embrace of the universal 
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jurisdictional right associated with natural law theory.522 The nature of the crimes becomes the 
basis for prosecution, not the fact that those crimes were committed terra nullius (on land 
belonging to no one).523  
While the Jerusalem District Court claimed that “universality of the right to punish refers 
to criminal acts which cannot be dealt with due to the absence or non-availability of a competent 
court,”524 the Supreme Court maintained a more nuanced position, acknowledging that a 
competent German court did in fact exist. Hugo Grotius, according to the Supreme Court, “refers 
to a universality [that] can only be applied as an alternative [under] the principle…aut dedere aut 
punire.”525 In its modernized form as aut dedre aut judicaire, the principle denotes the 
requirement that a state either “exercise jurisdiction (which would necessarily include universal 
jurisdiction in certain cases) over a person suspected of certain categories of crimes or…extradite 
the person to a State able and willing to do so or…surrender the person to an international 
criminal court with jurisdiction over the suspect and the crime.”526 Although certainly more 
restrictive than the District Court’s opinion, the Supreme Court’s reading affirmed the naturalist 
right of universal jurisdiction, insofar as no other state requested Eichmann’s extradition, and no 
international criminal court as-yet existed. 
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IV. Superior Orders 
Kelsen distinguishes acts performed under superior command from that of acts of state. He 
writes: 
The fact that an act is an act of State constitutes, in the first place, a problem of general 
international law, which, as a rule, excludes individual responsibility for an act of State. 
The fact that an act is performed at a superior command constitutes a problem of national 
criminal law.527 
 
Individuals accused of crimes committed under superior command are held responsible only, 
it would seem, if acted out independent of an official state role. The critical issue here is whether 
obligations to superior orders and acts of state can be assessed on the same plane by a court of a 
foreign state acting under international law. “Responsibility for acts performed at superior 
command [remain] a specific problem of criminal law, not of international law.”528 A two-edged 
defense would therefore remain a viable option under pure theory, which could potentially 
immunize those in high ranking positions, who claim absolution under the AoSD, while 
simultaneously protecting those in subordinate positions who plead immunity from prosecution 
under the superior orders defense.529  Another possible outcome is that no liability could ever be 
attributable to those in lower rankings following the instructions of their immediate superiors, 
since those in higher ranking positions already absolved those lower down in the organizational 
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hierarchy under the AoSD. Even in exceptional cases, such as treason, a subordinate would 
seemingly be absolved from international prosecution.530 Nevertheless, as has been described in 
the previous case study, Kelsen’s application of retroactive lawmaking in instances where 
offenses were so egregious as to make state officials “morally responsible,” and hence criminally 
culpable, warrants a re-evaluation of his position on superior orders prosecution. 
 The Trial chamber suppressed the plea of obedience to superior orders under Article 8 of the 
NNCL531. While the court of first instance made passing references to the denial of this defense 
in the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10532, for example, the Supreme Court of 
Israel embarked on a detailed survey of international law, including its relationship to the AoSD, 
to justify the NNCL’s denial of the superior orders defense. The Supreme Court of Israel 
resolved that the reason for the strict application of Article 8 was predicated on two distinct 
arguments against the application of the superior orders defense: (a) the Fuhrer Principle or 
‘leadership principle’, which granted Hitler’s will the force of law, created a reductio ad 
absurdum, and (b) ‘criminal consciousness’ could be deduced from Eichmann’s commission of 
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atrocities on the magnitude of crimes against the Jews and crimes against humanity.533  
These two arguments were famously subject to forceful criticism in Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
The claim, according to Arendt, that Hitler’s “oral pronouncements…were the basic law of the 
land,” and hence “within this ‘legal’ framework, every order contrary in letter or spirit to a word 
spoken by Hitler was by definition, unlawful,”534 indicated that Eichmann considered it his duty 
to obey Hitler’s law, even when his more immediate superiors commanded otherwise. Since 
“these crimes undeniably took place within a ‘legal’ order,”535 according to Arendt, “it was not 
[his] fanaticism but his very conscience that prompted Eichmann to adopt his uncompromising 
attitude.”536 In this case, Eichmann’s “conscience” required that he not deviate from the rules of 
the legal order in which he found himself. The court’s determination that Eichmann possessed 
“criminal consciousness” of the “magnitude of crimes against the Jews and…humanity,”537 
ignored the fact that his “conscience,” according to Arendt, was arguably also heavily influenced 
by Hitler’s decrees.  His belief that the source of law or Hitler’s pronouncements caused him to 
“always act[] against his ‘inclinations’ whether they were sentimental or inspired by interest, that 
he had always done his ‘duty’”538 bears on a fuller assessment of Eichmann’s culpability. The 
correspondence between Arendt’s and Kelsen’s emphasis on ‘inclination’ and ‘duty’ will be 
discussed after a general evaluation of the court’s test of manifest illegality. 
V. The Test of Manifest Illegality 
The Supreme Court of Israel “indirectly added its voice to the chorus of proponents of the 
manifest illegality principle as the generally acceptable criterion for establishing criminal 
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534Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1994), 148. 
535 Ibid., 292. 
536 Ibid., 146. 
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responsibility under international law in case of compliance with orders.”539 While the Supreme 
Court found Eichmann “fully conscious at the time that he was a party to the perpetration of the 
most grave and horrible crimes,”540 it nevertheless was impelled to ‘add its voice’ to the issue of 
“whether moral choice was in fact possible”541 under international law.  
Choosing a middle path between, on the one hand, the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
which categorically relieved soldiers of responsibility to superior orders by attributing culpability 
solely to the commanding officer, and on the other, absolute responsibility, or imputation of ICR 
to those on the receiving end of orders,542 the Supreme Court recognized the difficulties both of 
maintaining “good order in the disciplinary body” and “the damage that [would] be caused to the 
public by the offence involved in carrying out the order…”543 Subject to two jurisdictions, a 
soldier risked the possibility that he might face a court martial for disobeying the orders of his 
commanding officer or else if he carried out orders and they proved to be illegal, “he would be 
liable to punishment under…general criminal law.”544 According to Section 11 of the NNCL:  
 
 
In determining the punishment of a person convicted of an offence under this Law, the court 
may take into account, as grounds for mitigating the punishment, the following 
circumstances: (a) that the person committed the offence under conditions which…would 
have exempted him from criminal responsibility or constituted a reason for pardoning the 
                                                          
539 Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of "Obedience to Superior Orders" in International Law (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 
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The District Court determined, based on the defendant’s own testimony, that he had seen “in  
this murder, in the extermination of Jews, the gravest crimes in the history of humanity.” 546 
Eichmann, therefore, “did not do his best to reduce the gravity of the consequences of the 
offence,” and admittedly knew that his acts were “unlawful, something terrible.”547 Section 11 
stipulating mitigation of punishment therefore did not apply, according to the pronouncement of 
the District Court judges, since Eichmann was fully aware of the immorality of his actions.548 
The District Court confined its analysis of the manifest illegality test chiefly to local 
rulings. The massacre at the Arab village of Kfar Kassem, for instance, underscores the limits by 
which soldiers claiming respondeat superior could invoke an absolute defense.549 The case 
hinged on the orders of Israel Defense Forces brigade commander Colonel Issachar Shadmi, who 
insisted that Israeli border police officers and soldiers in a district comprised of a complex of 
twelve villages, including Kfar Kassem, institute a new nightly curfew to begin at 5PM and end 
at 6AM at the start of the 1956 Suez War. Concerned that Jordan would join forces with Egypt in 
attacking Israel as part of the war effort, and that Arab villagers from the Central District or 
“Triangle” in the Jordanian border region of Israel might link up with enemy troops, Shadmi 
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Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 169–197. 
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gave the order to enforce the new curfew on October 29, 1956 at 3:30 PM when several hundred 
villagers of Kfar Kassem were still out in the fields unaware that an order had been put into 
effect.  
One Palestinian witness described the situation, which resulted in the deaths of 49 Arab 
civilians, including men, women and children:  
We talked to them. We asked if they wanted our identity cards. They didn't. Suddenly 
one of them said, 'Cut them down' - and they opened fire on us like a flood.550 
 
 
No villagers outside of Kfar Kassem were shot, because local commanders ordered their 
platoons to hold fire, breaching the instructions set by Shadmi. Even in Kfar Kassem, only one 
unit followed Shadmi’s order, which resulted in 1958 in charges brought against eleven border 
police men and soldiers, including Shadmi and Major Shmuel Malinki, the latter directly 
responsible for overseeing the village curfew. 
Quoting the judgment, the District Court in Jerusalem acknowledged that for manifest 
illegality to exist there must be “a black flag over the order…as a warning reading ‘Prohibited!’” 
Cases where a belligerent opened fired on its enemy’s sick conveyed by an International Red 
Cross (IRC) ambulance where the sign of the cross was clearly visible would constitute, for 
instance, a ‘black flag’.“[A] certain and imperative unlawfulness appearing on the face of the 
order or of the acts ordered, an unlawfulness which pierces the eye and revolts the heart, if the 
eye is not blind and the heart not obtuse or corrupted”551 was the natural human response to the 
illegality of positive orders.552 
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The compulsion to act under the threat of persecution to a subordinate’s own life was the 
standard that the Appeals Chamber interpreted as the test by which an accused could be granted 
mitigation of punishment. The danger to his life, however, would need to be imminent, and he 
could have no method of saving himself from direct punishment.553 The test amounted to a 
question of mens rea, defined as the criminal intent or “the state of mind indicating culpability, 
which was required by statute as an element of a crime.”554 Was the defendant coerced to act a 
certain way or did he know that what he was doing was wrong when he was ordered to act? The 
Supreme Court stated that “when the will of the doer merges with the will of the superior in the 
execution of the illegal act, the doer may not plead duress under superior orders.”555556557 
                                                          
recognized the defense of superior orders, especially as pertained to the laws of war. The British and American 
Military Code of 1914 assigned responsibility solely to the commanding officer under respondeat superior. Only in 
the 1921 Llandovery Castle case, did the Supreme Court of Germany rule on the lawfulness of obeying patently 
illegal orders setting in motion the compromise between respondeat superior and absolute responsibility. In the 
case, the German submarine, the U-86, torpedoed a British hospital ship, the Llandovery Castle. Lieutenant Helmut 
Patzig, the submarine commander, acted against the known-interests of his superiors, instructing his crew to open 
fire not only on the vessel conveying sick patients, but several lifeboats that had managed to be launched after the 
attack. While Patzig was not apprehended, two of his officers, Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt, faced prosecution. 
The defendants’ claimed that they were merely following Patzig’s orders. The court in turn responded that in most 
instances the military subordinate must not question the order of his superior officer, “but that no such confidence 
can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to everybody, including also the accused, to be without 
any doubt whatever against the law.” From a theoretical vantage point, assessing the defendant’s guilt within the 
context of having followed superior orders without knowledge of their mental state would have resulted in acquittal. 
However, if the acts of state of doctrine were applied in defense of Ditmar and Boldt, each would have been found 
guilty, since the order given by Patzig was not an act of state. The Supreme Court of Israel saw the murder of 
defenseless people in lifeboats as analogous to the accused’s offenses. Llandovery Castle case, A.J.I.L, vol. 16 
(1922), 721-722 in Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of "Obedience to Superior Orders" in International Law (Leyden: 
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557The test of manifest illegality, however, was once again re-introduced into Article 33 of the ICC Statute. The  
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VI.  Critique of ‘Manifest Illegality’ 
 Does the criterion of manifest illegality apply to crimes legalized by the state? Neither 
was Eichmann a common soldier, nor had he acted within a normal legal framework. What was 
illegal under ordinary circumstances was legal under Hitler’s rule. Moreover, the Jerusalem 
court, according to both Kelsen and Arendt, confused intention, inclination or desire with 
behavior or action. A Kantian description that granted “no true moral worth” 558 to actions 
performed out of inclination, distorted a conception of ICR based on the perceived lawfulness of 
the orders delegated to Eichmann. Arendt writes: 
 
And just as the law in civilized countries assumes that the voice of conscience tells 
everybody ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ even though man’s natural desires and inclinations may 
at times be murderous, so the law of Hitler’s land demanded that the voice of conscience 
tell everybody: ‘Thou shalt kill,’ although the organizers of the massacres knew full well 
that murder is against normal desires and inclinations of most people. Evil in the Third 
Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognize it—the quality of 
temptation.559  
 
 Informed by the law of Nazi Germany, which was decidedly not “civilized”560 and where 
only exceptional men and women could withstand the behavioral pressures of fascist rule, a 
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Nazi’s conscience, according to Arendt, could not so easily distinguish “manifest illegality.” The 
court’s criterion presupposed the doctrine associated with Kant’s moral philosophy, which, 
according to Kelsen, meant “that only conduct directed against inclination or egoistic interest is 
of any moral value.”561 “Bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, which rules out blind 
obedience,”562 and does not license through the categorical imperative “theft or murder…because 
the thief or murderer cannot conceivably wish to live under a legal system that would give others 
the right to rob or murder him,”563 Kant nevertheless, according to Kelsen, obscures the fact that 
“this crime [was] not an ordinary murder but what [Arendt] calls an ‘administrative 
massacre.’”564 As such, “this is a new crime, one that depends less on being able to establish 
psychological intentions than on describing politically organized modes of uncritical obedience. 
In this sense, Eichmann himself is a new kind of person or an unprecedented sort of criminal, 
and so the mechanisms and terms of justice have to be rethought and remade in order to address 
this new situation.”565 
Before entering into a discussion of how Kelsen’s retroactive methodology is relevant to 
Arendt’s determination that Eichmann, in spite of his “uncritical obedience” to Nazi regulations, 
was to be found guilty, it is necessary to linger on the question of the relationship between law 
and intentionality. The question, writes Arendt, is whether “a feeling of lawfulness [lies] deep 
within every human conscience...A striking feature of the Israeli court’s line of argument is that 
the concept of a sense of justice grounded in the depths of every man is presented solely as a 
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substitute for familiarity with the law.”566  
 Eichmann understood the rules of the Nazi legal order. Any decision to turn to 
conscience was therefore superfluous. In accordance with the court’s expectation that a soldier 
be capable of distinguishing regular from irregular rules, Eichmann knew legally what his 
conscience only confirmed. For example, in clear violation of  Reichsführer of 
the Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron SS) Adolph Himmler’s order to stop the deportation of 
Hungary’s Jews from Budapest to Auschwitz in July 1944, Eichmann, on the pretext that Hitler 
would have supported furtherance of the extermination process, ignored Himmler’s more 
immediate orders.567 “He did not abide by Himmler’s orders,” writes Arendt, “but rather 
followed a “version of Kant ‘for the household use of the little man”568 based on the will of the 
Fuhrer. For Eichmann, adherence to Hitler’s words meant identifying his own will with the 
principle source of law in Nazi Germany—the Fuhrer Principle (or grundnorm in Kelsenian 
terminology). As Arendt describes it, “he had always acted against his ‘inclinations’ whether 
they were sentimental or inspired by interest, that he had always done his duty.”569  
Eichmann operated under a criminal, if legal, regime where “a huge shower of regulations 
and directives, all drafted by expert lawyers and legal advisers…”570 followed the Fuhrer’s 
orders for the Final Solution. By shifting the focus from motivation to behavior, Kelsen asserts, 
“each is able to insist that a person, who acts “’from duty’ or ‘respect for law’, acts from 
inclination; for he acts in this way because he finds an inner pleasure in obeying the law, because 
the consciousness of acting lawfully or dutifully gives him ‘inner pleasure’.”571 Kant’s assertion 
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that an individual act “from inclination [who] finds [inner] pleasure” in acting a certain way,572 
does not, therefore, preclude the prospect of “inner pleasure” in obeying the law.  Morality is 
inner directed, according to Kant, “insofar as [the laws of freedom] are directed to mere external 
actions and the lawfulness of such action…are called juridical.”573 Kelsen insists that “this 
means that ‘legality’, too, is agreement with moral laws. Legal norms are moral norms; and so 
moral norms refer to external actions; there is, however, a moral norm prescribing that one 
should act, not from inclination, but from respect for the law.”574 
VII. Retroactive Methodology 
Although Kelsen claims that law does not represent a “moral minimum,”575 and 
contemporary Kelsenian Jorg Kammerhofer affirms that since there are no moral absolutes the 
normative imperative “You ought to commit genocide”576 is a statement reconcilable with a pure 
theoretical cognition of law, there is nevertheless convincing reason to believe that Kelsen would 
have licensed Eichmann’s prosecution. Even if murder is “performed against [ones] inclination,” 
it is forbidden, if the social order deems it illegal. Kelsen writes: 
 
It is not any conduct you please that can be moral, so long as it is carried out contrary to 
inclination or egoistic interest. If somebody obeys another’s order to commit a murder, his 
act can have no moral value, even though performed against his inclination or egoistic 
interest, so long as the murder is forbidden, i.e., deemed of negative value, by the social order 
assumed to prevail.577 
 
Since Kelsen entitled IMT judges, for example, to enforce retroactive laws criminalizing 
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Nazi offenses based on a criterion of “moral responsibility,” presumably he would have similarly 
licensed Eichmann’s prosecution. Did his commentary on the Nuremberg trial not suggest the 
illegality of crimes against humanity? Even if he did not believe that at the time of the Eichmann 
proceedings the scope of illegality had expanded to incorporate international licensing of 
prosecution for crimes of the magnitude of Eichmann’s acts as manifested in provisions 
associated with the Genocide convention (1948)578, Kelsen would certainly have granted Israel 
the right to judge Eichmann’s immoral acts on retroactive grounds.  
Chapter three argued that Kelsen deserves credit for de-linking the Nuremberg trial from 
criminalization of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and in turn placing international criminal law on a 
firm legal foundation free of the war-nexus requirement. The same can methodological 
innovation can likewise be applied to this case. Ex post facto lawmaking is the means by which 
Kelsen intercedes against objections based on his own strict evaluation of the AoSD and superior 
orders defense. While Kammerhofer may have a point with regard to a national legal order’s 
licensing of individual responsibility for genocidal acts at the time of their commission, there is 
no reason to assume that state officials will not eventually be held accountable in accordance 
with international law for such acts. Kelsen repeatedly makes this point.579 Kelsen writes: 
 
Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established 
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the 
persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the 
retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely 
incompatible with justice. Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the 
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fact that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts 
made punishable with retroactive force.580 (my emphasis) 
 
While Servatius described Kelsen’s position as clearly supporting his client’s immunity, 
Attorney General Gideon Hausner argued before the Appellate Court that: 
  
In 1947, Hans Kelsen…the last important survivor of the conservative approach, 
concludes that the principle of individual responsibility for crimes committed within the 
framework of the state is a loftier expression of justice than reliance on laws which 
ostensibly allowed those crimes to be perpetrated.581  
  
The Attorney General thus countered Servatius’ claim that Kelsen would find the 
Eichmann proceedings illegitimate. While according to a formal logic any illegal acts that 
Eichmann may have committed could not be considered a violation of international law because 
no punishment for individuals was specified in a treaty signed by Germany, Kelsen also asserted 
that if an “act was at the moment of its performance morally, although not legally wrong,”582 an 
ad hoc court like Nuremberg’s ought to have the right to prosecute.  
Hausner states that “[Kelsen] admits that where two principles collide, the principle of 
basic justice on the one, and formalism on the other, justice must gain the upper hand.”583 This 
statement of course runs counter to a traditional reading of pure theory. For how could Kelsen 
implicate those responsible for core international crimes when he repeatedly implores jurists to 
separate law from morality584 in constructing the AoSD?  
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The argument that was introduced earlier focused on the centrality of Kelsen’s 
description of the AoSD in defense of Eichmann. However, Kelsen recognized that, though 
exceptional, “acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were committed,”585 
such as international offenses that were “certainly…morally most objectionable,” were subject to 
prosecution.586 The District Court was therefore right to speculate that it was “possible [that] 
even according to Kelsen…there [was] no longer any basis for pleading ‘act[s] of State’”587. In 
judging that there was “clearly no principle of international law embodying the maxim against 
retroactivity of criminal law,”588 the Jerusalem court reaffirmed Kelsen’s major doctrinal 
contribution to the changing notion of ICR. Kelsen wrote that no rule of general customary 
international law existed “forbidding the enactment of norms with retrospective force…,”589 and 
therefore war criminals could be tried retrospectively since the “act was at the moment of its 
performance morally, although not legally wrong.” Notwithstanding Kammerhofer’s statement, 
there is no reason to suggest that Eichmann would have been protected from prosecution.  
Like Kelsen, Arendt states that “what [Eichmann] had done was a crime only in 
retrospect….” and that his offenses “violate[d]… only formally, not substantially, the principle 
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.”590 As with the 1945 London Agreement, which produced 
the IMT charter, Israel’s Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950 was valid, she 
claimed, because of the type of crime: genocide.591 As a consequence of its application to 
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persecutions of national minorities, crimes against humanity encompassed a similar subject 
matter jurisdiction at Nuremberg as the genocide charge. The substantive element of Eichmann’s 
crimes, consequently, warranted the attribution of international criminal responsibility under 
universal jurisdiction.592As with Kelsen’s earlier criticism of the jurisdictional authority of allies 
at Nuremberg, Arendt’s polemic against the Jewish state as creating a form of victor’s justice593 
in prosecuting Eichmann was superfluous. She already believed that Eichmann deserved to be 
prosecuted due to the gravity of his offense; a retroactive methodology similar to the one 
articulated by Kelsen was the means by which the court, according to Arendt, could legitimately 
hold him accountable.  
VII. Freedom and Causality 
This last section speculates on Kelsen’s view of Eichmann’s guilt, given his 
circumscribed notion of ‘agency’. Given that the phrase ‘banality of evil’ is so enmeshed with 
the case against Eichmann, Arendt’s approach to judgment must be considered, if briefly, 
alongside Kelsen’s. The intention is not to provide a definitive account of Arendt’s views on 
Eichmann’s capacity to judge, but to furnish a deeper understanding of Kelsen’s much-neglected 
contributions to this case.  
As “the normative relations between the two elements of the legal norm—delict and 
sanction,”594 imputation possesses a degree of precision, according to Kelsen, that responsibility 
does not.595 “Whereas the concept of responsibility links the behavior to the person, imputation, 
                                                          
592 Ibid., 275. 
593Ibid., 169-171. 
594 William Ebenstein, “The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought,” California Law Review 59, no. 
3 (May 1971): 635. 
595 Ibid., 635. 
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by contrast, links a certain behavior, the delict, to the sanction.”596 Therefore, as with his 
structural account of the “concept of ‘imputation’ [which] removes the notion of ‘the criminal’—
with its existential and moralizing undertones—and replaces it with the morally neutral concept 
of a set of circumstances or specific delict that ought to be followed by a sanction,”597 judgment 
is circumscribed by societal regulation. Similarly, ‘freedom’ must be understood as separate 
from the ‘willing’ element traditionally associated with ‘agency’.598 Kelsen writes: 
Freedom is ordinarily understood to be the opposite of causal determinacy. That which is 
not subject to the law of causality is held to be free. That the human will is free is 
understood to mean that it is not causally determined…It is understood to assume that 
only man’s freedom, the fact that his will is not subject to the causal law, makes it 
possible to hold him to account. But the very opposite is the case. Man is not held to 
account because he is free; he is free because he is held to account. Accounting and 
freedom are indeed essentially connected with each other.599  
 
A legal order that performs its function effectively channels the ‘will’. It motivates or 
induces individuals under threat of coercion to behave in accordance with conduct indirectly 
prescribed by the legal order. Though still part of the chain of causality, behavior is effectively 
regulated, so that individuals are inclined or desire to ‘will’ what the coercive social order 
specifies as right legal conduct. Consequently, individuals “‘will’ what they legally ought to do, 
and their will thus become a cause of their actions in conformity with the law.”600   
Having no choice but to be born into a coercive order pre-structured by a set of legal 
values that strictly regulate human behavior, Kelsen diminishes the capacity for human agency. 
                                                          
596 Ibid. 
597 Ibid., 635-636. 
598 Ibid. 
599 Hans Kelsen, “Causality and Accounting,” in Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, ed. Ota Weinberger 
(Boston: Reidel, 1974), 163. 
600 Ebenstein, 636. 
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Arendt, in contrast, emphasizes the practice of thinking, a cognate of judgment, which though 
distinguishable in her later writings,601 is here used interchangeably to indicate a “broadened way 
of thinking”602 or “enlarged mentality.”603 Reconciling Kelsen and Arendt’s divergent views on 
the capacity to judge, this section closes with a shared affirmation of the “principle of tolerance,” 
which Eichmann violated in his attack on the “plurality of humanity”604. 
While Arendt’s critique of the court’s criterion of “manifest illegality” aligns with 
Kelsens’s, including criticism of the Kantian differentiation between inclinations, interests and 
desires, on the one hand, and the law on the other, she states that “[Eichmann] functioned in the 
role of prominent war criminal as well as he had under the Nazi regime; he had not the slightest 
difficulty in accepting an entirely different set of rules. He knew that what he had once 
considered his duty was now called a crime; and he accepted this new code of judgment as 
though it was nothing but another language rule.”605 While agreeing with Kelsen that the law’s 
function is “to induce men to be motivated by ideas in accordance with the conduct indirectly 
prescribed by the legal order,”606 Arendt “faults Eichmann for his failure to be critical of positive 
law, that is, his failure to take distance from the requirements that law and policy imposed on 
                                                          
601 See: Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” Research 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1971); 
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Hannah Arendt, Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Hannah Arendt, 
Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003). See also: Gisela T. Kaplan, 
Hannah Arendt: Thinking, Judging, Freedom, ed. Clive Kessler (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1990). 
602 Christopher Horner, “The Fate of Judgement: Hannah Arendt, The Third Critique and Aspects of Contemporary 
Political Philosophy” (Ph.D. diss., University of Roehampton, 2012), 225. 
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604 Judith Butler, “Hannah Arendt’s Death Sentences,” Comparative Literature Studies 48, No. 3 (2011): 291. 
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606 Ebenstein, 636. 
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him; in other words, she faults him for his obedience, his lack of critical distance, or his failure to 
think.”607  
In contrast, Kelsen assumes that to be effective, positive law must not only regulate 
behavior in a certain manner but must influence the faculty of judgment. But adhering to law, 
even bad laws, as Kelsen writes, can also be construed as a moral act, since the peaceful ordering 
of a given society (i.e., “justice as peace”) is of supreme value.608 While judgment may be 
caused by other moral or religious social norms, it is preponderantly derived from the threat of 
coercive measure—or the law. The capacity to judge is consequently informed by a chain of 
causality stemming from the structured, often legal, norms of a given society. 
Like Kelsen, Arendt recognizes that causality and freedom are not easily disassociated.609 
But she does not agree with Kelsen’s position that “man is free because, and to the extent that, he 
is ‘imputable,’ that is, because legal consequences can be attached to his actions.”610 Such causal 
reductionism is irreconcilable with her distinction between practical reason and obedience.  
Notwithstanding her critique of Eichmann’s claim that his duty derived from Kant’s universal 
moral precept that the principle of his will could become the principle of general laws, which she 
asserted “was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, since Kant’s moral 
philosophy is so closely bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, which rules out blind 
obedience,”611 she nevertheless departs from Kant’s notion of practical reason.612 Rather than 
                                                          
607 Butler, “Hannah Arendt’s Death Sentences,” 280. 
608 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 13. 
609 See: “What is Freedom?” in Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(New York: Viking Press, 1963), 143-171.  
610 Ebenstein, “The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought,” 637. 
611 Arendt, Eichmann, 136. 
612 Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics,” Political Theory 16, no. 1 (Feb., 1988): 36. 
See also: Richard Bernstein, "Judging-the Actor and the Spectator," in Philosophical Profiles (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvana Press, 1986), 221-238. This is not to assert that Kant did not assume a significant role in 
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subscribing to Kant’s idea of judgment, "as the faculty of thinking the particular under the 
universal," where a universal morality is known in advance and the particular follows,613 Arendt 
describes Socrates’ tentative approach614 as a ‘model’615 of the thinking man, who engages his 
fellow citizens in conversations about ‘perplexing’616 matters. In Thinking and Moral 
Considerations: A Lecture, Socrates is set up as the anti-Eichmann. Arendt comments: 
 
Socrates…who is commonly said to have believed in the teachability of virtue, seems 
indeed to have held that talking and thinking about piety, justice, courage, and the rest 
were liable to make men more pious, more just, more courageous, even though they were 
not given either definitions or ‘values' to direct their further conduct.617 
 
 Arendt uses three similes—the gadfly, the midwife and the electric ray—to describe 
Socrates618 and his method of social inquiry. The gadfly attempts to awaken his fellow citizen 
slumbering in the dark, to examine the unexamined life; the midwife, whose main function in 
ancient Greece was to decide on whether a baby should live or die just as Socrates was known to 
“purge[] people of their ‘opinions,’ that is, of those unexamined prejudgments which prevent 
                                                          
Arendt’s later account of judgment, in particular with respect to Kant’s determination of judgment in the realm of 
aesthetics. For illustration’s sake, the Socratic method of thinking is introduced as a counter-point, not only to 
Eichmann, but to the constraints imposed on thinking through a pure conception of imputation or legal 
responsibility.  
613 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 10 in Seyla 
Benhabib, 37 
614 Arendt writes: “The trouble is that few thinkers ever told us what made them think and even fewer have cared to 
describe and examine their thinking experience…In brief, I propose to use a man as our model who did think 
without become a philosopher, a citizen among citizens, doing nothing, claiming nothing that, in his view, every 
citizen should do and had a right to claim. You will have guessed that I intend to speak about Socrates, and I hope 
that no one will seriously dispute that my choice is historically justifiable.” Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral 
Considerations: A Lecture,” 427.  
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid., 432. 
617 Ibid., 431.  
618 Ibid., 432 
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thinking”619; and the electric ray, which ‘paralyzes’, as opposed to ‘arouses’ like the gadfly, 
reaffirms the importance of “remain[ing] steadfast with [one’s] own perplexities.”620  
Arendt insists that ‘banality of evil’ was not meant as a ‘thesis’ or ‘doctrine’ but to 
indicate a distinction from the common use of the word ‘evil’ as signifying radical forms of 
depravity.621 While traditionally associated with the sins of ‘pride’ and ‘envy’, ‘weakness’, ‘the 
powerful hatred wickedness feels for sheer goodness’ or ‘covetousnes’, Eichmann’s ‘evil’ “was 
quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous.”622 When confronted with 
routines that deviated from the normal course of acting, he resorted to standard bureaucratic 
language, clichés. “It was not stupidity,” she writes, “but thoughtlessness.”623 
Standardized expressions immunize us to a reality full of surprise; Eichmann’s habitual 
use of stock phrases protected him from the arduous task of thinking. Arendt asks:  
Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be 
connected with our faculty of thought?... Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit 
of examining whatever happens to come to pass or attract attention, regardless of results 
and specific contents, could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain 
from evildoing or even actually 'condition' them against it?624  
 
The capacity for critical distance, and, with it, moral judgment, coincides with Arendt’s 
phenomenological inclination, where, circumspect of traditional political, moral and legal 
theoretical ‘concepts’, she instead prefers to return to "to the things themselves" (zu den Sachen 
selbst).625 Kelsen’s pure theoretical methodology—with its formal conceptualization of 
                                                          
619 Ibid. 
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imputation or legal responsibility would therefore seem ill-fitted to Arendt’s approach. By 
presupposing legal norms as predominating the faculty of thought, Kelsen’s structural approach 
indicates a lack of agency. 
To locate the agent one must search specifically in Kelsen’s writings on war crimes 
prosecution. In “The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War 
Criminals,” he writes: 
Even if the atrocities are covered by municipal law, or have the character of acts of State 
and hence do not constitute individual criminal responsibility, they are certainly open 
violations of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized peoples and 
hence were, at least, morally not innocent or indifferent when they were 
committed…There can be little doubt that, according to the public opinion of the 
civilized world, it is more important to bring the war criminals to justice than to respect, 
in their trial, the rule against ex post facto law, which has merely a relative value, and 
consequently, was never unrestrictedly recognized.626 
 
With this statement, Kelsen affirms a ‘moral minimum’, which he otherwise denies.627 
He begins by focusing on ‘the atrocities’, which are “open violations of the principles of morality 
generally recognized by civilized peoples.”628 But Kelsen does not discount that the acts were 
also “morally not innocent or indifferent when they were committed.”629 This suggests agency 
that Kelsen generally excludes from his pure description. “In defining imputation as the 
normative relation between delict and sanction, according to Ebenstein, “Kelsen…removes an 
element of morality and natural law thinking implied in the traditional concept of 
responsibility.”630 But the evaluation of whether an act is “morally…indifferent when they were 
                                                          
626 Kelsen, “The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals,” 10-11 
627 Hans Kelsen, “Law and Morality, in Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, ed. Ota Weinberger (Dordrecht, 
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committed,”631 presupposes someone ought to know that he is acting in violation of “principles 
of morality generally recognized by civilized peoples.”632 
 At the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt  suggests that even if it “was nothing more 
than misfortune that made [Eichmann] a willing instrument in the organization of mass 
murder,”633 he still ought to be punished for the crimes of genocide. She writes: 
[T]here still remains the fact that…just as you supported and carried out a policy of not 
wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other 
nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and 
who should not inhabit the world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human 
race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you.634 
The principles of morality that Kelsen invokes depends on civilizational ‘standards’. 
Genocide—and the principle of tolerance that prevention necessitates—must be the ‘moral 
minimum’. But it is not clear if agency can be fully restored to Kelsen’s interpretation of the 
parameters of judgment or if the atrocity is what makes a war criminal like Eichmann culpable.  
IX. Conclusion 
This case study focused on pure theoretical contributions to the changing notion of 
international criminal responsibility at the trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem. At the time of 
the 1961 proceedings, Kelsen’s prodigious commentary on international criminal law and his 
legacy as a scholar who influenced practice at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 
had been well-documented. However, aside from an unresolved footnote in Principles of 
International Law (1967), he left no direct evidence regarding the case.  
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In analyzing trial transcripts where Kelsen is invoked by court practitioners as a leading 
international publicist, it is possible to recreate a pure theoretical view of Eichmann’s culpability. 
He is both drawn upon by defense counsel in order to reaffirm a traditional notion of the acts of 
state doctrine, and prosecutors and judges as an advocate of a higher principle of justice based on 
retroactive lawmaking for acts deemed morally irresponsible. The significance of re-visiting this 
case is not only important in terms of filling a historical gap but provides insight into the 
philosophical question of agency with respect to Hannah Arendt’s commentary on the ‘banality 
of evil’ where under conditions of terror most comply with the norms of the national legal order.  
Like Arendt, Kelsen would certainly have contested the court’s criterion of “manifest 
illegality.” Individuals accused of war crimes were expected to disregard the orders of their 
superiors when those orders patently deviated from the law in conformity with Kant’s ethical 
doctrine that only conduct directed against ‘inclination’ is of any moral value.  But what if an 
individual’s inclination is to observe the law of his legal order, even if the grundnorm is the 
Fuhrer Principle? 
As Kelsen often observed, if the law is to be effective it must forge behaviors that 
conform to the coercive norms of a given social order. Freedom, normally understood to be the 
opposite of causal determinacy, is the end point to a chain of causality or imputation that consists 
of a delict and sanction. Rather than accepting the traditional view that acts of state, a 
personification of the duties that officials are ordered to perform, comprises the sum total of 
Kelsen’s vision—mechanistic or deterministic—Kelsen also affirms that when acts are “morally 
most objectionable, and the persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their 
immoral character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as 
absolutely incompatible with justice.”   
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This case study followed from a reconceptualization of the acts of state doctrine to a 
Kelsenian exploration of agency under superior orders arguing that while Kelsen would not have 
subscribed to the court’s criterion of “manifest illegality,” like Arendt he would have found 




In the history of international criminal law, international tribunals have done more than 
merely give jural imprimatur to norms in waiting and have been much more than mere 
‘evidential sources’ of customary law. In effect, taking advantage of the…indeterminacy 
of customary law, international courts and tribunals, not least the ad hoc Tribunals, have 
often acted as ‘customary midwives’…so that international criminal law may owe more 
to judges than any other part of international law.635 
 
Chapter 5 
Judgment in the Post-Cold War Era: The Decline of Formalism in the Mirror of Pure 
Theory 
I.  Introduction 
As with previous case studies on Hans Kelsen’s contributions to the changing notion of ICR, 
including the author of pure theory’s validation, based on retroactive lawmaking in violation of 
principles of legality, of international criminal prosecution at the Nuremberg IMT (chapter 
three), and the universal jurisdictional application, in accordance with pure theory, of standards 
ascribed to “the international community” at the trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem for acts 
of state of the magnitude of crimes against humanity (chapter four),636  this chapter emphasizes 
how a purposive judicial logic, which focuses on the core humanitarian element instantiating the 
purpose or intention of the ICL regime, may be reconciled with Kelsen’s structural account of 
imputation. 
Kelsen’s endorsement of discretionary powers for ICL judges, in accordance with a 
hierarchically-delegated normative schema, is especially pronounced in the post-Cold War era 
where customary international law, a traditionally indeterminate international law source, has 
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been mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as sponsor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Although this chapter does not claim to be an 
exhaustive account of judicial lawmaking at the ICTY, the choice to emphasize this tribunal, as 
representative of the turn to expressly purposive hermeneutics in the post-Cold War era, 
animates the broader narrative arc. Application of Kelsen’s theoretical approach, once again 
demonstrates a progressive commitment to the regulation of barbarous acts of state. 
In the Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the ICTY, judges were 
instructed to only apply those legal norms that were beyond doubt part of customary 
international law637. In contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was 
empowered to also use treaty law, regardless of whether it conformed to existing custom.638  As a 
result, the ICTR is a less compelling test case than the ICTY for flexible construction, since 
decision-making at Arusha has not demonstrated the same potential for extracting the moral 
claim on responsibility that an unwritten identification of law dealing exclusively with custom 
would.  
The Report of the Secretary General states that: 
 
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen sine 
lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary law so that the problem of 
adherence of some, but not all States to specific conventions does not arise. This would 
appear to be particularly important in the context of an international tribunal prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.639 
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Part II reviews Kelsen's theoretical contributions to customary international law 
application. In the modern approach, opinio juris emphasizes statements rather than actions, 
depending on the “intention” of states to elicit the meaning of custom. The author of Pure 
Theory’s neo-Kantian epistemological project, in contrast, endorses state practice as the 
exclusive element of customary international law, in accordance with a de-psychologized 
description of responsibility that is meant to disregard the legal subject’s “intention”.  Those 
critics who assert that Kelsen viewed international law as inevitably progressing away from the 
use of custom as a determinant source, however, are incorrect.640 Part II endorses the claim that 
Kelsen champions the supremacy of this highly flexible “meta-norm” in order to shore up 
structural limitations associated with this sphere.641 As a result, Part II focuses on why Kelsen 
remains relevant as a seminal international legal publicist for the post-Cold War era where 
customary construction, vital to the development of ICR, is employed in a highly creative 
fashion.642  
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The tension observed in previous chapters between, on the one hand, Kelsen’s general 
advocacy of the principle of legality’s rule against ex post facto lawmaking, and on the other, his 
endorsement of retroactive laws based on principles of morality for crimes of the magnitude of 
crimes against humanity and genocide, reasserts itself anew at the ICTY. Although Kelsen’s 
moral emphasis seems counter-intuitive, as pure theory limited the customary scope of judicial 
interpretation to the “frame” derived from an examination of actual state practice, Part III 
nevertheless emphasizes how Kelsen’s theory is reconcilable with extra-legal judicial decision-
making.  
Historian and legal scholar Jeremy Telman writes that: 
Within the law of interpretation, Kelsen acknowledges that the norm is but a frame. Legal 
norms provide the frame within which various interpretations can arise, but those 
interpretations do not involve cognition and application of higher norms but exercises of will 
in the furtherance of legal policy. Judges resolve issues within the framework of the legal 
norm by consulting non legal normative systems.643 
 
In recognizing international judges, including representatives of national or hybrid courts 
as authorized by state parties to decide on the degree of culpability for once-valid acts of state, 
Part III emphasizes Kelsen’s view on the supremacy of discretionary judicial interpretation.  
Unlike Judith Shklar’s position that Kelsen’s legal philosophy remains thoroughly “formalist,”644 
this section, follows Kelsen scholar Stanley Paulson’s distinction between the “scientific” frame 
of legal normativity conforming with pure theoretical cognition, and non-formal or “authentic” 




643 Jeremy Telman,  “Problems of Translation and Interpretation: A Kelsenian Commentary on Positivist 
Originalism” (IVR German Section Conference, University of Freiburg, Freiburg Germany, September 29, 2018).  




judicial interpretation, which Kelsen readily endorses. Kelsen’s embrace of Hermann 
Kantorowicz’s “free law” methodology resembles the broad interpretive scope professed by 
American legal realism, a camp that Shklar professes to admire.645  
While “scientific” legal cognition provides a frame for valid interpretation of 
international law sources, these sources are informed by the structural position of the judge in the 
stupenfau or hierarchy of delegation described in chapter two.  Once judges of core international 
crimes are authorized to decide cases introduced through treaty ratification by state parties, acts 
of state are subsequently deprived of their immunizing quality. This would include tribunals 
sponsored by the UNSC and authorized by the implied consent of all members of the United 
Nations. The UNSC is further animated by the normative authority of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.646 The judicial ruling, whether it deviates from the pure theoretical “frame” of cognition 
or not, in consequence, legitimately delegates responsibility. 
 Part IV reconciles Kelsen with the prevailing purposive interpretive methodology used in 
post-Cold War cases before the ICTY. Through his support of “Free Law,” Kelsen grants judges’ 
wide scope for interpreting humanitarian violations specific to the material jurisdiction of this 
sphere. In addition to providing theoretical legitimacy for the application of a purposive 
approach, the particular problem of how to expand the parameters of international criminal 
responsibility to incorporate “non-international armed conflict” is also reconciled by Kelsen 
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through theoretical endorsement of an expanded conception of “international legal subjects”. 
Perpetrators of humanitarian crimes, for example, who belong to the same state as victims, can 
be tried, according to Kelsen, in accordance with new descriptions of “substantial relations” 
based on “ethnic affiliation”. In addition to justifying the now-commonplace proposition that 
ICL applies to non-international armed conflict, Kelsen furthers the prospect that “principles of 
humanity” may be used as a purposive interpretive remedy, not in defiance of positive law 
commitments, but in conjunction with permitted discretionary judgment.  
 
II.  Customary International Law from a Pure Theoretical Perspective 
Customary international law is not a special department or area of public international law: it is 
international law.”647 
 
a. Traditional and Modern Approaches to CIL 
 
“[W]hat distinguished custom amongst nations in public international law?” asks legal 
philosopher David Bederman. “An answer may lie in the sheer volume, breadth, and density of 
[customary international law] norms. Custom—as distinct from treaty obligations or the 
application of inchoate ‘general principles of law’—continues to dictate broad swathes of 
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international legal obligation.”648     
Much of the post-World War II project of ensuring states protect the human rights and 
dignities of their citizens, and that they observe restraint in their treatment of non-combatants in 
war time, has been elucidated through customary international law. Yet “some jurisprudes,” 
Bederman notes, “most famously Hans Kelsen—have maintained that, over time, treaty-based 
sources of international norms will dominate over customary principles…” because of “a natural 
tendency, as in any ‘mature’ legal system, for legislation to crowd out custom. One might, 
therefore, believe that custom is actually waning as an influential or legitimate source for 
international legal obligation.”649 
While Bederman’s analysis underestimates the central role that custom plays for Kelsen in 
validating international law, he is right to conclude that Kelsen saw treaties rather than 
customary principles as the source of international law that would transform international law 
from a “primitive” to a more “mature” system. The proof for this is the fact that Kelsen believed 
that in time state legal organs would likely delegate their powers through treaties to international 
organizations—creating the blueprint for a “a thoroughly legalized and institutionalized world 
order.”650 
Before examining the pure theoretical application of custom, which in addition to treaty law 
is considered the only other valid source, according to Kelsen, in cognition of ICR651, this 
                                                          
648 David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 136. 
649 Ibid. 
650  Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in Universal Law, 2. 
651 Kelsen notably denies that general principles of international law are valid international law sources. Of course, 
Kelsen’s embrace of “principles of civilization” in pursuit of retroactive justice against state officials who have 
committed core international crimes presumes a general principle adhered to by the majority of states. In this sense, 
as the concluding chapter (six) argues, Kelsen’s theoretical description of ICR ought to be placed alongside his 
student, the equally eminent international legal theorist Hersch Lauterpacht, who recognizes general principles of 
law as necessary tools in assigning criminal responsibility for core international crimes.  
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chapter briefly reviews the distinction between “traditional” and “modern” approaches to this 
enduring source of international criminalization. Legal scholar Anthea Roberts, for example, 
considers the fault line between, on the one hand, those approaches that elevate state practice to a 
supreme position in the hierarchy of customary interpretation (“traditional”), and, on the other, 
those that recognize that state practice, hard to detect and easy to renege, requires a more 
subjective, extra-legal interpretive element (“modern”)652.  
While the traditional approach to custom, says Roberts, is based on an inductive process 
that is evolutionary and “derives from specific instances of state practice,”653 a modern approach 
uses deduction that starts with a general statement—or principle shared by states—rather than 
particular instances of practice.654 Opinio juris is emphasized in the modern approach to custom 
where statements rather than actions often become the basis of interpretation in determining the 
“intention” of states. Whereas the traditional approach is typically associated with an inductive 
method and the consent of state parties, a modern consideration of customary international law is 
linked with a deductive method and substantial principles of justice.655 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines international 
custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”656  The phrase can be broken into 
                                                          
652Anthea Roberts, “Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation,” 
American Journal of International Law 95 (2001): 7. 
653Ibid. 
654Ibid. 
655 Koskenniemi's oft-referenced distinction between 'apology' and 'utopia' corresponds to the use of an inductive  
rather than deductive method, as the former encouraged state immunization for humanitarian abuses provided states  
claimed non-consent, while the latter highlighted the incorporation of human rights principles apriori. See Martti  
Koskeniemmi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2015). 
656 Article 38 reads: “The Court shall apply: 1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; 2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 4. Subject to the provisions of 
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.” League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of 
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two distinct units: (a) “evidence of a general practice” associated with state practice or “usage,” 
and (b) “accepted as law” or the element concerned with opinio juris.657      
Roberts describes modern customary international law as part of a deductive process that 
emphasizes opinio juris—or the “accepted as law” element in Article 38. Opinio juris begins 
with general statements of rules rather than specific instances of practice.658 The Merits decision 
                                                          
International Justice, 16 December 1920, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/40421d5e4.html [accessed 11 
October 2018].  
657 Separate decisions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and its precursor the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), the judicial branch of the League of Nations, highlight the diverging application of 
custom in an international law setting. 
    The 1927 Lotus case before the PCIJ, for example, involved a French Steamship, the SS Lotus, and a Turkish 
vessel, the S.S. Boz-Kourt, in a dispute that crystallized the traditional understanding of customary formation. The 
issue revolved around the right of Turkish jurisdiction over a French officer responsible for the death of eight 
Turkish sailors aboard the S.S. Boz-Kourt. Turkish officials arrested the officer as he sailed into Istanbul. As a result 
of the incident, France lodged a formal complaint before the PCIJ challenging Turkey's exercise of jurisdiction. 
   The PCIJ ruled that Turkey was allowed to try the French official, because France had not shown evidence of state 
practice where criminal cases against foreign nationals aboard flag ships on the high seas was prohibited. The court 
placed a high burden of proof on France. The PCIJ required that France show instances in which a Turkish vessel 
had in the past collided with a foreign ship, Turkey had protested the prosecution of its national before a foreign 
court, and in turn had had its official exonerated for an incident similar to the misconduct of the French officer. The 
case, in short order, demonstrated that international law was a fully permissive system where, unless an action was 
explicitly prohibited, states were allowed to do whatever they deemed appropriate. 
    Since the PCIJ placed such a high bar on proof of a general practice, the Lotus case, however, was far from 
representative of  approaches to state practice. In contrast, the 1900 Paquette Habana case was a far more common 
representation of reasoning based on evidence that proved uniform, consistent and of long usage. In Paquette 
Habana, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in favor of two Cuban fishing boat owners, whose vessels were seized by 
U.S. naval forces during the Spanish-American War as “prizes” of war. The attorney for the boat owners, J. Parker 
Kirlin, was able to demonstrate that over a period of two centuries, an earlier 1798 precedent from the English High 
Court of Admiralty that had deemed the seizure of vessels an act of “comity” or “courtesy” rather than a rule of law 
that immunized fishing craft had been overturned. Kirlin demonstrated that the legal practice of protecting fishing 
craft was binding on the United States. He based his argument on a variety of sources, including treaties between 
European nations, English royal ordinances, the opinion of international legal publicists, and instances in which the 
U.S. Navy had received instructions in earlier conflicts to abstain from similar practices. Kirlin won the case. 
     Paquette Habana proves to be salient as an example of customary interpretation based on state practice that 
resembles opinio juris in the sense of licensing a broad scope of sources to reaffirm practice (even non-practice). 
The distinction between usus or “practice” and the personified mens rea or “intent” of “states” produces a region of 
blurriness. Do moral idealizations contained in non-binding statements of support for the criminalization of 
humanitarian offenses, expressed by legal “organs” or state  representatives in an official capacity, for instance, 
amount to “state practice”? The Paquette case was a major customary interpretive advancement over statist-
immunizing elements that foreshadowed the broadened scope of customary construction, especially in post-Cold 
War cases. Lotus Case,(1927), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 10; The Paquete Habana Case, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
658  The 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf judgment by the ICJ defined opinio juris as the “belief that...a  
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief...is implicit in 
the very notion of opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must...feel that they are conforming to what  
amounts to a legal obligation.” North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal  
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1969 (Feb. 20), p. 3. See also: Roberts, 7. Maurice  
Mendelson, “The Subjective Element in Customary International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 66  
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in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua659 before the ICJ exemplifies 
the thrust of this deductive approach, which becomes central to the moralization of customary 
application in ICL beginning with the Tadic appeals court judgment660. Like Roberts, legal 
scholar Anthony D'Amato distinguishes state practice as a form of action as opposed to opinio 
juris, which he considers akin to statements, such as treaties and declarations about the legality 
of action.661 The Filartiga v. Pena-Irala case662, in which the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals relied on UN General Assembly resolutions to determine violations of the “law[s] of 
nations” confirming the right of the court to jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act,663 the 
Nicaragua judgment derived customs of non-use of force and nonintervention from General 
Assembly resolutions. The Nicaragua opinion determined that “In order to deduce the existence 
of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of State should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule 
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule.”664 The assumption of the court was that a state practice that deviated from the 
                                                          
(1995), 177, 206-207 objects to ICJ decisions like the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, because he considers 
proof of opinio juris where there is a “well established practice” to be the “superfluous.” Yet as Brian D. Lepard  
insists, opinio juris is a requirement of Article 38—and consequently the subjective element must be considered an  
essential component of customary formation. Brian D. Lepard Customary International Law: a New Theory with  
Practical Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
659 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (June 27). 
660  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 11 
October 2018]. 
661 Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  1971), 74- 
75.  
662The case set the precedent for prosecuting non-US citizens in American courts for tortious acts. The Federal Court 
wrote that: "The torturer has become – like the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani generis, an enemy 
of all mankind.” Filártiga v. Peña-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
663Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), is a section of the United States Code that reads: "The district courts shall  
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations              
or a treaty of the United States.” Alien Tort Claims Act, US Code 28 (1789) § 1350. 
664Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (June 27), 98. 
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general statement condemning the non-use of force and nonintervention was not “recognition of 
a new rule.” Similarly, in the Filartiga v. Pena-Irala case, since states—even those that practiced 
torture—voted in the UN General Assembly for resolutions condemning state-sponsored torture, 
the assumption was that opinio juris carried more weight than practice that diverged from the 
articulations of those states' responsible for such abuse.  
 Legal scholar Frederick Kirgis re-orients the debate between traditional and modern 
approaches by viewing each method along a sliding scale where “[t]he more destabilizing or 
morally distasteful the activity—for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of 
fundamental human rights—the more readily international decisionmakers will substitute one 
element for the other...”665 Kelsen, who determines in a uniform manner the parameters of 
custom based on what states actually “do” rather than pronouncements of “belief”, alters his 
method in its application to human rights violations—specifically core international crimes— as 
opposed to other international delicts. Chapter two argued that in order for retroactive lawmaking 
to take full effect, a distinction would need to be made between laws pertaining to what 
Blackstone describes as acts “indifferent in itself” and offenses on the magnitude of core 
international crimes. Kelsen uses this statement of acts “indifferent in itself” to justify the 
prosecution of acts which were not. Kirgis' sliding scale approach in consequence mirrors 
Kelsen’s concern for the distinctively debased acts that comprise the substantive jurisdiction of 
ICL.             
b.  The Pure Theory of Law and Custom     
 
   “Custom is, just like a legislative act, a mode for creating law,” writes Kelsen.666 The 
                                                          
665Frederick L. Kirgis, “Custom on a Sliding Scale,” American Journal of International Law 81(2012): 149.  
666  Hans Kelsen, “Theorie du droit international coutumier,” (N.S.) Revue internationale de la theorie du droit 
(1939) 253, at 263.  
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equivalence drawn by Kelsen between custom and legislation is qualified by the fact that in  
legislation lawmakers are “conscious and deliberate,”667whereas in the creation of custom “men 
do not necessarily know that they create by their conduct a rule of law, nor do they necessarily 
intend to create law.”668  Custom encompasses the effect of conduct (i.e., state practice) that 
individuals subject to the law create unconsciously through a decentralized process; whereas, 
legislation is made through a centralized process by an organ that is “more or less”  
distinguishable from those subject to the law.669 
 Treaties, or contracts between nations, resemble both legislation and custom. Similar to 
the legislative process, a treaty is “conscious and deliberate” lawmaking. However, while  a 
legislative enactment is made by special organs who legislate in a stable legal environment, those 
subject to treaties are the contracting parties themselves, which includes officials who transfer 
responsibility to the “state”. While “conscious and deliberate,” treaties, which create law 
applicable to the contracting parties only, are not the predominant source of international law. 
“With respect to its validity,” treaty law, writes Kelsen, “is inferior to customary international  
law.”670  
Bederman's assessment of pure theoretical contributions are therefore misguided, 
especially when he suggests that for Kelsen “there can be no real legal obligations for states in 
following CIL rules.”671 Pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”), attributed to 
                                                          
667 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law,2nd ed., ed. Robert Warren Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1967): 441. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid. 
670Ibid., 446; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell, 1945), 369.; Brian D. Lepard,  
Customary International Law: A New Theory with Practical Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2011), 40.; Jörg Kammerhofer, “Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International  
Law and Some of Its Problems,” European Journal of International Law 15, no. 3 (2004): 548. 
671 Bederman, 161. 
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international treaty law, is a norm, according to Kelsen, subordinate to the customary idea that 
states ought to behave the way they customarily do in practice.672  Treaties alone do not 
constitute a basic norm, or presupposed source from which international law derives, says 
Kelsen. What grants each legal normative order or personified “state” the right to make treaties is 
the fact that “agreements must be kept”; and “agreements must be kept” because a higher norm 
dictates that “states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.” Custom, for Kelsen, 
constitutes general international law. 
       Bederman contests the accusation of contemporary critics of customary international law 
like Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner,673 who use game-theoretical and rational choice models to 
prove that there is no legal obligation for states to follow customary rules of international law. 
“For Goldsmith and Posner,” Bederman writes, “to follow a [customary international law] norm 
because of its inherent value (coincidence), or out of self-interest (cooperation and coordination), 
or even because of fear of negative consequences (coercion) is inimical with its being a legal 
rule.”674 
These writers endorse a description that suggests that these norms are adhered to, not out 
of a sense of legal obligation, but because it is beneficial to follow a customary norm. This 
implies that Goldsmith and Posner elevate sovereign right above the requirements of 
international society, and are in fact, according to Bederman, political realists.675 Bederman 
                                                          
672Hans Kelsen. Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1952), 417-418.; See also: 
FrancoisRigaux, “Hans Kelsen on International Law,” European Journal of International Law  9 (1998): 328. 
673 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
674 Bederman, 102. 
675 Like classical political realists Hans Joachim Morgenthau and Georg Schwarzenberger, who consider 
international law to have limited powers to constrain states in their actions, and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, whose 
structural or neo-realist theory of international relations denies international law any significant role, Goldsmith and 
Posner grant state interests a decisive quality. See: Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International 
Law, 6-9.; Hans J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law,” American Journal of 
International Law 34 (1940).; Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 7th ed. 
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consequently attributes their critique to a skepticism towards customary international law rooted 
in “Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart’s two-edged attack on international law.”676  
“Kelsen and Hart famously argued that, to the extent that custom plays any role in 
international legal obligation, it is a sign of a ‘primitive’ legal order and, even worse, a thinly 
disguised naturalist one based on inchoate notions of ‘international morality’.”677 While Hart's 
view of customary international law may affirm such a view, since Hart dismisses the customary 
validity of international law (see below), given that Kelsen grounds his basic norm of 
international law in a customary source, and values customary international law as 
methodologically useful in determining ICR, Bederman is incorrect when he attributes to Kelsen 
the sentiment that “there can be no real legal obligations for states in following [customary 
international law]...”678 Bederman obscures the fact that Kelsen, unlike Hart, turns to custom to 
validate international law as a “system” in which states pattern behavior on customary practice. 
Unlike Kelsen, Jeremy Bentham, an early critic of naturalism in legal theory679 associated 
custom with ‘barbarism.’ John Austin in Province of Jurisprudence Determined also provided 
limited guidance for the determination of custom.680 Austin certainly did not consider it 
                                                          
(New York: Random House, 2006).; Georg Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers of International Law (London: Stevens, 
1962).; Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979). 
676Bederman, 161. 
677 Ibid. 
678 Bederman, 162 
679 Legal positivist Jeremy Bentham writes: “[I]f the laws of a barbarous age are not changed in an age of 
civilization, the tribunals will depart in degrees from the ancient principles, and insensibly substitute new maxims. 
Hence will arise a kind of combat between the law which grows old, and the custom which is introduced, and in 
consequence of this uncertainty, a weakening of the power of the laws over expectation.” Jeremy Bentham, Works of 
Jeremy Bentham, Part 1, “Power Over Expectation” (London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1843), 325, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=oZ1EAAAAcAAJ&pg=RA1 (accessed June 15, 2018). 
680 John Austin writes of custom: “At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the governed observe 
spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a law set by a political superior. The custom is transmuted into positive law, 
when it is adopted as such by the courts of justice, and when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by 
the power of the state. But before it is adopted by the courts, and clothed with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule 
of positive morality: a rule generally observed by the citizens or subjects; but deriving the only force it can be said to 
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legitimate for the purpose of international legal obligation, which to Austin was no more than 
‘positive morality’ classified alongside the laws of fashion and honor.681682 
While Hart’s “neo-positivist” legal philosophy would seem to be a good candidate for 
endorsing international law and the criminalization of humanitarian offenses, since like Kelsen 
he shared a post-Austinian view of law that granted legal norms validity free of sovereign-
backed commands, he, too, creates obstacles to prosecution.683 Even as he devotes a chapter of 
The Concept of Law to the subject684 of international law, he considers it to be a system that 
contains only primary rules685. Primary rules govern conduct, while secondary rules “serve, 
among other purposes, the vital function of establishing procedures for identifying the primary 
rules that bind people. The ‘rule of recognition’ [being] the master rule for such a purpose” 
functions similar to Kelsen's basic norm.686  
With regard to Kelsen’s belief that the basic norm of the international system is that 
“states should behave as they customarily behaved,”687 Hart rejects this on the grounds that there 
                                                          
possess, from the general disapprobation falling on those who transgress it.” John Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined: Being the First Part of a Series of Lectures on Jurisprudence, or, The Philosophy of 
Positive Law, Vol 1, Second Edition (London: John Murray Albemarle Street, 1861), 23.  See also: Austin, The 
Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 23-25, for a more extensive discussion on the place of the judge in relation 
to custom, and custom as positive law. 
681 Ibid., 2. 
682 The Legacy of John Austin's Jurisprudence, ed. Michael Freeman and Patricia Mindus (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Springer, 2013), 99. Freedman and Mindus write that “Austin...[has]...been associated with the Thrasymachian 
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and Legal Normativity,” Revus— Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law 24 (2018), 
file:///C:/Users/Jason%20Reuven%20Kropsky/Downloads/revus-3984.pdf. 
684 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1961] 2012), 213-238. 
685 See: The Legacy of HLA Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy, edited by Mathew H. Kramer, Claire 
Grant, et al, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
686 Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: a Liberal Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 81. 
687 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1952), 146. In the 1952 edition, 
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can be no secondary rule of recognition in international law. Hart writes with reference to the 
aforementioned phrase that: 
 
[I]t says nothing more than that those who accept certain [customary] rules must also 
observe a rule that the rules ought to be observed. This is a mere useless 
reduplication…688 
 
“What Hart overlooks,” writes Neil MacCormick, “is that his theory of a ‘rule of 
recognition’ is a theory concerning a rule about the standards which it is obligatory for judges [as 
state officials] to observe. In that case, it is no mere useless reduplication to say that certain 
judges, when states voluntarily refer disputes to them, must decide according to the standards of 
‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice of law accepted as law…”689  
This standard is found in Article 38 of the statute of the Permanent International Court of Justice. 
Judges merely follow the standards set forth by the international community in Article 38 that 
specifies sources that judges must follow in order to maintain the validity of the system. These 
sources, in addition to custom, include treaties, general principles of law, judicial rulings and the 
scholarship of international publicists.690    
Notwithstanding the fact that Kelsen validates international law according to the principle 
                                                          
of Principles of International Law Kelsen focuses on the distinction “between responsibility based on fault 
(culpability) and absolute responsibility, [which] is characteristic of a relatively progressive legal order. It is 
unknown to primitive law, where, together with collective responsibility,  absolute responsibility prevails.” Hans 
Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952), 12. The transfer of power to ad hoc or permanent jurisdictional 
authorities produces the validity-defining aspect of ICR. States reaffirm customary state practice by transferring 
authority to presumably neutral or relatively neutral judicial bodies in determination of core international crimes. 
From the vantage point of conceptualizing the responsibility of individuals as culpability or fault, international law 
incorporates customary international law as a source, highly effective in discriminating between collective and 
individual forms of responsibility, due to the flexibility of this “meta-norm”. 
688 Hart, 230. 
689 Neil MacCormick, HLA Hart (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 114. 
690 League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40421d5e4.html [accessed 11 October 2018].  
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that “states should behave as they customarily behaved,” which Hart dismisses as mere 
“reduplication,” the issue is still what is meant by this phrase. Does it not also include what is 
“accepted as law” even when there is scant evidence of state practice? While contemporary legal 
positivists like G.J.H. van Hoof691 enunciated a sentiment that Kelsen could not but agree with—
the notion that opinio juris was far too vague and general to constitute a “rule of recognition” in 
the Hartian sense—692 Kelsen does indeed incorporate custom—contra Hart—as a valid source 
of international law. 
             In Kelsen’s “Theorie Du Droit International Coutumier” or “Theory of Customary 
law,693 Kelsen rejected what he called the “metaphysical doubling” of the law. Since customary 
law was created by state organs through their conduct, any reference to opinio juris sive 
necessitatis would have already been confirmed through state practice.  Kelsen consequently 
believed that such a conviction only adulterated—in a metaphysical sense—the purity of 
international legal norms. 
Like a dryad behind a tree, a nymph behind a river, or sun god behind the sun, from an 
epistemological vantage point none could be proved.694 Likewise, opinio juris created an 
unwarranted dualism between what the state did in fact and what it was assumed to believe. It, 
too, could not be proved, he suggested. To try and elicit the real intention of states beyond what 
was already confirmed in state practice, said Kelsen, was wholly redundant. 
But how could state practice, for example, determine customary judgment when violations of 
international rules so frequently occur? Such violations would seem to “constitute a law-
                                                          
691 G.J.F. Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1983). 
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693 Hans Kelsen, “Theorie du droit international coutumier,” Revue internationale de la theorie du droit (1939). 




destroying exercise…”695 Without the added element of opinio juris, each “Is” act—or state 
practice—would be given equal weight in the determination of norms. Furthermore, as suggested 
previously, modern international law demonstrates that opinio juris has played a substantive role 
in international judicial rulings when state practice is contrary to moral principles that states have 
simultaneously upheld through declarations constituting opinio juris. 
However, Kelsen denies this psychological element effective power. He writes: 
To be sure, the psychological element of custom, the [opinio juris sive necessitaties], may be 
inferred from the constancy and uniformity of state conduct. Indeed, in practice it appears 
that the opinio juris is commonly inferred from the constancy and uniformity of state 
conduct. But to the extent that it is so inferred it is this conduct and not the particular state of 
mind accompanying conduct that is decisive.696 
 
  
 Conduct, not the particular “state of mind” of the state, which Kelsen considered a 
personification impossible to access, was the essential element of custom. To introduce opinio 
juris in concrete cases, especially in a deductive manner as per the modern method of customary 
interpretation, was tantamount to filling “gaps” with moral or political elements. This ignored the 
fundamental principle that subjects (in this case, states) were legally permitted to do all that was 
not legally forbidden. Lawmaking organs therefore could not fill “gaps” under the guise of 
creating new international law where none existed. Insofar as neither treaties, nor a “long-
established practice of states”697 under customary international law could be located, the 
introduction of opinio juris, in accordance with deductive methods of customary interpretation, 
was considered invalid. 
  The wording of Article 38 that international custom is “evidence of a general practice...” 
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696 Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 450-451. 
697 Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 441. 
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is of particular interest to Kelsen, as he considered the idea that “custom was created by another 
fact than custom”698 (i.e., “evidence”) to contravene the legal positivist notion that custom can 
only have a constitutive, not a declaratory character. The idea “that the true creator of law 
stands—so to speak—behind custom” were the “assumptions of social theorists, who...attempt[] 
to present moral-political postulates as objectively valid principles when, in fact, they are neither 
verified, nor verifiable.”699 Kelsen implicates those advocates of the German doctrine of the 
Volkgeist (national spirit)700, as well as the French doctrine of the solidarite social (social 
solidarity),701 in accordance with his general disapproval of all doctrines that affirm that “there 
exists, behind and above the positive law, customary or statutory, an absolutely just law which 
can be deduced from nature—the nature of man, the nature of society, or even the nature of 
things...”702 Opinio juris as a “psychological” element dependent on “belief” thus contradicted 
Kelsen's commitment to banishing moral and political ideas that “inferr[ed] from that which is 
that which ought to be...”703 
Towards the end of his life, Kelsen still acknowledged that problems associated with 
customary international law could be resolved through a permanent compulsory international 
court, but he reluctantly conceded that a court might never be established. In his book Principles 
of Public International Law, he wrote: 
 
It may be readily granted that for the most part these uncertainties would not arise if 
international tribunals had the same role in the interpretation and development of 
international law that national courts have in the interpretation and development of national 
                                                          
698 Ibid., 442. 
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700 For a representative description of the nineteenth century school of Volkgeist, see: Friedrich Karl von Savigny. 
System of the Modern Roman Law, trans. William Holloway (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2013). 
701 On a representative description of the French school of sociological jurisprudence, see: Léon Duguit, The Law 
and State, trans. Frederick J. de Sloovère. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1917). 




law. But in the absence of a system of compulsory jurisdiction the many uncertainties 
attending customary law must be expected to persist.704 
 
       According to Kelsenian Jörg Kammerhofer, commenting on Kelsen's contributions to the 
study of customary international law, “a deduction of norms means that these are not the result of 
a human act of will, a human legislation in the widest sense.”705 At international tribunals, 
however, norms have been followed, not because they were considered legislation based on a 
human act of will steeped in a valid procedural method, but “out of a sense of legal or moral 
obligation.”706 Contrary to Kelsen's narrow observation of the limits of customary international 
law based on opinio juris, which he weds to a deductive methodology that ICL judges have often 
turned to in order to constitute “principles of humanity,” he nevertheless counter-intuitively 
provides justification for the introduction of a far more robust customary element than is 
normally associated with the author of the pure theory of law.  
           Kelsen’s preference for “consensus,” as legal scholar and diplomat J. Peter Pham notes, 
points to Kelsen’s role in promoting the interests of the international community” over, for 
instance, defectors from the “consensus”.707  Strict interpretation of state practice as requiring 
“unanimity” of “opinion” is offset by Kelsen’s introduction of the “will” of the “international 
community”. “What Kelsen proposes,” writes Pham, “is a sociological circle wherein the norm 
ought to reflect the conduct of the members of the group. This ‘consensus’ is interpreted to be 
the expression of a ‘general will,’ that is then obligatory on all as a norm.”708 Pham quotes 
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Kelsen to this effect: 
 
 At first the subjective meaning of the acts that constitute the custom is not an ought. But 
later, when these acts have existed for some time, the idea arises in the individual 
member that he ought to behave in the manner in which the other members customarily 
behave, and at the same time the will arises that the other members ought to behave in 
that same way. If one member of the group does not behave in the manner in which the 
other members customarily behave, then his behavior will be disapproved by the others, 
as contrary to their will. In this way the custom becomes the expression of a collective 
will whose subjective meaning is an ought.709 
 
           Despite Kelsen’s emphasis on long-standing state practice, his concern for the “general 
will” of “the international community” creates a progressive model for customary international 
law interpretation, relaxing strict hermeneutical standards to promote [morally-informed] 
“consensus”. (The next, concluding chapter, engages Pham’s argument in detail to express 
implications to the changing notion of international criminal responsibility derived from a pure 
theoretical model that embraces “consensus” as “the will” of “the international community”). 
            Notwithstanding Kelsen’s effort to grant custom a defining role as a binding source of 
international law free of moral attributions, pure theory licenses ICL adjudication that has 
become dependent on the moral element associated with post-Cold War “gap-filling”. His 
acknowledgement that “many uncertainties” abound in relation to the interpretation of customary 
international law is, at the very least, an important first step to communicating a problem 
resolvable under Kelsen’s general approach to judicial law making. 
    
III. Judicial Discretion and The Purposive Method in ICL 
                                                          




Despite retaining a critical approach to the use of opinio juris as an element of customary 
construction, Part III demonstrates how the author of the Pure Theory of Law reconciles a 
hierarchically-ordinal interpretive approach accommodating purposive methodological 
construction with “formal” rules of legal cognition. Kelsen’s contributions to the changing 
notion of ICR in the post-Cold War era must therefore be understood as fundamental to 
reconstructing the general imagery of Kelsen as an arch-formalist.710 As Paulson notes, Kelsen 
agrees with nineteenth century legal philosopher Rudolf von Jhering’s criticism of the notion of 
the judge as a “juridical slot machine” (Rechtsautomat).711 Responding to the widespread 
accusation amongst German legal scholars that Kelsen promoted a “jurisprudence of concepts” 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz),712 Kelsen writes that “to want to belittle the Pure Theory of Law as 
Begriffsjurisprudenz—a charge not uncommonly made—is a truly pathetic 
misunderstanding.”713  The importance of distinguishing “the process of discovery, where the 
idea is to arrive at a suitable reading of the premises of the legal argument” (i.e., non-formal 
legal interpretation) with “the process of justification, where the task is a post hoc reconstruction 
of the legal argument with an eye to showing its legal validity”714 (i.e., formal legal cognition), 
according to Paulson, places Kelsen outside the bounds of “logicistic” thinking.715 Judges, as the 
                                                          
710 See: Stanley Paulson, “Formalism, ‘Free Law’, and the ‘Cognition Quandary’: Hans Kelsen’s Approaches to 
Legal Interpretation,” University of Queensland Law Journal 27, no. 2 (2008). 
711 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht, 2nd ed 1884) vol 1, 294 in Paulson, “Formalism,” 16. 
712 For a list, see: Paulson, “Formalism,” 16. 
713 Hans Kelsen, “Juritischer Formalismus und reine Rechtslehre,” Juritische Wochenschrift 58 (1929) in Paulson, 
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714 Paulson, “Formalism,” 7. 
715 See: Hermann Heller, “Die Krisis der Staatslehre,” Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 55 (1926); 
Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010);  
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polemic against Kelsen. Lon Fuller, "The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum,' Journal 
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last delegated authority in the hierarchy determining legal accountability, are free to deviate from 
“juridico-scientific” interpretation. “[T]he interpretation by the law applying organ,” according 
to Kelsen, “is always authentic.”716  
Paulson writes in “Formalism, ‘Free Law’, and the ‘Cognition’ Quandary: Hans Kelsen’s 
Approaches to Legal Interpretation” that: 
 
Always authentic, [Kelsen] adds, for [the interpretation of judges] creates law. To be 
sure, legal cognition imposes constraints on what the judge or official can decide, for—so 
the standard Kelsenian line—the scope or frame of the general norm sets limits on what 
will count as possible interpretations of the general norms. That is, the judge, say, can 
‘cognize’ individual norms qua possible interpretations of the general norm only if they 
fall within the scope of the general norm. At the same time, Kelsen grants the point that 
the judge’s choice from among the possible individual norms—the judges ‘authentic’ 
interpretation, handed down as law—may well be guided by the judge’s standpoint on 
politics and ideology.717 
 
Paulson provides a general framework for a rejoinder to those who claim that Kelsen’s 
“formalism” denies the possibility of purposive ICL construction. While Paulson emphasizes 
Kelsen’s radical skepticism towards legal interpretation, including Kelsen’s denial of all standard 
approaches in the mode of Hermann Kantorowicz, a leading figure in the Free Law Movement, 
Paulson nevertheless introduces a range of options to interpretation that could include 
purposiveness. Kantorowicz’s position in The Struggle for Legal Science718 inaugurated a 
                                                          
of Legal Education (1948-1949): 496. For a comprehensive analysis of the American response to Kelsen’s putative 
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challenge to judicial formalism that Kelsen, through his student Fritz Schreir719, would 
consequently come to endorse.  
For scholars who wish to uphold the ideal of pure theoretical cognition within a frame of 
possible positive law meanings the problem is particularly acute. Since scholars are prohibited 
from turning to “politics and ideology” (a particularly nebulous phraseology)720 to resolve 
possible meanings of legal norms, and since Kelsen denies traditional canons of interpretation, 
legal scholars are encouraged to banish political and ideological views “on pain of violating the 
purity postulate”.721 Drawing on Max Weber’s separation between scientific and value judgment, 
on the one hand, and Weber’s embrace of value-reference (Werbeziehung)722, on the other, 
Paulson champions “the legal community” as instrumental for the legal scholar “in arriving at a 
spectrum of possible meanings.”723 Although the legal scholar cannot introduce his own value 
judgment, value-reference means that the “legal scholar is not cut off from the political and 
ideological views current in the legal community.”724  
Paulson, however, does not engage with the humanitarian frame specific to ICL 
judgment. As with his general neglect of Kelsen’s contributions to the conception of ICR, which 
Paulson overlooks in his otherwise masterfully written “Classical Legal Positivism at 
Nuremberg,”725 Paulson’s comprehensive analysis of Kelsen’s approaches to legal interpretation 
                                                          
“Formalism,” 17. 
719  Fritz Schreir, Die Interpretation cr Gesetz und Rectsgeschafte (1927), 26, 48-55, 71-3 in Paulson 20. See also: 
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720 Paulson, “Formalism,” 26. 
721 Ibid. 
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Introduction to the Historical Sciences, trans Guy Oakes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), who 
influenced Weber’s embrace of value-reference. Paulson, “Formalism,” 26. 
723 Ibid. 
724 Ibid., 27. 
725 See: chapter two for an extensive discussion of Paulson’s position in Stanley Paulson, “Classical Legal Positivism 
at Nuremberg,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 2 (Winter, 1975): 132-158. 
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do not link up with the author of Pure Theory’s particular concern for imputation at the highest 
level of criminal concern. The legal community that Paulson alludes to may be different at 
different levels of interpretive valuation. The spectrum changes in the international sphere. Here, 
unlike at the national level, ICL judges must turn to what Kelsen constitutes as “principles of 
civilization,” to determine “the political and ideological views current in the legal 
community.”726 For now, the question of what these “principles” are, must be left to the 
concluding discussion, which summarizes Kelsen’s position on the relationship between law, 
politics and morality at the level of international criminality (see: chapter six).   
Turning to the purposive methodological choice incorporated in the post-Cold War era, it 
is possible to detect correspondence between Kelsen’s conferring of discretionary interpretive 
powers over customary interpretation once state’s license ICL courts. Before determining how 
this is possible, it is necessary to engage with a leading contemporary figure advocating for the 
use of purposive methodology. In a 2007 review of Aharon Barak’s book Judge in a 
Democracy727 in The New Republic728—and again in How Judges Think (2009)729—Richard 
Posner, the most-cited legal philosopher today730, wrote that “Barak is a world-famous judge 
who dominated his court as completely as John Marshall dominated our Supreme Court. If there 
were a Nobel Prize for law, Barak would probably be an early recipient.”731 Yet his detractors 
are many, including Posner himself. Like the late Robert Bork732, an originalist and strong critic 
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of Barak’s, Posner, an economist in legal methodology, finds in Barak’s writings a tendency 
towards “judicial hubris”.733 
Much of this has to do with the fact that Barak’s method steers away from authorial 
intention towards a high level of abstraction734 in order to integrate the ‘enlightened’ values of 
judicial interpreters. This is an especially egregious usurpation of power by the judiciary in a 
system with “separation of powers”, according to Posner. In the U.S. judicial system, judges 
must “make some effort to tether [decisions] to orthodox legal materials, such as the 
constitutional text.”735 In contrast, Barak’s judicial approach has been hailed by Supreme Court 
Justice Elena Kagan. “In 2006, while dean of Harvard Law School, Ms. Kagan introduced Judge 
Barak during an award ceremony as ‘my judicial hero.’ She added, ‘He is the judge or justice in 
my lifetime whom, I think, best represents and has best advanced the values of democracy and 
human rights, of the rule of law and of justice.’”736 US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer 
makes multiple references in Active Liberty, which summarizes Breyer’s judicial philosophy, to 
Barak’s position that “law is tied to life”.737  
While Barak’s method in Purposive Interpretation in Law, which sets out his views on 
the integration of elements of justice that move beyond the bounds of strict construction focuses 
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exclusively on domestic law738, international scholar Mia Swart has drawn extensively on 
Barak’s purposive hermeneutic to explain changes in decision-making in the post-Cold War era 
of ICL.739 (Part IV integrates Swart’s analysis with respect to key ICTY judgments). Barak 
rejects a hard textualist approach740 that excludes “reasonable” authorial intent, or what judges 
understand to be contextual factors “implicit” in the text and mirrored by societal norms, 
including “social goals (like the public interest), proper modes of behavior (like reasonableness 
and fairness), and human rights”,741 and on the other hand, the radical invention of new texts742 
with little or no consideration of the “explicit” authorial intent, which “the author of the text 
sought to actualize.”743 Moving back and forth between text and context, purposive interpretation 
is thus, according to Barak, able to approximate a “reasonable” judicial intent.  Judges do this 
either consciously or unconsciously, and their judicial opinions reflect “the horizon of the author 
and the horizon of the interpreter” simultaneously.744 
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The interpreter does not try to enter the shoes of the text’s author, a task made impossible 
by the gap in time. The interpreter and the text’s author live in different time periods. 
Each has his or her own pre-understanding. The interpreter therefore does not try to relive 
the experience of creating the text. He or she tries to combine his or her modern 
understanding with the understanding at the core of the text. This blending of horizons, 
central to purposive interpretation, expresses the proper hermeneutic perspective.745 
 
 
Context matters.  Fundamental values and human rights norms change over time, says 
Barak. In addition to the “explicit” text or “subjective” intent of the author it is also necessary for 
judges to entertain “the social values prevalent at the time the text is interpreted, including values 
of morality and justice” or ‘the objective component of purpose’.746 The “blending of 
horizons”747 is an apt metaphor for the methodological effort in “the intellectual history of 
dignity,” as Barak puts it,748 to elicit the humanitarian purpose or intent of the originating legal 
norm.   
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In Kelsen’s “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International 
Organization” (1944), it is possible to glean a purposive endorsement of judge-created 
international law. In analyzing the Moscow Declaration (1943), which proclaimed “the necessity 
of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving States, and open to membership by all such 
States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security,”749 the author of 
Pure Theory stresses the international judge’s primary position in defining the parameters of 
sovereignty. This is especially necessary given the lack of executive and legislative functions at 
the international level. Rather than conceive of sovereignty as “supreme authority” in the sense 
of the unlimited right of each nation to act how it wishes, Kelsen interprets the Moscow 
Declaration to mean “the existence of an international law which imposes duties and confers 
rights upon States.”750 The goal of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and 
China—the four signatory powers at Moscow—was to create law and order “for the purpose of 
inaugurating a system of general security, [which] can only be the Law of Nations, the 
international legal order as a set of norms binding upon the States.”751 The Moscow Declaration, 
the first public pronouncement of the intent of the allied powers to try the heinous acts of Nazis 
under international jurisdiction, must be recalled with respect to “a system of general security”. 
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and 
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin noted that "evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass 
executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have 
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overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled"752 required justice. Nazis would 
either be returned to the countries where they had committed their crimes and "judged on the 
spot by the peoples whom they have outraged,”753 or else, for those Germans whose criminal 
offenses had no geographical localization, they would be prosecuted under international 
jurisdiction. Although Winston Churchill is often associated with the position that summary 
execution was the most fitting punishment for Nazi crimes,754 he was instrumental in drafting the 
“Statement of Atrocities,” which led, in turn, to the formation of the European Advisory 
Committee, a body instrumental in drafting—with the consent of state parties— the IMT 
Charter. 
In arranging the legal limits of sovereignty, judges dealing with core international crimes, 
as Kelsen avers, may go beyond the parameters of positive law. Purposive construction follows 
from the valid delegation of powers by states to neutral international judges to try state officials 
for core international crimes. First, however, it is necessary to once again de-link Kelsen’s 
position on cognition from interpretation. Kelsen writes: 
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The establishment of compulsory adjudication of international disputes is a means—
perhaps the most effective means—of maintaining positive international law. It may be 
doubted, however, whether a court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction always will 
apply only and exclusively positive international law to the disputes submitted to its 
decisions, even though the court is not expressly authorized by its statute to apply other 
norms. It is probable that a court which has the power to decide all disputes without any 
exception will, in cases in which a strict application of positive law seems unsatisfactory 
to the judges, adapt the positive law to their idea of justice and equity. (my emphasis)755 
 
Like Barak, Kelsen maintains the right of judges to introduce conceptions of justice that 
may not comport with “orthodox legal material”.756 Judges, as Kelsen notes, will “adapt the 
positive law to their idea of justice and equity,”757 since “it is difficult…to prevent a court 
endowed with compulsory jurisdiction from applying other norms than those of positive 
international law…. “758 Kelsen, therefore, disputes the notion that international judges, under 
the principle of sovereign equality, assume a “declaratory” rather than “constitutive” role, once 
assigned powers by states subject to a dispute. “According to traditional doctrine,” writes Kelsen, 
“the law to be applied by the judicial decision exists prior to the decision; this preexisting law is 
disputed only in respect to the relationship between the parties to the conflict.”759 Whether the 
dispute is based on questions of fact or law,  interpretation is necessitated.760 Disputed facts or 
disputed rules of law are therefore resolved by judicial decision.761  
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761 “There is, to be sure, a certain difference between a judicial decision applying an undisputed rule of positive law 
to a disputed fact or a disputed rule of positive law to an undisputed fact, and a judicial decision applying a new, that 
is, not preexisting rule, thus altering existing law and adapting it to changing circumstances. But the difference is not 
so strongly marked as it seems to be, because the interpretation of positive law, necessarily connected with every act 
of applying law, always implies more or less an alteration of law.” Hans Kelsen, “The Principle of Sovereign 
Equality of States,” 218.  
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Courts rather than legislative organs, as chapter two describes in relation to the 
architecture of the international system Kelsen envisions, are more compatible with this principle 
of sovereign equality, according to Kelsen. Courts impose new obligations or duties, including 
those applicable to state actors, in an objective or neutral fashion, which is slower than 
legislation, and therefore less apt to impose “political decrees issued according to the principle 
that might goes before right, which is a negation of law.”762 Once states submit disputes to 
international judgment (and for our purposes, national or hybrid courts deciding cases of core 
international crimes), “it is the fact that judgments, even if not the strict application of a 
preexisting legal rule, are based on the idea of law, that is, on a rule which, although not yet 
positive law, should, according to the conviction of independent judges, become law and really 
becomes positive law for the case settled by the judicial decision.”763 Kelsen therefore premises 
his position related to international legal validity, and inter alia, international criminal law, on 
the ability of judges to move outside the range of predetermined positive law, in accordance with 
their “idea of justice and equity”.  
 “International criminal law rules,” writes Swart, “because of their essentially unwritten 
nature, are relatively indeterminate, adaptable to new circumstances and possess a certain 
‘malleability’ and ‘flexibility’”.764 While this may create the international public perception of 
“adventurous” judicial decision-making, Kelsen’s approach to interpretation and the process of 
discovery legitimizes such a role. Kelsen’s strict interpretation of customary international law, 
notwithstanding, he remains committed to a position that mirrors Barak’s. Although this is not 
readily apparent, as Paulson notes, Kelsen’s skeptical approach to legal interpretation in the 
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764 Swart, “Is there a Text?,” 771. 
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mode of Kantorowicz’s “free law movement” points to the latitude Kelsen grants judges. To 
claim that Kelsen is agnostic on the question of legal interpretation in the ICL sphere is neither 
born out either by earlier case studies, or Kelsen’s insistence that there be limits to inhumane 
conduct under the guise of “acts of state”.  
 
IV. The Acts of State Doctrine Revisited: ‘Substantial Relations or Formal Bonds?’   
In the first trial before the ICTY, the defendant Dusko Tadic, a former member of the 
paramilitary forces supporting the attack on the district of Prijedor, and a Bosnian Serb involved 
in mistreatment and killings at the Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm detention camps,765 was 
convicted in 1997 of crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and 
violations of the customs of war. 
In reviewing the case, the Tadic Appeals Chamber did not always explicitly reference the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)766, which provided ample instructions on the 
                                                          
765Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Indictment), IT-94-1-I, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), February 13, 1995, available at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/ind/en/tad-ii950213e.pdf 
[accessed 13 October 2018]. 
766 The trial chamber in Delalic would turn to The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in order to set 
out progressive principles of interpretation. The VCLT, which had never before applied its guidelines to a Statute, 
nor been invoked in war crimes proceedings prior to the UN Security Council-sponsored tribunals, was ruled 
applicable to ad hoc proceedings, because the latter was a creation of a primary organ of the United Nations. The 
Delalic decision insisted that the VCLT was therefore applicable to the ICTY Statute.  
     The case focused on the responsibility of guards at the Celebici prison camps located in the Konjic municipality 
in central Bosnia and Herzogovina. The four accused were implicated for cruel treatment of inmates in violation of 
the the Geneva Conventions of 1949 under Article 2 of the governing statute of the ICTY (Statute), and with 
violations of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute. The Chamber applied Vienna Convention 
rules, which established that in cases where statutory words are clearly defined, the “ordinary meaning” of words—
or literal approach—should be followed. Next, the golden rule of interpretation ought to be put into effect where the 
grammatical sense of a phrase would otherwise be distorted. This measure was used  to “avoid injustice, absurdity, 
anomaly or contradiction as clearly not to have been intended by the legislature.” 
    The Trial Chamber in Delalic commented on judicial “gap-filling” distinguishing between, on the one hand, “the 
doctrine of the separation of powers” that clearly defined judicial lawmaking as “an abuse of the legislative function 
of the judiciary,” and on the other, “courts…established to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
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scope of interpretation, but, noted Swart, “…applied the principles set out in that instrument”.767 
Nowhere was contextual balancing more apparent than in (a) the effort to characterize the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as international based on the purpose, or intention, of the grave 
breaches regime under the Geneva Conventions, and (b) the decision to expand the meaning of 
crimes against humanity to include other categories besides ‘persecutory crimes’ as contained in 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.768 While the next section engages with the ever-changing 
description of crimes against humanity, this section considers the way ICL further eroded the 
distinction between international and internal conflicts through contextual ‘balancing’ of Article 
2.  
Article 2 reads: 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering 
to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the 
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant 
Geneva Convention: 
(a) willful killing;  
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;  
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;  
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;  
                                                          
legislature.” Although the latter may be in violation of a strict adherence to the principle of legality, it insures that 
under a system where ambiguity of language, due to the politicized nature of multilateral treaty negotiations and 
unwritten customary norms is prevalent, the “intention” of ICL authors is taken into consideration. This “intention” 
mirrors the purpose of the ICL sphere, which is to extract a generally accepted, if changing, notion of 
“humanitarianism” as manifested in the evolving conception of international criminal responsibility.  
        The Trial Chamber in Delalic succeeded in establishing the legitimate basis for “modifying a rule of law 
contained in its statutory form.” By adopting VCLT guidelines and a purposive hermeneutic similar to Aharon 
Barak’s interpretive method, judges in Delalic insisted on the importance of weighing context  “and including it as a 
relevant factor for their judgment.”) United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 
1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html 
[accessed 8 October 2018]; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic aka “Pavo, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka “Zenga”, 
Zejnil Delalic (Appeals Judgement), IT-96-21-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
20 February 2001, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases, ICTY, 3ae6b7590.html [accessed 8 October 2018]. 
767 Swart, “Is there a Text?,” 773. 
768 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended on 




(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; 
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;  
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;  
(h) taking civilians as hostages.769  
 
In order for the Geneva Convention to apply770, not only would the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia need to be conceptualized as an international armed conflict, but the victims of the 
conflict would need to be categorized as “protected persons”.771 The test of effective control (i.e., 
the nationality requirement), established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
Nicaragua case,772 did not apply in this case because, according to defense counsel, the 
Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) and Bosnian Serb army, of which Tadic was a 
member, was not formally controlled by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).773 A cross-
                                                          
769 Ibid. 
770 Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 
1949http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/geneva07.asp [accessed October 14, 2018 
771 ICTY Appeals, para. 80 reads: Article 2 of the Statute embraces various disparate classes of offences with their 
own specific legal ingredients.  The general legal ingredients, however, may be categorised as follows. 
(i) The nature of the conflict.  According to the interpretation given by the Appeals Chamber in its decision on a 
Defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the present case,101 the international nature of the 
conflict is a prerequisite for the applicability of Article 2. 
(ii) The status of the victim.  Grave breaches must be perpetrated against persons or property defined as “protected” 
by any of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.  To establish whether a person is “protected”, reference must 
clearly be made to the relevant provisions of those Conventions. International Law Reports, Vol. 124, ed., Elihu 
Lauterpacht, C.J. Greenwood, A.G. Oppenheimer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 96. 
772 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America); Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 1986, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a44d2.html [accessed 14 October 2018]. 
773 In a separate opinion (section XI of the Appeals Chamber Judgment),  Judge Shahabuddeen wrote, “I agree with 
the Appeals Chamber, and with Judge McDonald, that there was an international armed conflict in this case. I also 
appreciate the general direction taken by the judgement of the Appeals Chamber, but, so far as this case is 
concerned, I am unclear about the necessity to challenge Nicaragua (I.C.J Reports 1986, p. 14). I am not certain 
whether it is being said that that much debated case does not show that there was an international armed conflict in 
this case. I think it does, and that on this point it was both right and adequate.”  
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 




appeal by the prosecution nevertheless argued that the Defense was wrong to formulate the test 
according to the question: “Were the Bosnian Serbs acting as ‘organs’ of another State?”774  
“The Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republika Srpska (“VRS”) 
had a “demonstrable link,” the prosecution argued, “with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) (“FRY”) and the Army of the FRY (“VJ”). It was not a situation of 
mere logistical support by the FRY to the VRS.”775 While the Appeals Chamber did not endorse 
the prosecution’s “demonstrable link” test, it did demonstrate that the VRS acted as a proxy 
force—and that “effective control” could be proven. 
The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Third Geneva Convention implicitly referred to a 
test of control by providing in Article 4 the requirement of “belonging to a Party to the conflict”: 
This conclusion, based on the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, is borne out by 
the entire logic of international humanitarian law.  This body of law is not grounded on 
formalistic postulates.  It is not based on the notion that only those who have the formal 
status of State organs, i.e., are members of the armed forces of a State, are duty bound both to 
refrain from engaging in violations of humanitarian law as well as - if they are in a position 
of authority - to prevent or punish the commission of such crimes.  Rather, it is a realistic 
body of law, grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring 
deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible.  It follows, amongst other 
things, that humanitarian law holds accountable not only those having formal positions of 
authority but also those who wield de facto power as well as those who exercise control over 
perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law.  Hence, in cases such as 
that currently under discussion, what is required for criminal responsibility to arise is some 
measure of control by a Party to the conflict over the perpetrators.776 
 
                                                          
774 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14 
October 2018], para 75. 
775 ibid. para. 72. 
776 Ibid, para. 96 
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Even if the Appeals Chamber deferred to the defense’s “test of effective control,” claiming 
that members of the VRS were taking orders from the FRY, judges deviated from a formal 
reading. Not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, would need to be 
considered. Those “who wield de facto power as well as those who exercise control over 
perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL)” were just as culpable 
as those in traditional positions of authority. In order to remain a “realistic body of law”, the 
Appeals Chamber acknowledged its need to expand the meaning of “effective control” to “the 
maximum extent possible” in “order to deter deviation from its standards...” 
But what are ‘standards’? Do they not entail purposive consideration, which accounts for 
‘objective’ needs like “social goals (the public interest), proper modes of behavior (like 
reasonableness and fairness), and human rights”777? The Geneva Convention (1949) provided a 
framework. There was “authorial intent” but a lack of forecasting.  A new variant of allegiance 
pertaining to de facto power dictated a different notion of “effective control”. By implicating 
non-traditional entities, including proxies like the Bosnian Serb Army, the Tadic Appeals 
Chamber conceived of customary international law in a way that expanded the meaning of 
“belonging to a Party in the conflict” beyond traditional associations with “organs of state”.  
In addition to establishing that the conflict was international, The Appeals Chamber also 
needed to prove that Bosnian Muslims were “protected persons”. However, if nationality rather 
than ethnicity were to be the primary criterion of “protected persons”, then Bosnian Muslims 
targeted by Bosnian Serb forces (VRS) could not assume a separate status. Formally they 
belonged to the same nation—Bosnia.  
                                                          
777 Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, xiv. 
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The Appeals Chamber thus decided to use a purposive logic to draw on exceptional 
categories of victims who assumed “protected persons” status under the Geneva Convention like 
refugees and neutral nationals.778 Although the Tadic case did not involve victims who fell into 
either of these categories, judges decided to abandon a literal interpretation of “protected 
persons” by appealing to the general purpose, or intention, of the nationality requirement. The 
“lack of allegiance to a state and diplomatic protection by this state were” ultimately 
“considered…more important than the formal link to nationality.”779   
The Appeals Chamber wrote: 
This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations rather than on formal bonds, becomes 
all the more important in present-day international armed conflicts. While previously wars 
were primarily between well-established States, in modern inter-ethnic armed conflicts such 
as that of the former Yugoslavia, new States are often created during the conflict and 
ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds for allegiance.780 
 
 “Substantial relations” informed a more contextualized ruling. Inter-ethnic conflict took on 
the role that war between states traditionally had. The Tadic Appeals Chamber decided that in 
order for Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute to fulfill its purpose—the moral rather than strictly legal 
instructions contained in the Geneva Convention—the Tribunal had to find a way of classifying 
the conflict as international. The Appeals Chamber showed fidelity to international provisions by 
demonstrating that even if formally the parties belonged to same nation (Bosnia), they were 
essentially fighting a war between parties independent of one another—one of which acted as a 
                                                          
778 See: Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts. 4 (2), 44 and 70 (2). International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html [accessed 
14 October 2018] 
779 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), para 165.  
780 Ibid., para. 168. 
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proxy for another nation. “In order to make Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute functional,”781 the 
“subjective intent” of the authors would need to be interpreted as if licensing new configurations 
of inter-party conflict. Acknowledging that context had changed nearly half a century after the 
ratification of the Geneva Accords (1949), the Appeals Chamber “return[ed] to the text with a 
‘correction’ and ‘improvement’ in [their] preliminary understanding.”782  
Kelsen’s dynamic approach to law recognizes the inherent mutability of circumstances. 
Judges who may be separated by generations from the promulgation of constitutional norms, are 
licensed to re-interpret, in the mode of Kantorowicz’s “Free Law” approach to juridical 
construction, elements of ICR, including the scope of the acts of state doctrine. As with legal 
realism’s emphasis on judicial discretion, Kelsen’s appeal to the process of discovery rejects 
Begriffjurisprudenz or a “jurisprudence of concepts”. Paulson’s description of Kelsen’s skeptical 
interpretive position, notwithstanding, there is reason to question Kelsen’s agnosticism towards 
juridical construction. Like Kirgis’s sliding scale theory, Kelsen acknowledges that core 
international crimes produce a different set of criteria in the ICL sphere than in other areas of 
law. The moral criterion associated with “principles of civilization” (see: chapter two) is the 
reason why Kelsen initially endorses retroactive lawmaking.  
But this does not mean that the methods initially endorsed are applicable under 
circumstances forbidding retroactive lawmaking. In an era when the UN Secretary General 
admonishes judges in cases before the ICTY to adhere to preexisting customary international 
law, or the Rome Statute, where the legal basis for the ICC, prohibits retroactive lawmaking, 
“prospective” methodology emphasizing “intent” or “purpose” is the optimal means in which to 
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reconcile the functional needs of a sphere that must defend the valid grounds on which state 
officials are tried. While contradicting what Andrea Gattini describes as Kelsen’s appeal to 
nineteenth century statist (positive law) protections783, this new interpretive gloss on Kelsen’s 
position on AoSD immunities insists on an implied licensing of moral criterion associated with 
higher principles of justice. 
Kelsen’s position on new actors of universal law, especially international organizations, 
produces a pure theoretical conception of ICR that has caught up with the times. Turning to 
Kelsen’s commentary on the League of Nations as a model for re-conceptualizing the 
relationship between international and state law784, we may deduce an equally similar position on 
the scope of power associated with the United Nations785—and especially the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). Bernstorff writes: 
The Vienna School’s theory of international law regarded the newly created organization in 
Geneva as the organ of a particular community of international law capable of taking action. 
The limitations on the authority of the League to act were to be laid down exclusively 
through the organization’s Covenant. From the perspective of universal law, it was precisely 
the constituent treaty that could endow the organization with whatever competencies it 
wished. That could also include material areas of regulation that had previously been dealt 
with exclusively within states. Because of the new conception of state sovereignty, the latter 
did not act as an a priori barrier to integration. Rather, the international treaty instrument was 
able to restrict the competencies of the state legal system at will. The supraordinated edifice 
of international law thus decided—in a sovereign and flexible manner—on the allocation of 
competencies between international law and national law.786 
                                                          
783 Andrea Gattini, “Kelsen’s Contributions to International Criminal Law,” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 2, no 3 (2004), 795-809. 
784  See generally: Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944). 
See also: Danilo Zolo, “Hans Kelsen: International Peace Through International Law” 
785 See generally: Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems: 
With Supplement (Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, [1950] 2011). For a critical review by the eminent 
United Nations scholar, Oscar Schachter, see: Oscar Schachter, “The Law of the United Nations,” The Yale Law 
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Legal Philosophy of the United Nations" (August 7, 2003). bepress Legal Series.  Working Paper 17. 
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Josef Laurenz Kunz, a student of Kelsen’s and one of the most prominent orthodox 
expositors of the Pure Theory of Law, neither precluded the possibility of the League of Nations 
pressing members to adhere to norms enacted with or without ratification by the entire body (i.e., 
unanimity’), nor rejected the introduction of laws applicable to individuals.787 Bernstorff’s study 
of Kelsen’s international law theory emphasizes the pure theoretical position that an 
“international treaty instrument [is] able to restrict the competencies of the state legal system at 
will.”788 Although state officials are traditionally protected under the AoSD, international 
organizations, beginning with the League of Nations, have been granted wide-ranging 
competencies with regard to its members. The creation of international courts, either ad hoc or 
permanent, in this case by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), adhered to the custom 
associated with “the supraordinated edifice of international law”.789  
As final arbiter of matters related to the Geneva Conventions, the UNSC is licensed by the 
UN Charter. Article 25 of the UN Charter states that “the Members of the United Nations agree 
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.”790 While the UNSC seldom authorizes coercive measures over state actions in violation 
of the Geneva Conventions, obligations to this constituent treaty assumes primary status over 
regional treaties and national laws. Since the UNSC licensed ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Geneva Convention’s codes, as adjunct to UN-sponsored treaties, 
                                                          
787 Ibid.,140. 
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790 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS VII, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html [accessed 8 October 2018]. 
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could be modified to incorporate new conceptions of state sovereignty, in accordance with 
formal requirements.  
The order of delegation that licenses the final purposive interpretation of “substantial 
relations” with respect to the “test of effective control” and “protected persons,” therefore, 
begins with the customary grundnorm, licensed by 193 member states of the United Nations. The 
invocation of contextually-licensed interpretations of the Geneva Convention is mandated by the 
UNSC in its licensed adjudication of ICTY and ICTR under UNSC Resolution 827 and Chapter 
VII provisions of the UN Charter.791 Since member states subscribing to the UN Charter license 
all acts of normative delegation by UNSC member states, including collective security 
intervention in accordance with forms of collective responsibility, as well as the delegation of 
powers to international courts to try individuals for acts of state in contravention of international 
peace (and Chapter VII), Kelsen’s structural hierarchical analysis of a valid legal normative 
order licenses the ICTY. Those ad hoc judges who chose to expand our understanding of custom, 
albeit seemingly contrary to Kelsen’s strict understanding of custom as based on state practice, 
nevertheless were permitted to act in accordance with their mandate. Pure Theory, therefore, 
accommodates discretionary interpretation by international judges that leads to the 
reconceptualization of “legal persons”. Bernstorff writes: 
The Pure Theory of Law regarded the application of the law as a process that, while 
prestructured could not, in the final analysis, be completely grasped jurisprudentially in its 
creative dimension. For example, Kelsen regarded the decision of a court not as a formalistic 
and immediate application of the law, but as the creative generation of an individual norm. 
                                                          
791 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 827 (1993) [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993), available at: http://refworld.org/docid/3b))f21b1c.html 
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And that was the reason why, according to Kelsen, the Pure Theory of Law could not be 
associated with a formalistic legal practice.792     
 
V.  Principles of Humanity? A Test of the ‘Separation Thesis’  
The author of the Pure Theory of Law endorses “principles of humanity”—termed 
“principles of civilization” in the Kelsenian lexicon—as a standard by which to determine the 
gravity of an offense meriting suspension of protections under the acts of state doctrine (AoSD). 
Kelsen’s doctrinal commitment to the separation of law from morality, transgressed under a pure 
theoretical conception of ICR, subjects international crimes to penalty for moral offenses 
committed in the past. This section analyzes the prospect of reconciling Kelsen’s approach with 
the court’s emphasis on an expanded notion of crimes against humanity. 
The transfer of powers to ICL judges in the post-Cold War era implies broad interpretive 
range. Judges now “make” law—but they do so based on a contextual apprehension of 
“civilizational” changes compatible with a deepening emphasis on the purpose at the core of this 
sphere. The difference between the post-Cold War era and previous iterations of ICL, including 
(a) the proto- or pre-modern effort to establish an order of war crimes retribution after the First 
World War, (b) the modern era encompassing the immediate post-Second World War 
international trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and ( c) ad hoc national trials against war criminals, 
most notably, the Cold War era case against Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem, is that the post-
Cold War period, encompassing inter alia cases before the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, reflect an 
acceleration in consciously developed purposive juridical construction.793  
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793This period is distinguished by the burgeoning threat of inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence that followed the 
end of the Cold War, which had previously secured a relatively stable, binary international order, which, generally 
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Against the constrained results of his cognition of valid customary construction based solely 
on state practice (Part II), the skeptical or discretionary interpretive position Kelsen assumes 
with respect to judicial decision-making is of a higher ordinal value than any general framing 
used to determine pure theoretical cognition. As with the tension between principles of morality 
(which may be retroactive) and principles of legality (which may not), Kelsen again places, in 
this case judges, as “midwives” of a higher principle.  
Even if Kelsen rejects the customary element of opinio juris for reasons described in Part II, 
the latitude he grants judges in determining responsibility for core international crimes is valid 
because of the nature of the act. Thus, acts of state that cannot be criminalized according to 
international law standards, such as housing or labor policy, must be distinguished from policies 
of widespread murder, especially for the furtherance of genocidal goals. What is purposive in the 
court’s licensing of customary interpretation resembles the criterion necessary for retroactive 
lawmaking: “principles of civilization”/”humanity”. Here, Kelsen’s broad account of the process 
of discovery serves to animate “pure theoretical” claims on the power of judges as guardians of 
civilization.  
In a reversal of the Trial Chamber’s ruling that all crimes against humanity must be 
committed with a discriminatory intent and only applied to ‘persecution type’ crimes, The Tadic 
Appeals Chamber followed a purposive line of reasoning to expand the ambit of crimes against 
                                                          
speaking, managed to curtail collectivist inter-ethnic and inter-religious aspirations in opposition to US and Soviet 
domination. During the Cold War period, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the rule of Josip Broz 
Tito, represented a relatively stable multi-ethnic regime. With Tito’s death in 1980, and the collapse of the Yugoslav 
economy, increased unemployment and inflation instigated ethnic conflict, which in turn led to war in the early 
nineties. Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: a Concise History; (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).  
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humanity.794 Was this an unprincipled form of discretion, as some critics argued, 795 or was the 
method, as part of the process of discovery, valid in accordance with pure theoretical 
construction? Article 5 of the ICTY Statute reads: 
Crimes against humanity—The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or 
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population. 
(a) murder;  
(b) extermination;  
(c) enslavement;  
(d) deportation;  
(e) imprisonment;  
(f) torture;  
(g) rape;  
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;  
(i) other inhumane acts.796 
 
Writing on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), legal experts 
Marco Sassoli and Laura M. Olson argued that the decision of the Tadic Appeals Chamber to 
reject the Report of the UN Secretary General along with the travaux préparatoires (preparatory 
works) or statements made by the United States, the Russian Federation and France as UN 
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Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 
1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14 October 2018]. 
795 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended on 
May 17, 2002), May 25, 1993, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda28414.html [accessed October 14, 
2018]. 
796 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), July 17, 




Security Council members,797 was a form of illegitimate legal construction.798 Both the Report of 
the Secretary General and the travaux préparatoires associated crimes against humanity 
exclusively with ‘discriminatory intent’.799 The decision to limit the scope of interpretation to 
what the Chamber considered an unambiguous (or ordinary) reading of Article 5 of the ICTY 
Statute, consequently minimized, according to Sassoli and Olson, the Report of the Secretary 
General and the dissenting views of the three Security Council members. 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber concluded that a “clear and unambiguous”800 or “ordinary”801 
interpretation of Article 5 in the ICTY Statute supported the view that “[discriminatory] intent is 
only made necessary for one sub-category of those crimes, namely ‘persecutions’ provided for in 
Article 5 (h).”802 Otherwise, Article 5 (h) would be a residual provision applicable to all crimes 
against humanity803, which would have made Article 5 (i) (“other inhumane acts”) superfluous. 
The only logical explanation for the inclusion of “other inhumane acts” was that the “statutory 
framers” wished to demonstrate that the list was non-exhaustive and “persecutions on religious, 
racial and religious grounds” were only applicable to one sub-category of article 5, ‘persecution-
type’ crimes requiring discriminatory intent. “It is an elementary rule of interpretation that one 
should not construe a provision or part of a provision as if it were superfluous and hence pointless: 
                                                          
797 Provisional Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) in Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, 
“Prosecutor v. Tadić (Judgement). Case No. IT-94-a-A. 38 ILM 1518 (1999),” The American Journal of 
International Law 94, no. 3 (Jul., 2000): 574. 
798 Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, “The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber on the merits in the Tadic case, 
International Review of the Red Cross, no. 839, available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jqqc.htm [accessed October 14, 2018]. 
799 Ibid. 
800 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14 
October 2018], para. 296.  
801 Ibid., para. 283. 
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid., para. 276. 
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the presumption is warranted that law-makers enact or agree upon rules that are well thought out 
and meaningful in all their elements.”804 
Barak recommends that judges move back and forth between ‘text’ and ‘context’. The context 
in which the norm is to be applied plays a significant role in determining the goals or aims of the 
promulgated rule after all effort to elicit ‘authorial intention’ has been exhausted. Even a 
seemingly ‘clear and unambiguous’ norm requires interpretation. In what way did the Tadic 
Appeals Chamber introduce the “humanitarian goals of the framers of the statute”805? In filling 
‘normative lacunae[s]’ with the opinio juris of the “international community,”806 ICTY judges 
deviated from pure theoretical concerns only in terms of the cognitive commitment to banishing 
this “alien” psychological element (i.e., opinio juris). In coupling Kelsen’s emphasis on higher 
principles of justice (i.e., “principles of civilization”) with judicial latitude, the courts followed 
the implied purposive reasoning of the author of the Pure Theory of Law.  
The Tadic Appeals Chamber did not confine itself to a literal, ordinary or unambiguous 
definition of ‘persecutory crimes’. Following an earlier decision in Trial Chamber II in Furund`ija 
acknowledging the legal weight granted to the Rome Statute, which at the time was a non-binding 
international treaty807 adopted by the majority of States attending the Rome Diplomatic 
                                                          
804 Ibid., para. 284. 
805 Ibid., para. 285 
806 To the contrary, the Tadic Appeals Chamber argued that there were “no significant normative lacunae.” Ibid., 
para. 277. 
807 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia(ICTY), December10,1998,available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40276a8a4.html [accessed 
October14,2018],para.227 in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-17/1-A, International 
CriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY), July21,2000,availableat:http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40
2768fc4.html [accessed 14 October 2018], para. 223. 
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Conference,808 the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case commented that “…[The Rome Statute] is 
supported by a great number of States and may be taken to express the legal position i.e. opinio 
iuris of those States.”809 Article 7 of the Rome Statute, in consequence, represented the drafters’ 
denial of discriminatory intent as the exclusive element of crimes against humanity.  Quoting the 
Rome Statute, the Tadic Appeals Chamber wrote that: 
“For the purposes of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder […].” Article 7(1) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court thus articulates a definition of crimes against humanity based 
solely upon the interplay between the mens rea of the defendant and the existence of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 810 
 
 
The Defense argued that it would “be unjust if a perpetrator of a criminal act guided solely by 
personal motives was…to be prosecuted for a crime against humanity.”811 The Appeals Chamber 
rejected this assertion. Basing its opinion, in part, on the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council 
Law No. 10, which distinguished between ‘murder type’ crimes such as murder, extermination 
and enslavement, and ‘persecution type’ crimes committed on political, racial or religious 
grounds,812 the Appeals Chamber suggested that a distinction was made very early on in the 
creation of the ICL system with regard to these two categories. Article 7, paragraph 1, of the ICC 
                                                          
808 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html [accessed 14 October 
2018]. 
809 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14 
October 2018], para. 291. 
810 Ibid. 
811  Ibid., para. 246. 
812  George Andreopoulos, “Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity” in International Crime and 
Justice, ed. Mangai Natarajan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 295-306. 
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Statute, which lacked any specific mention of discriminatory intent, 813 by omission reaffirmed 
views contained in the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. The Prosecution 
contended that: 
…the object and purpose of the [ICTY’s] Statute support the interpretation that crimes against 
humanity may be committed for purely personal reasons, arguing that the objective of the 
Statute in providing a broad scope for humanitarian law would be defeated by a narrow 
interpretation of the category of offences falling within the ambit of Article 5.  
 
What the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case maintained was that (a) the opinions of the three 
dissenting states amounted to a minority sentiment akin to the occasional violation of rules 
through state practice, and (b) that the travaux préparatoires and the Report of the Secretary 
General played a subordinate role in determining ‘authorial intent’. While the Appeals Chamber 
was willing to concede that each could be drawn upon to assess authorial intent, as “for instance, 
when interpreting Article 3 of the Statute…pronouncing on the question whether the International 
Tribunal could apply international agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict,” the 
Chamber concluded that the travaux préparatoires and the Report of the Secretary General did 
not apply in this instance.814 
In light of the humanitarian goals of the framers of the Statute, one fails to see why they should 
have seriously restricted the class of offences coming within the purview of “crimes against 
                                                          
813 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html [accessed 14 October 
2018], Article 7, para. 1. 
814 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40277f504.html [accessed 14 
October 2018], para. 304.  
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humanity”, thus leaving outside this class all the possible instances of serious and widespread 
or systematic crimes against civilians on account only of their lacking a discriminatory intent. 
For example, a discriminatory intent requirement would prevent the penalization of random 
and indiscriminate violence intended to spread terror among a civilian population as a crime 
against humanity.815 
Judges turned to historical examples to demonstrate how even ‘persecution-type’ crimes ought 
not to be limited to the charges specified under Article 5 (h). In Nazi Germany, those with physical 
and mental disabilities, deviant sexual preferences and infirmity were targeted. In the Soviet 
Union, ‘class enemies’ were singled out. And under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, the urban 
educated were forced out of their homes and made to work in labor camps where the prospect of 
death was ever-present. Through a more purposive reading of the Appeals Chambers judgment, 
one may presume that failing to protect any group targeted would run counter to the humanitarian 
goals of the original authors and community of interpreters. Even “lacking a discriminatory 
intent,” however, should not “prevent the penalization of random and indiscriminate violence 
intended to spread terror among a civilian population.”816   
As with the Tadic Appeals Chamber decision, judges in the Kupreskic Trial similarly 
concentrated on the “purposes of persecution” and the category of “other inhumane acts,” which 
allowed courts flexibility in determining criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity.817 
Reprisal attacks, a focal point of the Kupreskic Judgment, evaluated the capacity of state agents 
to distinguish between legitimate acts of war and gross humanitarian violence in the shelling of 
                                                          
815 Ibid., para. 285. 
816 Ibid. 
817 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40276c634.html [accessed 
14 October 2018], para. 623. 
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population bases. Some reprisals, according to international law, are considered legitimate acts of 
war; others, because they are “random and indiscriminate,” prosecutable. The Martens Clause 
acted as a customary tool critical to ‘humanizing humanitarian law’ in the Kupreskic case.818 A 
preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II-Laws and Customs of War on Land, the clause was 
named after the Russian delegate to The Hague Peace Conference, Fyodor Fyodorovich 
Martens.819 “The Martens Clause,” according to international lawyer Mia Swart820, “has had an 
important influence on the unconventional determination of custom at the Tribunals.”821 The code 
reads: 
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it 
right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as 
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity 
and the requirements of the public conscience.822 
 
                                                          
818 Ibid. 525-526.; International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 
1907, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4374cae64.html [accessed 14 October 2018]; For a debate 
between former presidents of the ICTY on the use and abuse of the Martens Clause, see also: Theodor Meron, “The 
Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and Dictates of Public Conscience”, American Journal of International Law 
1, no. 94 (2000): 78-89 and Antonio Cassese, “The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?”, 
European Journal of International Law 11, no.1 (2000): 187-216.       
819 Vladimir Pustogarov, “Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845–1909) – a humanist of modern times,” International 
Review of the Red Cross no 312 (June 1996): 300–314,  doi: 
https://www.icrc.omrg/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jn52.htm. 
820 Swart, “Judicial Lawmaking,” 465. 
821 Ibid., 465 See: Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T, para. 527. 
822 The Martens Clause would be slightly modified in the 1907 Hague conventions, and, though it did not appear in 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it was included  in the additional protocols of 1977. 
See: International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18,1907, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4374cae64.html [accessed October 14, 2018]; International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html [accessed October 14, 2018]. 
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Antonio Cassese, an Italian jurist who specialized in public international law and the first 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, stated that the 
Martens Clause can be used as an equally valid historical source of international law as “usages 
of States”, or state practice.823 “It is logically admissible,” Swart asserted, “to infer that the 
requirement of state practice [usus] may not be strictly required for the formation of a principle 
or rule based on the laws of humanity. The Martens Clause, in [Cassese’s] view, loosens the 
requirement of usus while at the same time elevating opinio juris to a rank higher than normally 
acknowledged.”824  
Likewise, international legal scholar Guenael Mettraux remarked that opinio juris played a 
disproportionate role relative to state practice in ICTY rulings. Whereas Kelsen advocated an 
inductive method in which to locate customary norms “based on an analysis of a sufficiently 
extensive and convincing state practice,” Mettraux asserted that deduction825 was the more 
common approach at post-Cold War proceedings. Although the result has been that judges have 
often “been too ready to brand norms as customary, without giving any reason or citing any 
authority for that conclusion,”826  they have also been instrumental in “turn[ing] the customary 
process on its head” by introducing principles of humanity. The Kupreskic Trial Chamber wrote: 
This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a much greater role than 
usus, as a result of the ... Martens Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have 
                                                          
823 See generally: Antonio Cassese, “The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?”, European Journal 
of International Law 11, no.1 (2000): 187-216 and Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  
824 Mia Swart, “Judicial Lawmaking,” 465. 
825 Guénaël Mettraux,  International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13.  
826 Ibid., 15. 
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implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law 
may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or 
the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other 
element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallizing as a result of the imperatives of 
humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the 
emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.827 
       “Principles of civilization” are central to Kelsen’s theoretical justification of retroactive 
lawmaking for core international crimes (see: chapter 2, Part IV). The Martens Clause affirms 
what Kelsen accepts as “legal”: the prosecution of immoral acts amounting to core international 
crimes. Although problems associated with Kelsen’s banishment of opinio juris from pure 
theoretical cognition persist, and while he traditionally refused to recognize “morality” as a 
legitimate criterion for assessing the “validity “of law as a sanction-oriented enterprise, Kelsen’s 
emphasis on “consensus” rather than unanimous assent by state parties, permits judges to assess 
deviation from state practice in light of the “the pressure of the demands of humanity.”  
VI. Conclusion 
North America’s foremost contemporary Kelsen scholar, Stanley Paulson828, creates the 
theoretical framework for a rejoinder to those like Judith Shklar who claim that Kelsen’s 
“formalism” denies the possibility of purposive ICL construction. Paulson’s emphasis on Kelsen’s 
embrace of “free law”—or radical skepticism towards legal interpretation—does not deny the 
                                                          
827Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T, para 527.  See also: Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), July 8, 1996, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4b2913d62.html [accessed October 14, 2018]. 
828 Michael Steven Green describes Paulson as “the dean of Kelsen studies (arguably not just in this country but in 
the world).” Michael Steven Green, “Why No Kelsen?” October 3, 2007, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/10/why-no-kelsen.html. For a formal reading of Kelsen that runs at 
cross-purposes to this study’s emphasis on the syncretism inherent to the Kelsenian account of ICR, see: Michael 
Steven Green, “Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, Alabama Law Review 53 (2003):  365-413. 
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possibility of purposiveness. Rather, Paulson identifies Kelsen as licensing discretionary 
judgments by ICL judges, which complements Kelsen’s clear statements on the matter in “The 
Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization” (1944). In 
affirming the judge’s role in the hierarchy of delegated legal normative authority, Kelsen 
emphasizes how ICL judges as representative of the “international community” are authorized to 
pronounce on the intended purpose of this sphere. Substantive in orientation and therefore 
exceeding a traditionally-conceived “frame” of pure theoretical legal cognition, Kelsen 
nevertheless provides the theoretical “tools” for an expanded notion of ICR exceeding the 
immunizing preferences of classical legal positivism.829 
If the strictest legal positivist licensing the “scientific” analysis of imputation in the 
international sphere must turn to “principles of civilization” to justify prosecution of core 
international crimes, then presumably the same reasoning Kelsen used to identify ICR in the 
period around the time of the promulgation of the IMT Charter could be extended to the case of 
former Yugoslavian war criminals. But the post-Cold War era presents new challenges. If at the 
time of the alleged humanitarian offense no customary norms existed to regulate acts of state, then 
the ICTY required that retroactive lawmaking be prohibited, in accordance with “principles of 
legality.”  This, of course, was not the case at the inauguration of the modern ICL system where 
Kelsen justified retroactivity in all ICL cases where no general rule of international law existed 
to prohibit ex post facto lawmaking (see: chapter 2, part IV, for a detailed discussion). Since the 
ICTY mandated what would be enshrined in the 1998 Rome Statute as a prohibition against 
                                                          





retroactive lawmaking, a new, more refined method of legal construction, would need to be 
introduced. 
Although Kelsen does not recognize psychological factors as relevant to cognition of law, and 
explicitly denies that “intention” matters with respect to customary construction, he nevertheless 
recognizes the importance of this flexible source of ICL interpretation. Kelsen’s affirmation of 
state practice and his denial of opinio juris must not be construed, therefore, as a general 
infringement on purposive legal application. Rather, the effort to demonstrate the significance of 
(unwritten) customary law, to Kelsen, produces a less-formal estimation of permitted sources of 
ICL construction. He does not circumscribe the potential for what former ICTY President Theodor 
Meron refers to as “the humanization of humanitarian law,” even as he seemingly remains 
unwavering in his rejection of the psychological element of opinio juris. 
In what ways, then, is a purposive application aided by Kelsen’s theoretical model? In 
addition to the contested role of state practice, J. Peter Pham, associates Kelsen’s theory of 
international law with “[the] drive to subsume national sovereignty within [a] single 
‘multilateral’ consensus.”830 Pham writes that international law “derives its theoretical 
foundations from the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, one of the most important jurists of the 
twentieth century, if not the most preeminent.”831  The “consensus” Pham criticizes relates to 
state practices, especially those of non-signatory states that contest the 
customary assumption by international officials and NGO’s that an “international community” 
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promoting “principles of civilization” indeed exists.832.  
Pham’s skepticism is not unwarranted from a state-centered perspective. But Kelsen’s 
approach, consistent with the” consensus” model,  is better suited to maintaining an efficacious 
order adjudicating core international crimes. Reconfiguring the identity of legal subjects and 
reconceptualizing the parameters of crimes against humanity, as the Tadic appeals court did, 
reflects a purposiveness compatible with Kelsen’s otherwise putatively ‘formalist’ or ‘logicist’ 
approach to legal cognition. In introducing “substantial relations “based on “ethnicity” the courts 
affirmed a dynamic conception of the “legal subject”.  The Appeals Chamber demonstrated 
fidelity to Geneva IV by asserting that even if formally the parties belonged to the same nation 
(Bosnia), they were essentially fighting a war between parties independent of one another—one 
of which acted as another state’s proxy. This is fully reconcilable with Kelsen’s position that the 
identification of “legal subjects” may be reconfigured with time as conforms with the dynamism 
of pure theory. 
Moreover, the ICTY’s position on the expanded notion of crimes against humanity is 
reconcilable with the validity requirements of Pure Theory. Here, Pham’s criticism of Kelsen’s 
embrace of the “consensus” of the “international community” is pertinent to a broader 
conception of this charge. Kelsen’s recognition of changing customary law—as identified by 
“the international community”—justifies ICTY judges in the Tadic appeals court decision in 
altering the interpretation of crimes against humanity to reflect the current moment. The next 
chapter engages in a historically-informed discussion of Kelsen’s conception of “principles of 
civilization” as rendered by the “international community,” was, as Pham puts it, was informed 
                                                          
832 See:  Kofi Annan’s stated that: “More than ever, a robust international legal order, together with the principles 
and practices of multilateralism, is needed to define the ground rules for an emerging global civilization .....” Kofi A. 
Annan, ‘We The Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: United Nations 
Department of Public Information, 2000), 13 in Pham, The Perils of Consensus, 557. 
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by Kelsen's theoretical vision, [which] lay[s] the intellectual foundations for the world body's 























                                                          




The Sovereignty of Conscience: Concluding Remarks on Hans Kelsen’s Conception of 
International Criminal Responsibility 
 
I. Hans Kelsen, Humanist 
 
International law scholar J. Peter Pham argues that “the jurisprudence of the United 
Nations” is an artificial construct of states, the UN and affiliate bodies, including NGOs. It 
represents “the Orwellian corpus produced by the legal hodgepodge of overlapping conventions, 
commissions, committees, and other ‘deliberative’ bodies.”834 In implicating the author of the 
Pure Theory of Law, Pham writes, “…it is the role that Kelsen’s theoretical vision plays in 
laying the intellectual foundations for the world body’s overall ideology as to the binding nature 
of its ‘consensus’ that is of capital importance.”835 For Kelsen, the Alleszermalmer or “universal 
destroyer,” according to Jochen von Bernstorff, “the instrument of the treaty…opened up for 
international politics quasi-unrestricted spheres of action.”836 Bernstorff, and expert on Kelsen’s 
role in public international law, confirms the flexibility of international treaty law, which could 
apply to third party states and individuals. Once the national legal order transfers authority to 
another national legal order, or a hybrid or international jurisdiction, for example, customary 
laws and prior decisions assume pivotal roles as sources of ICL. This is confirmed especially in a 
Bernstorff’s recent writings on Kelsen’s interpretation of sources of international law.837  
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The traditional nineteenth century methodological vision of George Wilhelm Hegel, 
which culminates in spiritual (and actual) rule by the Prussian state, is subverted by Kelsen, who 
reinterprets the personified “state” as the unity of legal norms. A national legal order under the 
authority of a system of international law creates the space, according to Kelsen, for validity 
claims that aid in the legal functioning of this sphere. Conservative objection to universal legal 
cognition is reflected in the intensity of the Hegelian rejection of sovereignty beyond the aegis of 
the Prussian state with its rigid assignment of administrative roles. "[State’s] rights are actualized 
only in their particular wills,” writes Hegel, “and not in a universal will with constitutional 
powers over them. This universal proviso of international law therefore does not go beyond an 
ought-to-be, and what really happens is that international relations in accordance with treaty 
alternate with the severance of these relations."838 
Hegel’s approach to imputation denies a “supra-state” model of a federated world state, 
or even a universal moral “consensus” that does not require centralization of authority, but a 
fragmented, primarily-ad hoc, system of international criminal law adjudication. Hegel shares 
with Austin’s “command” skepticism an unwarranted rebuttal, according to Kelsen, of the rule of 
international law. This last chapter interrogates a subject that has been bracketed throughout this 
dissertation: “agency” beyond an exclusively normative conception of legal responsibility. 
Overcoming the politicization of the state through a putatively, but ultimately inaccurately, 
applied Kelsenian conception of the acts of state doctrine (AoSD) is revealed in the bold initial 
assertions by Kelsen of (a) the necessity of differentiating traditional collective forms of 
international responsibility imputed to states with a modern, individual or fault-based, 
                                                          




conception of international criminal responsibility, and (b) the development of a positive law 
analysis of retroactive lawmaking in violation of the principle of legality rule against ex post 
facto laws. Kelsen understood that the magnitude of Nazi offenses warranted prosecution.  
Part II demonstrates what I have found out in the course of my research and what I 
believe to be original contributions to a subject area that matters especially in a period of 
accelerated technological and political change. Part III points to recommendations, specific to the 
evidence of this study and what I believe to be healthy areas for future research. After describing 
the merits of Kelsen’s theoretical and empirical analysis of this term, I proceed to propose a 
conception of imputation in international law that reflects the logical path of Kelsen’s “extra-
legal” or moral assumption that “choice” can indeed be made under heavily-influenced legal or 
coercive conditions (see: chapter four). Kelsen reveals his true feelings regarding “agency” when 
he writes that “Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established 
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable and the persons 
who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of 
the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompatible with justice.” (my 
emphasis).839 In addition to recognizing that “internationally illegal acts” retroactively created 
“were also morally most objectionable” by a standard— “the consensus” of the “international 
community,” Kelsen further acknowledged that the individual was “certainly aware of their 
immoral character”. Recommendations for further exploration, in the mode of Erich Fromm’s 
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humanistic psychological diagnoses of democratic and autocratic characterology, is briefly 
discussed in Part III. 
II. Research Objectives 
Chapter 1 introduced Kelsen’s practical contributions to the development of an individual 
(fault-based) conception of responsibility expressed in retroactive terms as applicable to state 
officials, including heads-of-state. Kelsen’s recommendations to Jackson on the necessity of 
including a definition of individual criminal responsibility in the London IMT charter produced a 
wholly new conception for jurisprudence. Whereas Kelsen endorses protections for most acts of 
state closely linked to the collective unit as a national legal order (or state”), he denies the 
automatic right to immunity for officials who committed acts of the magnitude of crimes against 
humanity and genocide. By the standards or “principles of civilization,” these acts were 
manifestly immoral, even if legally valid, Kelsen maintains, and state officials ought to have 
known this. The correspondence between Kelsen’s advice and the wording of the text of the IMT 
Charter was explored in this chapter along with Kelsen’s general transatlantic influence on the 
development of ICR.  
Chapter Two examined the primary philosophical point of inquiry animating the 
correspondence between Kelsen’s pure theoretical approach and progressive methodological 
choices necessary to the development of ICR. Dueling principles of justice, including the 
principle of legality rule against ex post facto lawmaking, on the one hand, and a higher moral 
principle of justice retroactively determined by judges, on the other, is reconciled in accordance 
with a “formal” determination of this term.  
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Chapter Two also described the ways in which Kelsen’s neo-Kantian theory of ICR, 
predicated on a strictly positive legal description of the relationship between legal norms as 
conditioning offenses, and coercive, normatively authorized sanctions, frames our understanding 
at the highest level of imputation. In addition, this chapter addresses acts of state, or legally-
authorized acts immunized under state-centered protections. In introducing the Fuhrer Principle 
as a legitimate constitutional ordering within a national legal order in which the leader is the law, 
where total authority resides in “decrees” or “words” that cannot be countermanded, Kelsen 
abides by his doctrinal position that responsibility ought to be “depersonalized” or “de-
psychologized”. To understand coercive normativity as the command (“act” or “fact”) of the 
autocrat is to recognize that legal responsibility is ontologically relativist. Under such an order, 
legal by Kelsen’s standards, the prospect of future liability nevertheless abounds. 
The last part of Chapter Two consequently reconciles Kelsen’s position that acts once-
legal can also have the capacity for prosecution under a retroactive methodological model unique 
to ICL based on “principles of civilization,” including recognition from a legal vantage point of 
the immorality of core international crimes. Thus, Kelsen is finally able to reconcile his 
commitment to the principle non sub homine sed sub lege (or “not under man, but under law”), a 
central concern of jurisprudence and political theory, which otherwise is undermined by acts of 
state immunity under autocratic rule.  
Chapter Three established, against the view of international law scholars Oona Hathaway 
and Scott Shapiro, that Kelsen, regardless of his effort to establish “peace through law” and the 
priority he seemingly places over the “Class A” charge of crimes against peace, nevertheless 
created a retroactive methodological description of ICR applicable equally to all core 
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international crimes. Additionally, Kelsen’s endorsement of just war theory, the basis for 
determining crimes against peace, and how it reflected the classical colonial model of 
international criminal law that presumed European dominance in the world, is interrogated here. 
Chapter Four shifted the historical focus fifteen years from the 1945-46 IMT Nuremberg 
to the 1961 trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem. Wolfgang Friedmann in his classic The 
Changing Structure of International Law (1966) recounted that international society had 
“undergone fundamental transformations which, though far from completed…already 
profoundly modified the substance and structure of international law.”840 While attention is paid 
to the Jerusalem court’s instrumental role in restructuring the notion of crimes against humanity 
as not merely an adjunct to the crimes against peace charge and the “war-nexus” requirement, the 
introduction of a series of major multilateral treaty agreements after the Second World War 
furthered the transformation of the ICL sphere.  
Chapter Four also examined the progressive transformation of the acts of state doctrine 
through universal jurisdictional principles and a deepened reflection on superior orders under the 
acts of state doctrine. Andrea Gattini’s conservative description of Kelsen’s philosophical 
contribution to the changing notion of ICR neglected to consider the Cold War implications of 
pure theoretical application. I argue that customary international law application in the Eichmann 
case once again endorsed an ex post facto logic that granted judges the progressive latitude in 
which to counter the immunizing acts of state doctrine. Additionally, Arendt’s famous “banality 
of evil” thesis is engaged in the last part of the chapter. Here I contended that Arendt’s approach 
                                                          




to superior orders found common ground with Kelsen’s insight into the heavy influence that law, 
especially under the Fuhrer Principle, assumes in a state official’s decision-making process. 
Despite the importance in recognizing the role that law assumes over every day social life, the 
methodological approach to ICR Kelsen licensed implied moral agency. The next—and final—
section briefly draws out this point. 
Chapter Five shifted attention from the mainly personified “individual” (who otherwise is 
merely the point of imputation in the relationship of a “bundle of legal norms”) to the judge, 
analyzing the way in which the post-Cold War era re-shapes the concept of imputation. Although 
Kelsen died in 1973, his approach remains useful. What made post-Cold War tribunals especially 
fertile for progressive interpretation was the imprimatur granted by the United Nations Security 
Council and UN General Assembly. Not only could the “international community” be said to 
endorse a significant role at the ICTY in customarily expanding, for example, the conception of 
state allegiance for the purpose of determining official immunity, but the “international 
consensus” invested such powers to judges who could, in turn, in accordance with pure 
theoretical doctrine, flexibly account for restrictions associated with the customary nature of 
lawmaking in this period.  While Kelsen presented a view of customary international law 
seemingly limited in its value, his conviction that international judges ought to be afforded a 
discretionary role in determining ICR indicates his commitment to a judge-centered institution 
progressive in orientation. 
III. Recommendations 
Initially, Kelsen’s writings animated one small part of my project on the genealogy of 
international criminal responsibility. Kelsenian Stanley Paulson’s minor account of Kelsen in 
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“Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg” coupled with Andrea Gattini’s seemingly definitive 
assessment in “Kelsen’s Contributions to International Criminal Law” as a “nineteenth century 
statist” closed the door on further interrogation of Kelsen’s notion of ICR. But in reading through 
key texts written by Kelsen during the period of his relocation to the U.S. as a refugee from Nazi 
Germany along with his sustained interrogation of this concept throughout the Forties, the notion 
propagated by Gattini and others of Kelsen’s conservatism did not conform to the reality of 
Kelsen's conception of a dynamic international institution that, not only validated ICR, but 
nurtured the strictest attempt at a positive legal construction. I found that Kelsen’s contributions 
consequently produced a progressive vision of an ICL sphere that skeptics like Gattini have as-
yet failed to consider a serious object of research. 
Kelsen’s theory about the nature of authority is based on moral “principles of 
civilization”. These “principles” are connected to general “principles of humanity” as “principles 
of tolerance,” which animates the international community’s implied “consensus” about the 
limits of depravity under contemporary international conditions. While setting aside an analysis 
of Kelsen’s direct impact on the philosophy of “consensus,” which Pham argues “derives its 
theoretical foundations from the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, one of the most important 
jurists of the twentieth century,841” the social construction of morality is implied in the 
politicized debate over the limits of ICL adjudication. In the mode of Rawls’ interpretation of 
Kantian constructivism, this socially-derived moral construction is categorically different than 
the absolutist description of natural law theory based on God, nature or reason.842 Social 
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construction associated with “international consensus” produces a relative scheme of morality 
that changes over time, investing legal normativity, from Kelsen’s perspective, with its most 
important feature: transparency.  
Having described Kelsen’s theory as vital to comprehending the changing notion of ICR, 
it is necessary to explore the prospect for future research. The present evaluation contains only a 
partial account of Kelsen’s overarching contributions to the conception of imputation or 
responsibility in international law, including three representative case studies that could be 
expanded to include further analysis of ICL proceedings, especially an expanded consideration 
of Justice Radhabinod Pal’s integration of Kelsen’s writings in his comprehensive dissent at the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (for a brief account of Pal’s position, see Chapter 
Two).  
The “international consensus” is a political statement, always ideological in its claim to 
regulate unjust, previously enacted, national laws. Under a historically-generated organizational 
and technological framework specific to the time in which adjudication of cases of core 
international crimes takes place, the unyielding “nineteenth century statism” attributed to Kelsen 
by Gattini is refuted by the validity Kelsen imputes to retroactive prosecution of core 
international crimes. Neither Gattini’s conservative statement regarding Kelsen’s unyielding 
support of the AoSD as a statist-politicization of ICR, nor J. Peter Pham’s position that the 
author of Pure Theory is responsible for an unfettered commitment to “supra-nationalism” whose 
denouement is necessarily a centralized legal order, are correct.843  




Kelsen endorses a judge-centered, ad hoc “system” of international criminal justice. His 
theory not only adapts to the discretionary role assumed by judges within this order, he also 
validates the record or chronicle of judicial decisions comprising all cases of international 
criminal law, including national, hybrid and international, ad hoc and permanent jurisdictions 
adjudicating cases of core international crimes. Much like the common law system practiced in 
England, the international criminal law system, which Kelsen endorses, is heavily based on the 
customary practice of using prior judicial decisions as a basis for determining present cases. 
Bernstorff has recently confirmed this configuration as structurally legitimate.844 
Kelsen’s legacy resides in his acknowledgment that the individual as state official is 
subject to the command of law, which masquerades as legitimate, retroactively-authorized 
command authority under the Fuhrer principle, but also, and in ordinal value, as the substantive 
normative jurisdictional locus of a future-existent warning of international criminal law to all 
state officials. Kelsen realized that principles of humanity or principles of civilization must be 
realized through the act of imagination beyond the prospective rule. Here, in the future, where 
there is knowledge that the once-legal act of state influenced the decision-making apparatus 
responsible for the conscience of would-be genocidists, the ICL judge must nevertheless assess 
the prospect of “choice”.  
Kelsen writes in “What is Justice?”: “Relativism imposes upon the individual the difficult 
tasks of deciding for himself what is right and what is wrong.”845 Despite claiming that only 
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Conference (Oslo). 
845 Hans Kelsen, What is Justice?: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1957), 22. 
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legal norms ought to be the object of legal cognition, Kelsen does not reject the possibility of 
moral choice. As Kelsen scholar Drury Stevenson correctly notes, the law is addressed to legal 
organs, since the central concern of law is the sanction.846 If a state official does not proceed with 
her responsibilities, she can expect a coercive action to be applied. At the most modest end, this 
means termination of position; in the extreme scenario, death resulting from non-compliance. 
Moral responsibility, Kelsen concedes, is difficult because we possess no absolute blueprint. 
There is no universal moral law that is a continuous source animating social life. Rather, an 
official’s choice “implies a serious responsibility,” writes Kelsen, “the most serious moral 
responsibility a man can assume.”847 The “weaknesses” of “men who turn to an authority above 
them, to the government and, in the last instance to God” for answers to life’s existential 
dilemmas demonstrates Kelsen’s belief that law must be distinguished from the sovereignty of 
conscience.848  
Kelsen’s response to Sigmund Freud’s social theoretical approach in Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego discounts the general psychoanalytic contention that the same basic 
mental processes exist in transient and more permanent groupings.849 Kelsen’s theory intimates 
that law is the predominant organizing force in everyday social life, the technique that best 
balances divided social interests, producing a distinctive rule-bound mentality. The regression of 
those who identify with aggressive leadership, especially under autocracy, is discounted by 
Kelsen in his criticism of Freud. Rather than emphasizing the place of the aggressive instinct, as 
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Freud does, Kelsen chooses instead to identify group psychology with general obedience to the 
legal norms that organize, on a relatively permanent basis, social behavior. Democracy, rather 
than autocracy, insures such an ordering.  
But where does this leave the prospect for individual freedom or agency? According to 
psychologist Erich Fromm, humanistic ethics,” in contrast to authoritarian ethics, which 
encompasses limitations on rights protections, is “formally…based on the principle that only 
man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and sin, and not an authority transcending 
him. Materially, it is based on the principle that ‘good’ is what is good for man and ‘evil’ what is 
detrimental to man; the sole criterion of ethical value being man’s welfare.”850 Any agreement 
with Fromm’s position, however, is obscured by Kelsen’s general unease in introducing moral 
decision-making into jurisprudential consideration. Nevertheless, Kelsen scholar Monica 
Zalewska points out the humanistic psychological elements conducive to independent decision-
making under democracies. She writes: 
 
Although Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is arguably one of the most influential 
theories of law in Europe, it has been occasionally misunderstood. One of the most 
common misunderstandings is the claim that Kelsen’s concept of the Rechtstaat (the rule 
of law) legitimizes any regime, the Nazi one included. This misunderstanding stems from 
the fact that Kelsen ascribed a double meaning to the concept of Rechtsstaat. While in a 
broad sense, Kelsen identified every legal order and state with Rechtsstaat…he also 
recognized the classical meaning of the Rechtsstaat in the narrow sense, which 
corresponds with the concept of the rule of law.851 
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Zalewska is right to recognize the impossibility that Kelsen could ever endorse the 
legitimacy of Nazism from the vantage point of the liberalism animating pure theory. Zalewska 
correctly identifies Kelsen’s commitment to moral relativism as an identifying mark of his liberal 
allegiance, encouraging democratic social compromise, a scientific outlook, and the rule of law. 
Kelsen argues that “Only freedom directed towards the equality relationship defined by Me — 
You, which entails a sense of responsibility, recognition of the other, and which directs I not into 
Myself but rather You, can be the basis of democracy.”852 Clemens Jabloner, co-director of The 
Hans Kelsen Institute, reaffirms this point. Jabloner writes: 
 
Since the basic principle of democracy is that freedom is desired also for other human 
beings who are regarded as essentially equal, equality joins freedom and thus justifies the 
majority principle. Kelsen looks for a particular type of characteristic and finds it in the 
human being whose basic experience is expressed by a famous formula of Sanskrit 
philosophy, the tat wam asi—the human being with whom, when he faces another, a 
voice says: that is you. Kelsen says this person has a “relatively diminished” ego; he is 
sympathizing, peace-loving, and not aggressive; he is a human being whose primary 
aggressive instinct is directed inwards with an inclination to self-criticism and an 
increased sense of guilt and responsibility.  Democracy, therefore, is not a fertile ground 
for the authoritarian principle.”853  
 
Further exploration of how autocratic and democratic forms of law impact the conception 
of ICR could provide a more useful psychological framework for ICL judges determining 
culpability under conditions specific to each regime.  
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Since the 1964 publication of Shklar’s Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials, the 
range of the transnational intellectual enterprise has evolved to include participants from 
international organizations, including the United Nations and its sub-departments, states and 
their representatives, and non-governmental organizations, especially NGOs concerned with 
human rights issues. The range of participants has expanded far beyond the structural limitations 
imposed by a Cold War divide. Technological improvement of communication capabilities 
throughout the globe has especially created a “global consciousness” of the prospect of political 
interconnection through the application of jurisdictional authority over core international crimes.  
As a result of the internet, instantaneous news of state-sponsored killings throughout the 
world may be consumed. The same could be said of international criminal cases, including trials 
conducted under conditions that generally preserve the rule of law. This prospect of global 
communication over the meaning of international criminal responsibility, according to Kelsen, is 
a necessary element of the dynamic construction of this term. Kelsen does not prohibit 
international judges from incorporating “principles of civilization.” In fact, his claim that only 
cases that are not “indifferent in themselves” can be retroactively determined are structured by an 
“international community” that changes over time. Therefore, Shklar’s polemic against Kelsen as 
formal, and hence “a-historical,” is incorrect. Kelsen’s philosophy, I argue, not only can 
accommodate, but necessarily warrants, historical investigation. 
Kelsen is perhaps the most significant theorist of ICR, a founding father of the twentieth 
century discipline of ICL, who marshalled the legal-technical resources to mount a challenge in 
defense of the legal validity of a system whose purpose is the determination of individual 
responsibility by state officials. Kelsen’s pure theory licenses a Kantian constructivist approach 
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to metaethics compatible with cognition of the relationship between once-valid and now-invalid 
legal rules with respect to the application of ICR. Kelsen’s general theory of law and state 
discounts individual agency; his conception of international criminal responsibility—the highest 
authoritative understanding of imputation—returns it to its rightful place. The individual now has 
choice. 
At its most beneficial, law is a transparent medium. It maps the reasons that legal norms or 
rules are coercively authorized, even when retroactively enacted. Transparency about the 
conversion of moral into legal norms within a system reliant on customary laws, judicial 
decision-making, and, early on, the positive law defense of ex post facto lawmaking, according 
to Kelsen, produces the clearest description of the entry points to “the humanization of 
humanitarian law”. Through extensive study of trial transcripts and Kelsen’s academic writings 
on international criminalization in relation to key doctrinal statements of the pure theory of law, I 
have argued that it has become possible to understand the structure of ICR, in accordance with 
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